Λέγω

λέγω, λόγος, ῥη̂μα, λαλέω, λόγιος, λόγιον, ἄλογος, λογικός, λογομαξέω, λογομαχία, ἐκλέγομαι, ἐκλογή, ἐκλεκτός*

λέγω, λόγος, ῥη̂μα, λαλέω

Contents: A. The Words λέγω, λόγος, ῥη̂μα, λαλέω, in the Greek World: 1. λέγω: a. The Basic Meaning of the Root; b. “To gather,” c. “To count,” d. “Toenumerate,” e. “To narrate,” “to say”; 2. λόγος: a. “Collection”; b. “Counting,” “reckoning.” i. “Calculation,” if. “Account,” iii. “Consideration,” “evaluation,” iv. “Reflection,” “ground,” “condition”; c. κατάλογος: “enumeration,” “catalogue”; d. λόγος: “narrative,” “word,” “speech,” etc. 3. ῥη̂μα; 4. λαλέω, λαλιά. B. The Logos in the Greek and Hellenistic World: 1. The Meaning of the Word λόγος in its Multiplicity; 2. The Development of the λόγος Concept in the Greek World: a. The Two Sides of the Concept; b. Heraclitus; c. The Sophists; d. Socrates and Plato; e. Aristotle; 3. The λόγος in Hellenism: a. Stoicism; b. Neo-Platonism; c. The Mysteries; d. The Hermes-Logos-Theology, Hermeticism; 4. The λόγοι of Philo of Alexandria; 5. Hellenistic Logos Speculation and the New Testament. C. The Word of God in the OT; 1. The Hebrew Equivalents of the Greek Terms for Word; 2. The General Use of דָּבָר as a Rendering of λόγος and ῥη̂μα; 3. The דָּבָר of Prophetic Revelation: a. Revelation in Sign; b. Revelation in Sign and Word; c. Dissolution of the Sign; d. The Writing Prophets; 4. The ρβ̀Δ̀ as Revelation of Law; 5. The Divine Word of Creation; 6. The Word in Poetry. D. Word and Speech in the New Testament: 1. Basic and General Aspects of the Use of λέγω/λόγος; 2. More Specific and Technical Meanings; 3. The Sayings of Jesus: a. The Quotation of theSayings; b. The Authority of the Sayings; c. The Appeal to the Word of Jesus outside the Gospels; 4. The Old Testament Word in the New Testament; 5. The Special Word of God to Individuals in the New Testament: a. Simeon; The Baptist; b. The Apostolic Period; c. Jesus; 6. The Early Christian Message as the Word of God (outside the Johannine Writings): a. Statistics; b. Content; 7. The Character and Efficacy of the Early Christian Word (outside the Johannine Writings): a. The Word as God’s Word; b. The Relation of Man to the Word; c. The Word as Spoken Word; 8. The Word in the Synoptic Account of Jesus; 9. The Word in the Synoptic Sayings of Jesus; 10. λόγοσ/λόγοι (του̂ θεου̂) in Revelation; 11. Jesus Christ the λόγος του̂ θεου̂; 12. 1 Jn. 1:1 ff.; 13. The Distinctiveness of the λόγος Saying in Jn. 1:1 ff.; 14. The Concern and Derivation of the λόγος Sayings in the Prologue to John, I: a. The Lack of Speculative Concern; b. The Allusion to Gn. 1:1; c. Other Connections; d. Relation to “Word” Speculations in the Contemporary World; 15. The Concern and Derivation of the λόγος Sayings in the Prologue to John, II: Logos and Torah.

A.     The Words λέγω, λόγος, ῥη̂μα, λαλέω in the Greek World.

It is hardly possible in this context to give a full history of the Greek words for “to say,” “to speak,” “to tell,” “word,” “speech” etc. such as that attempted by J. H. H. Schmidt, I, 1–112, or more briefly E. Hofmann, 120 ff. It must suffice to lay the foundation for the philosophical use of λόγος (→ B.) and for the use of the terms λέγω, λόγος, ῥη̂μα and λαλέω in the OT and NT (→ C.D. → ῥη̂μα, → λαλέω).

1.     λέγω.1

a. The Basic Meaning of the Root. The basic meaning of leg- is “to gather.” This may be seen from the Lat. as well as the Greek (→ b.),2 for both the simple legere (e.g., oleam, nuces, also vestigia, oram) and the compounds colligere, deligere and eligere have kept this meaning,3 which may also be seen in the Albanian mb-l’eθ, “gather,” “reap.”4 To gather is to pick out things which from some standpoint are alike.5 It implies on the one side “succession,” “repetition,” and on the other “judgment,” “logical separation.” Both ideas are broadly developed in λέγω and λόγος.

b. λέγω is very common in the sense “to gather,” e.g., in Hom. ὀστέα (Il., 23, 239), or αἱμασιάς (material for a wall, Od., 18, 359), also mid. “to assemble” (λέξασθαι, Il., 2, 125) and “to collect for oneself” (ὀστέα, Il., 24, 793; ξύλα, 8, 507 and 547; ἄνδρας ἀρίστους, Od., 24, 108 [κρινάμενος, by sifting]): so also the compounds, from the time of Hom. ἀνα—, “to glean” and συλ—, “to gather,” and from the class. period ἀπο— and ἐκ—, “to select.”

c. “To count.” The material or mental gathering one after the other of similar things can often be linked with counting. Thus λέγω can sometimes mean “to count”: Hom.Od., 4, 450 ff.: Proteus followed all the seals and counted them (λέκτο δʼ ἀριθμόν), among them the Greeks (disguised as seals) (ἡμέας πρώτους λέγε).

d. “To enumerate,” i.e., to recall from memory things of the same kind with a view to impartation. So in Hom. and his imitators (ἔργα, κήδεα, “sufferings,” ὀνείδεα, “deeds of shame,” πάντα, ταυ̂τα), also with κατα— (from Hom.Od., 16, 235; 22, 417), “to draw up,” “to enter on a list,” “to enlist” (soldiers). The enumeration usually aims at completeness, hence in Hom. (πα̂σαν) ἀληθείην καταλέξαι acc. to the basic sense of ἀλήθεια: “not concealing or forgetting anything” (→ I, 238), and without obj. with ἀτρεκέως (?), and in Hes.Theog., 627 with ἅπαντα διηνεκέως, “everything thoroughly.”

e. “To narrate,” “to say.” Soon after Hom. a further step was taken, and the complete enumeration of things or events of the same kind became the narration, depiction or recounting of various matters, and then speaking in general.6 Already in Hes.Theog., 27: ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοι̂α, it is better to translate “narrate” than “enumerate.” Then we quickly find many passages in which λέγειν περί τινος means “to speak about something,” Sappho Fr., 149 (Diehl, I, 387) and Xenophanes Fr., 8, 4 (I, 131, 10, Diels5), cf. λέγειν τι κατά τινος, Theogn., 1239 f. (Diehl, I, 180), λέγειν as the opp. of ᾄδειν from Anacr. Fr.&, 32 (Diehl, I, 456), ἅσσα λέγω, Xenophanes Fr., 34, 2 (I, 137, 3, Diels5). From the time of Pindar and the tragedians the word λέγειν is then common in many shades of meaning, with the acc. and infin, from Pind.Pyth., 2, 60: τω̂ν πάροιθε γενέσθαι ὑπέρτερον, with the acc. of person and object, esp. κακὰ (ἀγαθὰ) λέγειν τινά(ς), “to speak evil (good) of (to) someone,” e.g., Hdt., VIII, 61; Aristoph.Eccl., 435 (also εὐ̂, κακω̂ς λέγειν τινά(ς), e.g., Aesch.Ag., 445; Soph.El., 524), with acc. of person and pred., “to name,” e.g., Aesch.Ag., 896: λέγοιμʼ ἂν ἄνδρα τόνδε with many predicates. With more precise content, “to mean or mention someone or something,” e.g., Aristoph.Eq., 1021: ταυτὶ … ἐγὼ οὐκ οἰ̂δʼ ὅ τι λέγει, Aesch.Prom., 946: τὸν πυρὸς κλέπτην λέγω (“I mean”); so also τι, οὐδὲν λέγειν, “to say something, nothing important”: Soph.Oed. Tyr., 1475: λέγω τι; “am I right?”, Aristoph.Thes., 625: οὐδὲν λέγεις, “nonsense!”, Hdt., I, 124: τὰ γράμματα (writing) ἔλεγε τάδε, Plat.Ap., 24e, also πω̂ς λέγεις, “how do you think that?” Also very commonly λέγουσι, λέγεται, λέγονται, “it is said,” Pind.Pyth., 5, 108: λεγόμενον ἐρέω, “I will say something which is commonly said.” Of the orator, Isoc., 3, 8: ῥητορικοὺς καλου̂μεν τοὺς ἐν τῳ̂ πλήθει λέγειν δυναμένους. δεινὸς λέγειν, “a skilled orator,” e.g., Soph.Oed. Tyr., 545. Several compounds are linked with this meaning, e.g., ἀντι—, “to contradict” (from the time of the tragic dramatists), ἀμφι(λ)— “to speak pro and con,” “to debate about something,” “to contest” (esp. in Doric inscr.), προ— “to foretell” (from Hdt. and Soph.), “to proclaim,” “to make known” (from Pindar and the tragedians), διαλέγομαι “to talk together” (from Hdt.). With the transition to the sense “to speak,” “to say,” λέγειν approximates to εἰπει̂ν and the root ῥη (→ 3.).7 Cf. εἰπει̂ν aor. “to make an utterance in speech,” “to express” and λέγειν pres. (“to enumerate”) “to narrate,” “to depict,” “to draw,” e.g., εἰ̂πε, “he made a proposition,” ἔλεγε, “he made a speech,” λέγε, λεγʼ, ὠ̂ ʼγαθέ, “speak on,” Aristoph.Eccl., 213, λέγε δή, “speak about it,” Plat.Phaedr., 271c, εἰπέ, “say it,” “speak,” “mention it” (e.g., εἴπʼ ἄγε μοι καὶ τόνδε, φίλον τέκος, ὅστις ὅδʼ ἐστίν, Hom.Il., 3, 192); cf. also Zeno Eleates Fr., 1 (I, 255, 19, Diels5): ἅπαξ τε εἰπει̂ν καὶ ἀεὶ λέγειν. Because of its durative significance λέγειν is better adapted than the instantaneous εἰπει̂ν to be the opp. of “to do,” “to-listen,” or “to be silent,” cf. Theogn., 1180 (Diehl, I, 177): Fear of the gods hinders man μήθʼ ἕρδειν μήτε λέγειν ἀσεβη̂, Democr. Fr., 86 (II, 161, 5, Diels5): πλεονεξίη (presumption) τὸ πάντα λέγειν, μηδὲν δὲ ἐθέλειν ἀκούειν, Aesch.Sept. c. Theb., 619: φιλει̂ δὲ σιγα̂ν ἢ λέγειν τὰ καίρια.

2.     λόγος.8

Both in general and in detail the development of λόγος is exactly parallel to that of λέγω.

a. The sense “collection” (cf. 1. b.) is attested only of a number of compounds and derivatives,9 e.g., σύλλογος, “gathering” (from Hdt. and the tragedians), παλίλλογος, “assembled again,” Hom.Il., 1, 126, and in class. times often with —λόγος “assembling” (also → σπερμο—λόγος), and —λογει̂ν, and cf. the Hell. → λογεία, λογεύειν.

b. “Counting,” “reckoning.” This sense, which one would expect from 1. c., is very rare, cf. Aristoph. Nu., 619: τη̂ς ἑορτη̂ς μὴ τυχόντες (the gods) κατὰ λόγον τω̂ν ἡμερω̂ν (cf. Hdt., I, 47: ἡμερολογει̂ν τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον, “to count by days”), and the class, γενεαλογει̂ν, “to count the generations” (→ I, 663; 665). Related, but also rare, is λόγος in the sense of “number,” e.g., Hdt., III, 120: ἐν ἀνδρω̂ν λόγῳ, Thuc., VII, 56, 4: ὁ ξύμπας λόγος (?), “the totality,” Aesch.Pers., 343: ὡ̂δʼ ἔχει λόγος (the number previously mentioned). Much more important is the sense of reckoning numbers (though there is nothing corresponding in the case of λέγειν). This is found from the beginning of the class, time, is common throughout the Greek world, and occurs frequently in the inscr. and pap.

i. “Calculation.” It is used for accounts: Hdt., III, 142: λόγον δώσεις τω̂ν μετεχείρισας χρημάτων, 143: ὡς δὴ λόγον τω̂ν χρημάτων δώσων, IG, I2 several times (from c. 434 b.c.; v. Index), IG, IV, 1485 (Epidauros, 4th cent. b.c.), 145, 151, 154, 155: λόγος λάμματος, “total income,” 161, 173, 178, and 1487, 12 and 18: λόγος δαπάνας, “total expenditure.” In Hellenistic Roman Egypt the written calculation becomes the account or balance or financial statement (Preisigke Wört., II, 33 f.).

ii. “Account.” More generally the word can be used for an account of other than financial matters, e.g., Hdt., VIII, 100: The Greeks will inevitably become thy slaves δόντας λόγον (as they are punished) τω̂ν ἐποίησαν νυ̂ν τε καὶ πρότερον, Plat.Polit., 285e: λόγον αἰτει̂ν, Demosth.Or., 30, 15: λόγον ἀπαιτει̂ν, Plat.Prot., 336c: λόγον δου̂ναι καὶ δέξασθαι. → λογίζομαι and derivatives belong under i. and ii.

iii. From expressions like “to take account of” there arises the sense of “consideration,” “review,” “evaluation,” “value,” e.g., Heracl. Fr., 39 (I, 160, 2, Diels5): οὑ̂ πλείων λόγος ἢ τω̂ν ἄλλων, Aesch.Prom., 231 f.: βροτω̂ν … λόγον οὐκ ἔσχεν οὐδέν(α), so esp. the class, phrases ἐν (οὐδενὶ) λόγῳ ποιει̂ν τινα or τι, (ἐλαχίατου, πλείστου, οὐδενὸς) λόγου γίγνεσθαι, etc., ἄξιος λόγου, “worth noting,” (also ἀξιόλογος), cf. also → λόγιος. Weaker, “respect,” e.g., Thuc., III, 46, 4, ἐς χρημάτων λόγον.

iv. From i. and iii. it is an easy step to the meanings “reflection,” “ground,” “condition,”10 which became important in everyday use and in philosophy, e.g., Aesch.Choeph., 515: ἐκ τίνος λόγου, “on what ground,” lit. from what calculation, Leucippus Fr., 2 (II, 81, 5 f., Diels5): Everything takes place ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπʼ ἀνάγκης, “for a specific reason and under the pressure of necessity,” Gorg. Fr., 11a, 37 (II, 303, 18 f., Diels5): ἔχει λόγον, “there is a reason,” Hdt., III, 36: ἐπὶ τῳ̂δε τῳ̂ λόγῳ ὥστε …, “on the ground of deliberation,” i.e., with a purpose, Plat.Gorg., 512c: τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ, “on what cogent ground,” Hdt., VII, 158: ἐπὶ λόγῳ τοιῳ̂δε (“on the condition”) τάδε ὑπίσχομαι, ἐπʼ ᾡ̂ … ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ δὲ λόγῳ οὔτʼ ἂν αὐτὸς ἔλθοιμι οὔτʼ ἂν ἄλλους πέμψαιμι, Democr. Fr., 76 (II, 159, 17, Diels5): νηπίοισιν οὐ λόγος (“rational consideration, understanding or persuasion,” “good counsel”?), ἀλλὰ ξυμφορὴ γίγνεται διδάακαλος, Hdt., I, 132 and elsewhere: λόγος αἱρέει “reason counsels.” On the further development in philosophy → B.; cf. also → ἄλογος → ἁμολογει̂ν, → ἀναλογία.

c. καταλέγειν, “to count (up),” gives us κατάλογος, “list,” “catalogue” (from the time of Aristoph. and Thuc.).

d. “Narrative,” “word,” “speech,” etc. The starting-point, as in the case of λέγειν (→ 1. e.), is “narrative.” Hom. has only this sense, and only in the plur.: Il., 15, 393: τὸν ἔτερπε λόγοις, Od., 1, 56 f.: αἰεὶ δὲ μαλακοι̂σι καὶ αἱμυλίοισι λόγοισιν θέλγει, then Hom. Hymn. Merc., 317 and Hes.Theog., 890, more freely Hes.Op., 78 and 789: αἱμυλίους λόγους. Less clearly Hes.Op., 106: εἰ δʼ ἐθέλεις, ἕτερόν τοι ἐγὼ λόγον (“narrative” or “rational explanation”?) ἐκκορυθώσω (will propound the main heads; there follows a description of the 4 ages of the world).11 Yet immediately after the age of the ancient epic λόγος is used for “what is spoken” in the widest and most varied sense. In so doing it replaces ἔπος, which was taken from the Indo-European12 to denote a “spoken utterance,” the “word” (esp. the “idle” or “mere word” as distinct from the act),13 and → μυ̂θος, the earlier word for “meaningful statement,”14 “fable,” “dictum.”15 ἔπος came to be almost completely limited to the sense of “verse” and μυ̂θος to be used only for (invented or not very well established) “history” in contrast to λόγος, (rationally established and constructed) “speech.” The victory of λόγος is the result of the permeation of philosophical thinking in the transition from the heroic to the class, period.16 Of the many nuances we may emphasise various kinds of utterance like “fable” (Plat.Phaed., 60d: οἱ του̂ Αἰσώπου λόγοι), “legend” (Hdt., II, 62: ἱρὸς λόγος), “ancient proverb” (Pind.Pyth., 3, 80: εἰ δὲ λόγων συνέμεν κορυφὰν [the last sense] … ὀρθὰν ἐπίστᾳ), “stories” (Hdt., I, 184: ἐν τοι̂σι ʼΑσσυρίοισι λόγοισι, Xenophanes, 7, 1 [I, 130, 19, Diels5]: ἄλλον ἔπειμι λόγον, a story in a dream, Hdt., I, 141), “command” (Aesch.Pers., 363: πα̂σιν προφωνει̂ τόνδε ναυάρχοις λόγον), “promise” (Soph.Oed. Col., 651: simple promise as distinct from formal oath), “good or evil reputation” (Pind.Isthm., 5, 13: λόγος ἐσθλός, Eur.Heracl., 165: λόγος κακός), “tradition” (Hdt., III, 32: διξὸς λέγεται λόγος, Soph.Trach., 1: λόγος μὲν ἔστʼ ἀρχαι̂ος ἀνθρώπων φανείς ὡς …, often λόγος ἐστί, “the story is”); “written account,” hence “writing” or part of such (Hdt., VI, 19: μνήμην ἑτέρωθι του̂ λόγου ἐποιησάμην, v. 22: ἐν τοι̂σι ὄπισθε λόγοισι ἀποδέξω, Plat.Parm., 127d: ὁ πρω̂τος λόγος), “speech” as a work of art,” e.g., ἐπιτάφιος λόγος, “funeral oration,” Plat.Menex., 236b; “speech” as distinct from action (Democr. Fr., 145 [II, 171, 4, Diels5]: λόγος ἔργου σκιή; often λόγῳ μὲν … ἔργῳ δέ), or from truth (Lyc., 23: ἵνα μὴ λόγον οἴησθε εἰ̂ναι, ἀλλʼ εἰδη̂τε τὴν ἀλήθειαν), or from silence (Pind. Fr., 180: σιγά is often better than λόγος); λόγοι, “conversation” (εἰς λόγους ἐλθει̂ν, λόγους ποιει̂ν etc.). Formally λόγος is the “utterance of thought in speech” (Plat.Soph., 263e: λόγος—διάνοια) “sentence” (Aristot. De Sophisticis Elenchis, I, p. 165a, 13: the opp. of ὄνομα “word”; among grammarians the μέρη του̂ λόγου are the parts of a sentence or parts of speech), “prose” (Pind.Nem., 6, 30: opp. of ἀοιδαί, Plat.Resp., III, 390a: of ποίησις, poetry). Sometimes the account of a thing and the thing itself merge, so that λόγος can be translated “thing”:17Theogn., 1055 (Diehl, I, 169): λόγον του̂τον ἐάσομεν, Hdt., I, 21: σαφέως προπεπυσμένος πάντα λόγον, VIII, 65: μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ τὸν λόγον του̂τον εἴπῃς, Soph.Oed. Tyr., 684: τίς ἠ̂ν λόγος (682: δόκησις ἀγνὼς λόγων), cf. 699 πρα̂γμα, Isoc., 4, 146: μηδένα λόγον (“material to be recounted”) ὑπολιπει̂ν.

Cf. the compounds and derivatives → ἄλογος, ἀντιλογία, ἀπολογει̂σθαι, → εὐλογει̂ν.

3.     ῥη̂μα.

The root (Ϝ)ερ— (Ϝ)ρη18 only exceptionally in Gk. forms a present, though the other tenses are common: fut. ἐρέω ἐρω̂, aor. pass. ἐρρήθην, Ion εἰρέθην, Hell. ἐρρέθην, perf. εἴρηκα εἴρημαι. Thus the sense is clearly non-durative, “to state specifically.” Of the derivatives19 the same is true esp. of ῥήτρα (Aeolic Ϝ ράτρα), “saying,” “treaty,” and the verbal adj. → ῥητός, “definitely stated,” “expressly laid down.” In related languages the verb is practically never found but the extension is ancient, e.g., Lat. verbum Old Prussian wirds, Lithuanian var̃das (“name”), German Wort. Eng. “word.” ῥη̂μα,20 then, is what is definitely stated (at first usually in the plur.). Thus in solemn announcement, Archiloch.Fr., 52 (Diehl, I, 226): [ὠ̂] Λιπερνη̂τες πολι̂ται, τἀμὰ δὴ ξυνίετε ῥήματ(α) (cf. Aristoph. Pax, 603: ὠ̂ σοφώτατοι γεωργοί …), of military orders in the epigram of Simonides (Fr., 92 [Diehl, II, 94]) on the Spartans who fell at Thermopylae: τοι̂ς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι,21 but with the weaker sense of “statements,” “words” already in Theog., 1152 == 1238b (Diehl, I, 174, 180): Do not change the friend δειλω̂ν ἀνθρώπων ῥήμασι πειθόμενος, Hdt., VIII, 83: τοι̂σι δὲ ῞Ελλησι ὡς πιστὰ δὴ τὰ λεγόμενα ἠ̂ν τω̂ν τηνίων ῥήματα, Pind.Nem., 4, 94: ῥήματα πλέκων. So also in the sing., Pind.Pyth., 4, 277 f.: Of a statement of Hom., Hdt.., VII, 162: ὁ νόος του̂ ῥήματος, τὸ ἐθέλει λέγειν, Plat.Prot., 343b: του̂ Πιττακου̂, 342e: ῥη̂μα ἄξιον λόγου βραχύ (pithy saying in contrast to long speeches, λόγοι). Words as distinct from deeds, Pind.Nem., 4, 6: ῥη̂μα, Thuc., V, 111, 3: Men fall into misfortune because they submit to the ῥη̂μα (previously ὄνομα ἐπαγωγόν, magically enticing word) of expected misfortune. Words as opposed to truth, Plat.Phaed., 102b: οὐχ, ὡς τοι̂ς ῥήμασι λέγεται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν; In Plato’s time grammatical and philosophical thought22 took over the word, at first with a fluid line of demarcation: Plat.Crat., 399b: ῥη̂μα, syntactical connection as distinct from ὄνομα, material or personal connection (cf. Aeschin.Or., 3, 72: ῥη̂μα, the wording of the whole saying, ὄνομα the offensive word in it), 431b: ὄνομα and ῥη̂μα together form the sentence (λόγος), cf. 425a; Theaet., 206d: λόγος is the intimation of the thought μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, Soph., 262a: τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ται̂ς πράξεσιν ὂν δήλωμα (the rendering of acts in speech) ῥη̂μά που λέγομεν … τὸ δέ γʼ ἐπʼ αὐτοι̂ς τοι̂ς ἐκείνας πράττουσι σημει̂ον τη̂ς φωνη̂ς ἐπιτεθὲν (the phonetic sign for the doers of the acts) ὄνομα,23 and this distinction between ῥη̂μα (active word) and ὄνομα (personal and material designation) led to the grammatical use of ῥη̂μα for verb and ὄνομα for noun (from Aristot. Poët., 20, p. 1457a, 11 ff.). Except in this special sense the word does not seem to have lived on in the postclass. period, Ditt. Syll.3, 1175, 5f., 18 f., 36f. (cursing tablet from c. 300 b.c.): ῥη̂μα μοχθηρὸν ἢ πονηρὸν φθένγεσθαι, pap. only from the 3rd cent. a.d.24

4.     λαλέω, λαλιά.

a. λαλέω and related words25 like the Lat. lallus (the “nurse’s crooning”), lallare (“to lull to sleep”), the Germ. lallen and the Eng. “lull” imitate the babbling of small children. Hence to use the word of the speech of adults is a sign of either intimacy or scorn: “to prattle,” Aristoph.Eq., 348 (σεαυτῳ̂), Alexis Fr., 9, 10 (CAF, II, p. 300): λαλει̂ν τι καὶ ληρει̂ν πρὸς αὑτοὺς ἡδέως in a light whisper, Pherecrates Fr., 131, 2 (CAF, I, p. 183): μελιλώτινον (sweet as Melilotus) λαλω̂ν (cf. Fr., 2, 3 [CAF, I, p. 145]);26 “to babble,” Aristoph.Lys., 627: καὶ λαλει̂ν γυναι̂κας οὔσας ἀσπίδος χαλκη̂ς πέρι,, Eccl., 1058: ἕπου … δευ̂ρʼ ἀνύσας καὶ μὴ λάλει. It is found as the opp. of rational normal speech (λέγειν):27 Eupolis Fr., 95 (CAF, I, p. 281): λαλει̂ν ἄριστος, ἀδυνατώτατος λέγειν, and to correct answering: Plat.Euthyd., 287d: λαλει̂ς … ἀμελήσας ἀποκρίνασθαι. So also of animal sounds as compared with human speech, Philemo Fr., 208 (CAF, II, p. 532): ἡ μὲν χελιδὼν τὸ θέρος, ὠ̂ γύναι, λαλει̂,, Plut. De Placitis Philosophorum, V, 20, 4 (II, 909a): λαλου̂σι μὲν γὰρ οὑ̂τοι (apes), οὐ φράζουσι, Theocr.Idyll., 5, 34: of the locust, Aristophon. Fr., 10, 6 (CAF, II, p. 280): of the grasshopper; also the sounds of musical instruments: Anaxandrides Fr., 35 (CAF, II, p. 149): μάγαδιν λαλήσω μικρὸν ἅμα σοι καὶ μέγαν, Aristot. De Audibilibus, p. 801a, 29: διὰ τούτων (flute etc.).

But λαλει̂ν can also be used quite objectively of speech when there is reference to sound rather than meaning, Aristoph.Thes., 267: ἢν λαλῃ̂ς, of a man dressed as a woman,28 Ra., 750 f.: παρακούων δεσποτω̂ν, ἅττʼ ἂν λαλω̂σι, Antiphanes Fr., 171, 2 (CAF, II, p. 80): ἀποπνίξεις δέ με καινὴν πρός με διάλεκτον (speech) λαλω̂ν, Alexis Fr. (CAF, II, p. 369): μετʼ ʼΑττικιστὶ δυναμένου λαλει̂ν. It can even be used of understandable speech, Strato Fr., 1, 45 f. (CAF, III, p. 362): πλὴν ἱκέτευον αὐτὸν (the cook who used many unintelligible words) λαλη̂σαι, Ps.-Plat.Ax., 366d: of a crying infant which cannot yet express in words (λαλη̂σαι) what it wants. “Speak of something” (acc.): Aristoph.Thes., 577 f.: πρα̂γμα λαλούμενον29 (“of which one speaks”). “Ability to speak” as a characteristic of man. Aristot.Probl., XI, 1, p. 899a, 1: Only man λαλει̂, Herond., IV, 32 f.: If it were not a stone statue, one would say: τοὔργον λαλήσει.30 “To speak” as the opp. of “to be silent”: Simonides in Plut.Athen., 3 (II, 346 f.) calls poetry a ζωγραφία λαλου̂σα, and painting a ποίησις σιωπω̂σα, Luc.Vit. Auct., 3: ἡσυχίη μακρὴ καὶ ἀφωνίη καὶ πέντε ὅλων ἐτέων λαλέειν μηδέν.

In the compounds the meaning in the class. period is always “to prattle” or “babble”: δια—, Eur.Cyc., 175, ἐκ—, Eur.Fr., 219, 2 (TGF), Demosth.Or., 1, 26, Hippocr. Jusiurandum (IV, p. 630, Littré), κατα—, Aristoph.Ra., 752, περι—, Aristoph.Eccl., 230, Fr. 376 (CAF, I, p. 490), προσ—, Antiphanes Fr., 218, 3 (CAF, II, p. 107), Heniochus Fr., 4, 3 (CAF, II, p. 432).

b. λαλιά31 is defined by Theophr.Char., 7, 1 as ἀκρασία του̂ λόγου, “excess of speech,” cf. also Ps.-Plat.Def., 416 (with the addition of ἄλογος), i.e., “talk,” “chatter,” Aristoph.Nu., 930 f.: εἴπερ γʼ αὐτὸν σωθη̂ναι χρὴ καὶ μὴ λαλιὰν μόνον ἀσκη̂σαι, Aeschin.Or., 2, 49: ἀποδιατρίβωσι (waste time) τὴν ὑπερόριον (about what is foreign) λαλιὰν ἀγαπω̂ντες ἐν τοι̂ς οἰκείοις πράγμασιν, “garrulity”: Aristoph.Ra., 1069: λαλιὰν ἐπιτηδευ̂σαι καὶ στωμυλίαν.

Debrunner

B.     The Logos in the Greek and Hellenistic World.

1.     The Meaning of the Word λόγος in Its Multiplicity.

Although little used in epic,32 λόγος; achieved a comprehensive and varied significance with the process of rationalisation which characterised the Greek spirit. Indeed, in its manifold historical application one might almost call it symbolic of the Greek understanding of the world and existence.

The etym. enables us to perceive the decisive and, in their συμπλοκή,33 basically significant features of the concept. The noun of λέγειν, λόγος means fundamentally “gathering” or “gleaning” in the selective and critical sense. Cf. Hom.Od., 24, 107 f.: οὐδέ κεν ἄλλως κρινάμενος λέξαιτο κατὰ πτόλιν ἄνδρας ἀρίστους.

Figuratively, but even as mental activity directed to something present, λόγος has the original sense of “counting,” “reckoning,” “explaining.” Emphasising the critical as well as the counting side of λέγειν (cf. συλλέγειν), the use34 of λόγος embraces the following senses.

a. “Counting up,” “recounting” (Hdt., II. 123, Where λόγος refers to the whole narrative), “account” (→ b.), the sum of individual words (ἔπη) to form the comprehensive construct “speech” or “language” (esp. prose as distinct from ποίησις,35 Plat.Resp., III, 390a), “sentence” or “saying.” Because λόγος, as distinct from → μυ̂θος,36 which is a developing or invented narrative or tradition in the poetic or religious sphere, always refers to something material, it is either that which is at issue (Hdt., I, 21; Soph.Trach., 484), or that which is recounted of someone, i.e., good or bad repute (Aesch.Prom., 732; Eur.Phoen., 1251; Heracl., 165), renown (Pind.Nem., 4, 71; Hdt., IX, 78; Heracl. Fr., 39 [I, 160, 2, Diels5]), saga (Pind.Nem., 1,34b), history (Hdt., VI, 137).

b. “Account,” “reckoning,” “result of reckoning” (a) in a more metaphysical sense as the principle or law which can be calculated or discovered in calculation (Heracl.Fr., 1 [I, 150, 1 ff., Diels5]) or often the reason which is the product of thought and calculation (Aesch.Choeph., 515; Leucipp. Fr., 2 [II, 81, 5, Diels5]), the argument or explanation (cf. λόγον διδόναι, “to give an account,” “to account for”; (b) as an economic or commercial term: “reckoning” (συναίρω λόγον, Mt. 18:23; cf. P. Oxy., I. 113, 28; BGU, 775, 19); “cash account” (δημόσιος λόγος), “account” etc. (very frequently in the pap.).37

c. As a technical term in mathematics:38 “proportion,” “relation,” “element” in the sense of Euclid (ed. I. L. Heiberg, II [1884]). V Definitio 3: λόγος ἐστὶ δύο μεγέθων ὁμογενω̂ν ἡ κατὰ πηλικότητά ποια σχέσις, Plat.Tim., 32b; common in Democr.; Plot.Enn., III, 3, 6. Here the orderly and rational character implicit in the term is quite clear. With the interrelation of mathematics and philosophy, λόγος, as the rational relation of things to one another, then acquires the more general sense of “order” or “measure” (Hdt., III, 119; Heracl. Fr., 31 [I, 158, 13, Diels5]; Fr., 45 [I, 161, 2, Diels5]).

d. From the second half of the 5th century it is used subjectively for man’s ratio, his ability to think (synon. with → νου̂ς), “reason” (Democr.Fr., 53 [II, 157, 1 ff., Diels5]), the human “mind” or “spirit,” “thought” (Democr.Fr., 146 [II, 171, 6 ff., Diels5]).

Since λόγος has so many meanings,39 for a right understanding it is important that they all converge into one concept and all-embracing content which is more or less systematically dissected again by later grammarians and rhetoricians,40esp. in the Scholia Marcinns in Artis Dionysianae, 11 (Grammatici Graeci, ed. A. Hilgard, I, 3 [1901], 353, 29–355, 15). Socrates refers back to the material connections present in the concept itself when in Plat.Theaet. he tries to give a progressive explanation of the untranslatable term λόγος, because he wishes to show that it is a significant preliminary stage in the rise of supreme ἐπιστήμη, of which the capacity for λόγον δου̂ναι καὶ δέξασθαι is an important aspect, Plat.Theaet., 206d ff.: τὸ μὲν πρω̂τον εἴη ἂν (sc. ὁ λόγος) τὸ τὴν αὑτου̂ διάνοιαν ἐμφανη̂ ποιει̂ν διὰ φωνη̂ς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων. The λόγος is first, then, the expression of διάνοια in words. It is secondly (206e–208b) the enumeration in correct order of the elements in a subject: τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἑκάστου λόγον εἰ̂ναι (207C). Finally, it is the establishment of the particular, ᾡ̂ ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν, within the κοινόν (208c), i.e., the definition41 and sometimes even the nature or essence.42

By reason of its structure λόγος in the course of its development necessarily entered into relations and parallels and connections and equations with a whole series of basic philosophical terms43 such as → ἀλήθεια (Plat.Phaed., 99e ff.; cf. Heracl.Fr., 1 [I, 150, 1 ff., Diels5]), though it can also stand in confrontation λόγοσ/ἔργον (Thuc., II, 65, 9; Anaxag. Fr., 7 [II, 36, 4, Diels5]) and even antithesis; ἐπιστήμη (Plat.Symp., 211a; Soph., 265c); → ἀρετή (Aristot.Eth. Nic., I, 6, p. 1098a, 7–16; Plut. De Virt. Morali, 3 [II, 441c]: ἀρετή is λόγος and vice versa); → ἀνάγκη (Leucipp. Fr., 2 [II, 81, 5 f., Diels5]); → κόσμος (→ III, 873; 878); → νόμος (II, p. 169, 28f.; III, p. 4, 2 ff., v. Arnim M. Ant., IV, 4; Plot.Enn., III, 2, 4; Heracl.Fr., 114 together with Fr., 2 [I, 176, 5 ff. and 151, 1 ff., Diels5]); → ζωή (Plot.Enn.,VI, 7, 11); → εἰ̂δος and → μορφή (ibid., I, 6, 2 f.; VI, 7, 10 f.); → φύσις; → πνευ̂μα, esp. in the Stoa (λόγος του̂ θεου̂ == πνευ̂μα σωματικόν, II, p. 310, 24 f., v. Arnim); → θεός (Max. Tyr., 27, 8; God is ὁ πάντων τω̂ν ὄντων λόγος, Orig.Cels., V, 14). λόγος and ἀριθμός are also related (Ps.-Epicharm. Fr., 56 [I, 208, 5 f., Diels5]). Acc. to Pythagorean teaching, the nature of things is expressed in numerical relations, and this gives us a close approximation to λόγος (cf. Plut.Comm. Not., 35 [II, 1077b]); Simpl. in Aristot. == Schol. in Aristot. (ed. C. A. Brandis [ 1836]), p. 67a, 38 ff.: ἀριθμοὺς μὲν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ λόγους ἐν τῃ̂ ὕλῃ ὠνόμαζον τὰ αἴτια ταυ̂τα τω̂ν ὄντων ᾑ̂ ὄντα (cf. Plot.Enn., V, 1, 5).

If one may put it thus, the imaginary basic meaning, the ambiguity or wealth of relations (→ 84) sustained by an ultimate unity of sense intrinsic to λόγος, makes the word a philosophical term κατʼ ἐξοχήν, and displays the philosophical content which from the very first underlies the very nature of the Greek language.

It should not be overlooked, however, that for the Greeks λόγος is very different from an address or a word of creative power.44 No matter how we construe it as used by the Greeks,45 it stands in contrast to the “Word” of the OT and NT. Naturally, concrete utterance is part of its content, especially when it is employed in an emphatic sense, as in human words of command (Hdt., IX, 4; Soph.Oed. Col., 66), divine or oracular sayings (Pind.Pyth., 4, 59), λόγοι μαντικοί (Plat.Phaedr., 275b), or philosophical dialogue. But there is implied the connected rational element in speech, which seeks to discover the issue itself in the demonstration,46 as distinct from the harmony and beauty of sound, for which the Greek uses ἔπος or ῥη̂μα, and especially in contrast to ῥη̂μα as the individual and more emotional expression or saying, though this does, of course, fall into a pattern, so that the fact of speech is the essential thing,47 and ῥη̂μα thus denotes the word as expressed will,48 as distinct from the explicatory element in λόγος According to the acute definition of Aristot. (De Interpretatione, p. 16b, 26), λόγος is a φωνὴ σημαντική, a “significant utterance.” Expressions like τί λέγεις; (“what is the meaning of what you say?”) point to the fact that the essential thing is, not the saying, but the meaning. λέγειν cannot be used for “to command,” or “to address,” or “to utter a word of creative power.” λόγος is a statement (ἀπόφανσις, ibid, p. 17a, 22) whether something ὑπάρχει or μὴ ὑπάρχει (p. 17a, 23). Hence the explanatory words are ἀποφαίνεσθαι (to cause something to be seen, p. 17a, 27); δηλου̂ν (p. 17a, 16; cf. Pol., I, 2, p. 1253a, 14: ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῳ̂ δηλου̂ν ἐστιν); (λέγειν) τι κατά τινος (p. 17a, 21;). “This causing of something to be seen for what it is, and the possibility of being orientated thereby, are what Aristotle defines as ‘word’ (λόγος).”49

It simply illustrates this specific use if in the Gk. magic pap. λόγος (cf. → πρα̂ξις) is an important tt. for the magical song or prayer or incantation of powerful demons, Preis. Zaub., I, 156; III, 3 and 17.50 In this connection we may cite some wholly nonGreek meanings of which there are no examples whatever in secular Gk. Thus Philo speaks of the ζηλωτικὸς λόγος, Leg. All., III,242, the “spirit of zeal,” and Jesus in Mt. 8:16 ἐξέβαλεν τὰ πνεύματα λόγῳ. The Jew Aristobulus is also using a singular turn of phrase when he has the word λόγος in the Jewish sense for that which is spoken essentially and primarily: Eus.Praep. Ev., XIII, 12, 3: δει̂ γὰρ λαμβάνειν τὴν θείαν φωνὴν οὐ ῥητὸν λόγον ἀλλʼ ἔργων κατασκευάς.

For the creative Word of God in the OT sense cf. Sir. 42:15: ἐν λόγοις κυρίου τὰ ἔργα αὐτου̂; in contrast, the classical Gk. λόγος concept is set in characteristic antithesis to ἔργον, cf. Thuc., II, 65, 9; Anaxag.Fr., 7 (II, 36, 4 f., Diels5). It is interesting that Wis. and the LXX do not use ῥη̂μα for the Word of creation and revelation; it is obviously too narrow. Instead, they have the more profound and comprehensive λόγος, though in the OT, as later in the NT (→ n. 144), λόγος and ῥη̂μα are closer to one another (cf. the non-Gk. combinations of the two in PhiloPoster. C., 102; Leg. All., III, 173; Cl. Al.Strom., VI, 3, 34, 3: ἡ κυριακὴ φωνὴ λόγος ἀσχημάτιστος· ἡ ‹γὰρ› του̂ λόγου δύναμις, ῥη̂μα κυρίου φωτεινόν).

2.     The Development of the λόγος Concept in the Greek World.

a. The Two Sides of the Concept. We shall pursue the distinctive Gk. use according to two aspects which are still significantly undivided at the startingpoint in Heraclitus (→ b.).

First, we have in view the use of λόγος for word, speech, utterance, revelation, not in the sense of something proclaimed and heard, but rather in that of something displayed, clarified, recognised, and understood; λόγος as the rational power of calculation in virtue of which man can see himself and his place in the cosmos; λόγος as the indication of an existing and significant content which is assumed to be intelligible; λόγος as the content itself in terms of its meaning and law, its basis and structure. Secondly, we have in view λόγος as a metaphysical reality and an established term in philosophy and theology, from which there finally develops in later antiquity, under alien influences, a cosmological entity and hypostasis of the deity, a δεύτερος θεός.

It is presupposed as self-evident by the Greek that there is in things, in the world and its course, a primary λόγος, an intelligible and recognisable law, which then makes possible knowledge and understanding in the human λόγος. But this λόγος is not taken to be something which is merely grasped theoretically. It claims a man. It determines his true life and conduct. The λόγος is thus the norm (→ νόμος). For the Greek, knowledge is always recognition of a law. Therewith it is also fulfilment of this law.

b. Heraclitus. Because the same λόγος constitutes the being of both the cosmos and man, it is the connecting principle which forms the bridge and possibility of understanding51 1. between man and the world, and also between men (in their political order, → 82), 2. between man and God, and finally in later antiquity 3. between this world and the world above. It is in Heraclitus52 (Fr., 1 [I, 150, 1 ff., Diels5]) that the λόγος is first stated to be that which establishes man in his true being in virtue of this interconnection (sense c. → 78): του̂ δὲ λόγου του̂δʼ ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκου̂σαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρω̂τον· γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν ἐοίκασι, πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων, ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγευ̂μαι κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ θράζων ὅκως ἔχει Cf. also Fr., 2 (I, 151, 1 ff., Diels5): διὸ δει̂ ἕπεσθαι τω̂ι κοινω̂ι· ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινός. του̂ λόγου δʼ ἐόντος ξυνου̂ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν. The λόγος is here the word. speech, or content of speech or book, but also what is meant by the word or in the work, the truth; for only of it can one say that it is eternally valid (ἀεὶ ἐόντος), and that everything takes place in its sense. Philosophical knowledge, the λόγος or → νου̂ς → σύνεσις, is thus for Heraclitus the means to evoke the words and works of men. Both speech and action follow from it. This λόγος of Heraclitus is to be understood and interpreted as an oracular word. For men are bound by the λόγος and yet they do not see it. They live as though there were an ἰδία πρόνησις (Fr., 2). Heraclitus connects this λόγος with the ξυνόν (→ κοινὸς λόγος), Fr., 2. It is the transcendent and lasting order in which eternal flux occurs, binding the individual to the whole. It is the cosmic law53 which is comprehended by the λόγος which grows in the soul (Fr., 115 [I, 176, 10, Diels5]: ψυχη̂ς ἐστι λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὔξων, cf. Fr., 45 [I, 161, 1 ff., Diels5]); as such it is the opposite of every individual or private δόξα. The deepest ground of the → ψυξή, which none can wholly plumb, is the λόγος. “He who hears the λόγος does not merely accept a claim which springs out of the situation and encounters him. He is aware of a claim, but in such a way that he truly understands it only if he realises that basically it is he himself who must raise the claim to transcend the ἰδία φρόνησις,54 Fr., 50 (I, 161, 16 f., Diels5): οὐκ ἐμου̂, ἀλλὰ του̂ λόγου ἀκούσαντας55 ὁμολογει̂ν σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν πάντα εἰ̂ναι.

c. The Sophists. After Heraclitus the word develops in Gk. thought, and the unity of meaning which distinguishes Heraclitus is disrupted. By way of the sense of reckoning and gradual synonymity with → νου̂ς, the λόγος now becomes predominantly the rational power set in man, the power of speech and thought. In political life it plays a decisive part as the means of persuasion and direction. Only in Stoicism does it reemerge as a universal, cosmic, and religious principle.

The great representatives of this development are the Sophists, who not only treated the λόγος apart from any norm or connection with given interests or situations even to the τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείσσω ποιει̂ν (Plat.Ap., 18b),56 but who were also the first to work out a theory57 of the λόγος.

In the political life of 4th and 5th century democracy, which was strongly marked by ratio, the λόγος naturally took on great significance. In Helenae Encomium, 8 (Fr., 11 [II, 290, 17 ff., Diels5]), Gorg. extols the psychagogic power of the λόγος, which is here almost personified:58 λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν, ὃς σμικροτάτωι σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτωι θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελει̂· δύναται γὰρ καὶ φόβον παυ̂σαι καὶ λύπην ἀφελει̂ν καὶ χαρὰν ἐνεργάσασθαι καὶ ἔλεον ἐπαυξη̂σαι, and the one mastered by it is a δου̂λος of the λόγος (cf. Plat.Phileb., 58b). The λόγος may take the most varied turns in detail, e.g., a pedagogic in Isoc. Or., 3, 7: τούτῳ, (sc. τῳ̂ λόγῳ) καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς ἐξελέγχομεν καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἐγκωμιάζομεν, and even a creatively cultural, ibid., 3, 6 ff.; Or., 15, 254: καὶ σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ διʼ ἡμω̂ν μεμηχανημένα λόγος ἡμι̂ν ἐστιν ὁ συγκατασκευάσας. Only the λόγος makes possible the political life which raises us above the level of the beasts. All cultural achievements are owed to it: οὐ μόνον του̂ θηριωδω̂ς ζη̂ν ἀπηλλάγημεν ἀλλὰ καὶ συνελθόντες πόλεις ᾠκίσαμεν καὶ νόμους ἐθέμεθα καὶ τέχνας εὕρομεν (loc. cit.).59 Ratio, oratio, and normative force are comprised in the term: οὑ̂τος γὰρ περὶ τω̂ν δικαίων καὶ τω̂ν ἀδίκων καὶ τω̂ν καλω̂ν καὶ τω̂ν αἰσχρω̂ν ἐνομοθέτησεν. Thus the ψυχη̂ς ἀγαθη̂ς καὶ πιστη̂ς εἴδωλον is finally ψυχη̂ς ἀγαθη̂ς καὶ πιστη̂ς εἴδωλον (ibid., 255).

d. Socrates and Plato. As Socrates and Plato transcend the more individualistic λόγος of the Sophists by pursuing this way to its logical end, a new and deeper conception of the λόγος arises. This is the thought, widespread in the Gk. world, of the power of the λόγος, if only it is linked to the κοινὸς λόγος, to establish fellowship by making possible agreement on the basis of the matter, ὁμολογία.60 The constantly recurring τί λέγεις; in the Socratic dialogues expresses the fact that here common speech with its words and concepts is recognised, or presupposed, as the common basis. The λόγος as the basic fact in all life in society is the decisive point in the politics of Socrates and Plato, just as there is a kind of pre-existent harmony between the λόγος of the thinking soul and the λόγος of things. Hence man must be on guard lest he become an enemy of the word as another might become the enemy of men. No greater misfortune can befall a man, and both hatred of the word and enmity against men proceed from the same disposition (Plat.Phaed., 89d; 90d e: Hence μὴ παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς τω̂ν λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἰ̂ναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μα̂λλον ὅτι ἡμει̂ς οὔπω ὑγιω̂ς ἔχομεν …, 99e: ἔδοξε δή μοι χρη̂ναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπει̂ν τω̂ν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν). The truth is attained when the λόγος interprets phenomena; but the λόγος must proceed from them. The Socratic-Platonic understanding and use of λόγος rests on this duality. λόγος is thinking as the διά—λογος of the soul with itself (Plat.Soph., 263e: διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν· πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τη̂ς ψυχη̂ς πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνη̂ς γιγνόμενος, cf. Theaet., 189e). Here Plato simply expresses philosophically the twofold content found in the word itself. By contrast with the eristic and destructive λόγος of the Sophists, which merely represents what is always The possible failure of the λόγος, the τω̂ν λόγων αὐτω̂ν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος (Plat.Phileb., 15d), since it is not oriented ἀφθόνως to the matter, the λόγος is here (Plat.Soph., 259c–264) developed as τω̂ν ὄντων ἔν τι γενω̂ν (Soph., 260a), and as such it makes philosophy possible because it is linked to being as to a great κοινωνία. λόγος and κοινωνία belong closely together, Soph. 262c (cf. 259e): τότω δʼ ἥρμοσέν τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθὺς ἡ πρώτη συμπλοκή. The συμπλοκή of ὀνόματα and ῥήματα, however small, at once produces a λόγος which has its essence in the fact that it does not merely speak (ὀνομάζει) words but τι περαίνει—262d—that it says (λέγει) something, a matter, a being (and therewith a sense). As ἀληθὴς or πιστὸς λόγος (Dio Chrys.Or., 45, 3), it expresses what is as it is.61 Once again, then, δηλου̂ν and σημαίνειν are correlative to λόγος (Soph., 261d/e).

Thought, word, matter,62 nature, being and norm (cf. the Identity of being and thought in Parm.) are all brought into a comprehensive interrelation in the λόγος concept. Thus Plato in Crito, 46b/d can say of the λόγοι of Socrates that they were not just λόγοι ἕνεκα λόγου, a mere speaking, nor were they παιδιά and φλυαρία (46d), but they were essence and deed, since they stood up even in face of death.63

e. Aristotle. Aristotle sums up once again the classical understanding of human existence in his statement: λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τω̂ν ζῴων, Polit., I, 2, p. 1253a, 9 f. Man has the word in the twofold sense that what he does and does not do are determined by the word or understanding, and that he himself speaks the word, achieving understanding and speech64 (Aristot.Eth. Nic., I, 6, p. 1098a, 4 f.: τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δʼ ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον The specific ἔργον ἀνθρώπου is the ψυχη̂ς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον (ibid., a 7).65 The λόγος is the source of the unique ἀρετή (Eth. Nic., II, 6, p. 1106b, 36 ff.) of man,66 and consequently of his εὐδαιμονία.

3.     The λόγος in Hellenism.

a. Stoicism. In Stoicism67 λόγος is a term for the ordered and teleologically orientated nature of the world (Diog. L., VII, 74 [149] λόγος, καθʼ ἃν ὁ κόσμος διεξάγεται). It is thus equated with the concept of God (→ θεός, III, 75; cf. Zeno in Diog. L., VII, 68 [134] [== I, p. 24, 7 f., v. Arnim] τὸ δὲ ποιου̂ν τὸν ἐν αὐτῃ̂ [sc. τῃ̂ ὕλῃ] λόγον τὸν θεόν), with πρόνοια, εἱμαρμένη, with → κόσμος, → νόμος, → φύσις—acc. to Chrysipp. εἱμαρμένη is the Διὸς λόγος (Plut.Stoic. Rep., 47 [II, 1056c]) or ὁ του̂ κόσμου λόγος or λόγος τω̂ν ἐν κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων (II, 264, 18 ff., v. Arnim).68 As such it can no longer be rendered actively as concrete speech which is uttered on a meaningful basis, as in Socratic-Platonic philosophy, It can be identified only passively with the (cosmic) law of reason. God is ὁ πάντων τω̂ν ὄντων λόγος, Orig.Cels., V, 14, and the basis of the unity of this world (εἱ̂ς λόγος ὁ ταυ̂τα κοσμω̂ν καὶ μία πρόνοια ἐπιτροπεύουσα, Plut.Is. et Os., 67 [II, 377 f.]; ὁ τὴν οὐσίαν τω̂ν ὅλων διοικω̂ν λόγος, M. Ant., VI, 1). By assimilation to popular religion this world logos is equated with Zeus, as in the well-known hymn of Cleanthes, Fr., 537 (I, p. 122, 7, v. Arnim): ὥσθʼ ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα. It is the principle which creates the world, i.e., which orders and constitutes it (ὁ του̂ κόσμου λόγος, Chrysipp. [II, p. 264, 18 f., v. Arnim]; M. Ant., IV, 29, 3), which makes it a ζῳ̂ον λογικόν (II, p. 191, 34 f., v. Arnim). It is the power which extends throughout matter (ὁ διʼ ὅλης τη̂ς οὐσίας διήκων λόγος, M. Ant., V, 32) and works immanently in all things. The world is a grand unfolding of the λόγος, which is, of course, represented materially (Diog. L., VII, 35 [56]: πα̂ν γὰρ τὸ ποιου̂ν σω̂μά ἐστιν) as → πυ̂ρ, → πνευ̂μα (II, p. 310, 24 f., v. Arnim), or αἰθήρ. But as the organic power which fashions unformed and inorganic matter, which gives growth to plants and movement to animals, it is the λόγος σπερματικός (Zeno [I, p. 28, 26, v. Arnim]). That is, it is a seed which unfolds itself, and this seed is by nature reason. As λόγος ὀρθός, the cosmic law, the → νόμος of the world as well as the individual, it gives men the power of knowledge (Pos. in Sext. Emp.Math., VII, 93: ἡ τω̂ν ἅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενου̂ς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι του̂ λόγου, cf. Diog. L., VII, 52) and of moral action (M. Ant., IV, 4, 1: ὁ προστακτικὸς τω̂ν ποιητέων ἢ μὴ λόγος κοινός). As all powers proceed from the λόγος, they all return to it again, M. Ant., IV, 21, 2: ψυχαὶ … μεταβάλλουσι καὶ χέονται καὶ ἐξάπτονται εἰς τὸν τω̂ν ἅλων σπερματικὸν λόγον ἀναλαμβανόμεναι. The particular logos of man is only part of the great general logos, V, 27; Epict.Diss., III, 3; M. Ant., VII, 53: κατὰ τὸν κοινὸν θεοι̂ς καὶ ἀνθρώποις λόγον, which achieves awareness in man, so that through it God and man, or the sage or philosopher as the true man who alone has the ὀρθὸς λόγος and who thus lives ἀκολουθω̂ν τῃ̂ φύσει (PhiloEbr., 34) are combined into a great κόσμος (II, p. 169, 28 f., v. Arnim: κοινωνίαν ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους [sc. ἀνθρώποις καὶ θεοι̂ς] διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν, ὅς ἐστι φύσει νόμος. The duality of λόγος as reason and speech (opp. πάθος) develops in Stoic doctrine inwardly into the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and outwardly into the λόγος προφορικός (Sext. Emp.Pyrrh. Hyp., I, 65). An extension of content signficant for later development is to be found in the equation of λόγος with φύσις (ὁ κοινὸς τη̂ς φύσεως λόγος, II, p. 269, 13, v. Arnim; M. Ant., IV, 29, 3) as a creative power. In the period which followed this aspect was increasingly emphasised, e.g., in Plut.Is. et Os., 45 (II, 369a): δημιουργὸν ὕλης ἕνα λόγον καὶ μίαν πρόνοιαν. In the Stoic λόγος the rational power of order and the vital power of conception are merged in one (Diog. L., VII, 68 [135 f.] == II, 180, 2 ff., v. Arnim).

b. Neo-Platonism. In debate with Stoicism Neo-platonism69 championed a developed logos doctrine. Here, too, the λόγος is a shaping power which lends form and life to things and is thus closely related to εἰ̂δος and → μορφή (Plot.Enn., I, 6, 2. 3. 6; III, 3, 6; IV, 3, 10), → φω̂ς (ibid., II, 4, 5) and → ζωή (ibid., VI, 7, 11: εἰ δὴ κατὰ λόγον δει̂ τὸ ποιου̂ν εἰ̂ναι ὡς μορφου̂ν, τί ἂν εἴη; ἢ ψυχὴ ποιει̂ν πυ̂ρ δυναμένη· του̂τό δʼ ἐστι ζωὴ καὶ λόγος, ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἄμφω). Life is artistically fashioning power. τίς ὁ λόγος; it is οἱ̂ον ἔκλαμψις (irradiation) ἐξ ἀμφοι̂ν, νου̂ καὶ ψυχη̂ς (ibid., III, 2, 16). Where it works, everything is permeated (λελόγωται), i.e., shaped (μεμόρφωται) by the λόγος, III, 2, 16. Nature is life and λόγος and the working power of form, III, 8, 2: … τὴν φύσιν εἰ̂ναι λόγον, ὃς ποιει̂ λόγον ἄλλον γέννημα αὑτου̂. Indeed, the whole world is λόγος, and all that is in it is λόγος, III, 2, 2, the former as the pure power of form in the intelligible world, the latter in admixture with matter to the final λόγος ὁ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν τὴν ὁρωμένην ἔσχατος ἤδη καὶ νεκρός, which οὐκέτι ποιει̂ν δύναται ἄλλον, and which was unknown to Stoicism in contrast to Neo-platonism, III, 8, 2. Thus Plot., like John’s Gospel, can say in III, 2, 15: ἀρχὴ οὐ̂ν λόγος καὶ πάντα λόγος. Sometimes this is regarded as a unity, an emanation from → Νου̂ς, III, 2, 2: του̂το δὲ λόγος ἐκ νου̂ ῥυείς. τὸ γὰρ ἀπορρέον ἐκ νου̂ λόγος, καὶ ἀεὶ.—not in singular historicity—ἀπορρει̂ ἕως ἂν ᾐ̂ παρὼν ἐν τοι̂ς οὐ̂σι λόγος … του̂ δὲ λόγου ἐπʼ αὐτοι̂ς τὴν ἁρμονίαν καὶ μίαν τὴν σύνταξιν εἰς τὰ ὅλα ποιουμένου … του̂ δὲ λόγου ἐπʼ αὐτοι̂ς τὴν ἁρμονίαν καὶ μίαν τὴν σύνταξιν εἰς τὰ ὅλα ποιουμένου, sometimes as a plurality by which it brings into effect the multiplicity of phenomena; for it is πολὺς καὶ πα̂ς, V, 3, 16, εἱ̂ς and πολύς, VI, 7, 14. Indeed, the one λόγος divides into warring opposites, III, 2, 16: ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ἕνα του̂τον λόγον ἐξ ἐναντίων λόγων εἰ̂ναι ἕνα τὴν σύστασιν αὐτῳ̂ καὶ οἱ̂ον οὐσίαν τη̂ς τοιαύτης ἐναντιώσεως, the antithesis securing its consistence and essentiality. But the formative principle is not, as in Stoicism, τὸ ὑγρὸν ἐν σπέρμασιν; it is τὸ μὴ ὁρώμενον· του̂το δὲ ἀριθμὸς (ideal measure) καὶ λόγος, V, 1, 5. the μέτρον, II, 4, 8. By his λόγος man can break free from the φύσεως γοητεία IV, 4, 43 f., and attain to the λόγος ἀληθής, the truth of being, IV, 4, 12; VI, 7, 4 ff. But the human λόγος does not lead to an ἀκούειν. It is the ἐκ τω̂ν λόγων ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν … παιδαγωγω̂ν λόγος, VI, 9, 4. As such it is not supreme or final. For what one sees in mystic vision is οὐκέτι λόγος, ἀλλὰ μει̂ζον λόγου καὶ πρὸ λόγου, VI, 9, 10.

c. The Mysteries. In connection with deities of revelation the λόγος takes on esp. in the Hellen. mysteries an enhanced religious significance as → ἱερὸς λόγος “sacred history,” “holy and mysterious doctrine,” “revelation,” in a sense not found elsewhere in secular Gk. The ἱερός here belongs essentially to the content and is not just traditional. Hdt., II, 51 already appeals to a ἱρόν τινα λόγον of the Cabiri mysteries in Samothrace (Syr. Dea, 15, 4); and we hear of sacred history in the Dionysus cult, among the Pythagoreans (Iambl.Vit. Pyth., 28, 146: Πυθαγόραν συντάξαι τὸν περὶ θεω̂ν λόγον, ὃν καὶ ἱερὸν διὰ του̂το ἐπέγραψεν), cf. the ἱερὸς λόγος of the Orphics70 (Suid., s.v. ʼΟρφεύς, No. 654 [Adler]). In the Isis hymn of Andros, v. 12 (ed. W. Peek [1930]) there is ref. to the sacred doctrine of the mysteries of Isis which induces pious awe in the initiate, and in Plut.Is. et Os., 2 (II, 351 f.) in connection with theological logos speculation, we read of the ἱερὸς λόγος, ὃν ἡ θεὸς [sc. Isis] συνάγει καὶ συντίθησι, καὶ παραδίδωσι (!) τοι̂ς τελουμένοις <διὰ> θειώσεως, and for which δεισιδαιμονία and περιεργία are not enough, 3 (II, 352b). Osiris is the half personified λόγος created by Isis, a spiritual reflection of the world (Is. et Os., 54). In the ῾Ερμου̂ του̂ τρισμεγίστου ἱερὸς λόγος (Corp. Herm., III heading [acc. to Reitzenstein Poim.]) Hermes tells how by God’s mercy he became λόγος and hence υἱὸς θεου̂. As a special gift of God (XII, 12. 13) and as λόγος τέλειος this ἱερὸς λόγος71 leads to the mystery of union with the deity (IX, 1; XII, 12). Indeed, the λόγος can even be equivalent to → μυστήριον or τελετή (XIII, 13b: the λόγος is the παράδοσις of παλιγγενεσία), and the initiate himself is the personified λόγος θεου̂, cf. I, 6 (Reitzenstein Poim.): τὸ ἐν σοὶ βλέπον (!) καὶ ἀκου̂ον λόγος κυρίου ἐστίν, which extols God in the regenerate and in the λόγος offers Him all things as λογικὴ → θυσία, XIII, 18. 21.

λόγος as prayer, Aesch.Choeph., 509; in connection with → εὐχή it plays a certain role in mystical speculation inasmuch as it is the only worthy way to enter into relation with God, cf. Sallust., 16 (ed. a.d. Nock, [1926]): αἱ μὲν χωρὶς θυσιω̂ν εὐχαὶ λόγοι μόνον εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ μετὰ θυσιω̂ν ἔμψυχοι λόγοι· του̂ μὲν λόγου τὴν ζωὴν δυναμου̂ντος, τη̂ς δὲ ζωη̂ς τὸν λόγον ψυχούσης). Apollonius of Tyana (in Eus.Dem. Ev., III, 3, 11) teaches that all genuine prayer must be offered through the λόγος; true honouring of God takes place μόνῳ … τῳ̂ κρείττονι λόγῳ (λέγω δὲ τῳ̂ μὴ διὰ στόματος ἰόντι), and can be known only λόγῳ (Schol. on Epic. Sententia, 1 in Diog. L., X, 31 [139]: τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητούς). The λόγος shows man the upward way, Max. Tyr., XI, 10: ἐκλαθόμενος μὲν τω̂ν κάτω οἰμωγω̂ν … καὶ δοξω̂ν …, ἐπιτρέψας δὲ τη̂ν ἡγεμονίαν αὐτους λόγῳ ἀληθει̂ καὶ ἔρωτι ἐρρωμένῳ· τῳ̂ μὲν λόγῳ φράζοντι ᾑ̂ χρὴ ἰέναι …, Plot.Enn., VI, 9, 4: παιδαγωγω̂ν λόγος. On this way the λόγος ends in mystical σιωπή, Philostr.Vit. Ap., I, 1: διδάσκαλον εὑρὼν σιωπη̂ς λόγον. Cf. VI, 11 (245): διδάσκαλον εὑρὼν σιωπη̂ς λόγον, Plot.Enn., III, 8, 6: ὃ γὰρ ἐν ψυχῃ̂ λαμβάνει λόγῳ οὔσῃ, τί ἂν ἄλλο ἢ λόγος σιωπω̂ν εἴη; In Plot. God is λόγου κρείττων, and in Plut.Is. et Os., 75 (II, 381b) φωνη̂ς γὰρ ὁ θει̂ος λόγος ἀπροσδεής ἐστι.72

d. The Hermes-Logos-Theology; Hermeticism. Almost all aspects of the philosophical logos concept occur in Gk. theology, personified and comprehended in the figure of the god Hermes73 and others. If in Gk. theology Helios, Pan, Isis etc.74 are the λόγος as well as Hermes, there is no implied incarnation of the λόγος but the equation of a revealing and cosmogonic principle with one of the deities of popular religion, This is the kind of identification which is often found in, e.g., the theological system of Stoicism (Zeus-Λόγος, Isis-θω̂ς, Isis-Δικαιοσύνη, Isis-Γένεσις, etc.). In other words, a concept is hypostatised as a god, or identified with a god. There is no question of the divine word of power and creation becoming man, incarnate. This kind of Hermes-Logos-theology is to be found in Cornut.Theol. Graec., 16 (cf. Diog. L., VII, 1, 36 [49]: τυγξάνει δὲ ὁ ʼΕρμη̂ς ὁ λόγος ὤν, ὃν ἀπέστειλαν πρὸς ἡμα̂ς ἐξ οὐρανου̂ οἱ θεοί, μόνον τὸν ἄνθρωπον τω̂ν ἐπὶ γη̂ς ζῴων λογικὸν ποιήσαντες … ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ σῴζειν μα̂λλον γέγονεν ὁ λόγος,75 ὅθεν καὶ τὴν ῾Yγίειαν αὐτῳ̂ συνῴκισαν … παραδέδοται δὲ καὶ κήρυξ θεω̂ν καὶ διαγγέλλειν αὐτὸν ἔφασαν τὰ παρʼ ἐκείνων τοι̂ς ἀνθρώποις, κη̂ρυξ μέν, ἐπειδὴ διὰ φωνη̂ς γεγωνου̂ παριστᾳ̂ τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον σημαινόμενα ται̂ς ἀκοαι̂ς, ἄλλελος δέ, ἐπεὶ τὸ βούλημα τω̂ν θεσ̀ν γιγνώσκομεν ἐκ τω̂ν ἐνδεδομένων ἡμι̂ν κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐννοιω̂ν. New and significant here is the role of Hermes as a mediator and revealer who as κη̂ρυξ and αγγελος declares and makes known to us the will of the gods. He thus has a soteriological role in so far as the λόγος is present for σώ̂ζειν.76 Indeed. Hermes is the great power of conception and creation, the λόγος σπερματικός of the Stoa, honoured under the image of the Phallos:77 γόνιμος ὁ λόγος καὶ τέλειός ἐστιν, and he finally rises to the level of the comprehensive κοινὸς λόγος: διὰ δὲ τὸ κοινὸν αὐτὸν εἰ̂ναι καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔν τε τοι̂ς ἀνθρώποις πα̂σι καὶ ἐν τοι̂ς θεοι̂ς. It is interesting to see how in later antiquity the λόγος concept, which derives originally from the cultural and intellectual sphere, sinks back increasingly into the sphere of the natural which it was once fashioned to oppose. Thus in Hellenistic mysticism λόγος is essentially a cosmic and creative potency, the guide and agent of knowledge, increasingly represented as a religious doctrine of salvation, the revealer of what is hidden.78

Under the influence of ancient Egyptian theology this philosophical and noetic concept ends, therefore, in the mystico-religious speculations of Hermeticism79 concerning creation and revelation. The λόγος comes forth from → Νου̂ς (Corp. Herm., I, 5a: the ἐκ του̂ φωτὸς προελθὼν λόγος ἅγιος ἐπέβη τῃ̂ ὑγρᾳ̂ φύσει). It is the son of God (I, 6: ὁ ἐκ νοὸς φωτεινὸς λόγος is the υἱὸς Θεους). It brings order and form into the world as its δημιουργός: Suid., s.v. ʼΕρμη̂ς, Ὁ Τρισμέγιστος, No. 3038 (Adler): Ὁ γὰρ λόγος αὐτους παντέλειος ὢν καὶ γόνιμος καὶ δημιουργικός, ἐν γονίμῳ φύσει πεσὼν καὶ γονίμῳ ὕδατι, ἔγκυον τὸ ὕδωπ ἐποίησε. Almost all the divine attributes are ascribed to it as such. But as the sum of all the δυνάμεις of the supreme deity it is still an intermediary making contact between God and matter, and also between God, the father of the λόγος, and created being, man. The idea of an intermediate λόγος is further developed in the concept of the father-son relation, cf. Schol. on Ael. Arist., III, p. 564, 19 ff., Dindorf. Thus the λόγος is also the son of Hermes, related to Hermes as Hermes is to the supreme deity, Zeus. In accordance with this intermediate position in creation Horus/Osiris in Plut.Is. et Os., 53 (II, 373a/b) is not καθαρός and εἰλικρινής, οἱ̂ος ὁ πατὴρ λόγος αὐτὸς καθʼ ἑαυτὸν ἀμιγὴς καὶ ἀπαθής, ἀλλὰ νενοθευμένος τῃ̂ ὕλῃ διὰ τὸ σωματικόν There is a graded connection which in the Hermetic conception of a world organism is elucidated in the thought of the image (→ εἰκών): The λόγος is an εἰκών of God, and man is an image of the λόγος, Cl. Al.Strom., V, 14, 91, 5: ἐκὼν μὲν γὰρ θεου̂ λόγος θει̂ος καὶ βασιλικός, ἄνθρωπος ἀπαθής, εἰκὼν θʼ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπινος νου̂ς.

The λόγος is not only God’s son. It is also λόγος θεου̂, Orig.Cels., VI, 60: λέγοντες τὸν μὲν προσεξω̂ς δημιουργὸν εἰ̂ναι τὸν υἱὸν του̂ θεου̂ λόγον καὶ ὡσπερεὶ αὐτουργὸν του̂ κόσμου, τὸν δὲ πατέρα του̂ λόγου τῳ̂ προστεταχέναι τῳ̂ υἱῳ̂ ἑαυτου̂ λόγῳ ποιη̂σαι τὸν κόσμον εἰ̂ναι πρώτως δημιουργόν.

Together with the → βουλὴ θεους and the κόσμος, the λόγος forms a divine trinity inasmuch as it is the divine seed which the βουλὴ θεους fashions into the visible world (→ I, 634).

4.     The λόγοι of Philo of Alexandria.

The Logos concept plays a considerable role in Philo.80 This is shown at once by the fact that he uses it over 1300 times.81 To the common use there corresponds a confusing vacillation of meanings82 which raises such a distinctive problem in relation to Philo. E. Schwartz83 can deny his derivation of the term from Gk. philosophy: he regards λόγος as at heart and in essence a jewish term (“Word of God”).84 L. Cohn,85 on the other hand, declares that the Stoic λόγος τη̂ς φύσεως is the root of Philo’s λόγος θεους (or Θει̂ος λόγος) in the sense of the “divine reason,” the “epitome of divine wisdom.”

The vacillation is naturally due to the synthesising tendency in Philo’s attempted uniting of Jewish religion and Gk. philosophical speculation. One can do justice to it only if one first considers the various aspects and understandings of the Philonic concept apart, not trying to harmonise them, but separating the incompatible Gk. and non-Gk. elements. In the main it is only the divine logos which is here at issue. The essential features of this cannot be explained in terms of the development of the Gk. logos concept. Even if we cannot be sure of the detailed roots of this new usage, they are manifestly non-Gk. The term is taken from the academic vocabulary of Hellenistic philosophy.86 But it is decisively refashioned in a new, very different, and primarily mythologising direction.

This λόγος θεου̂ or θει̂ος λόγος, as the new use with the gen shows, is no longer God Himself as in the Stoa (I, p. 24, 7; II, p. 111, 10, v. Arnim; cf. also Orig.Cels., V, 24: ὁ τω̂ν πάντων λόγος ἐστὶ κατὰ μὲν Κέλσον αὐτὸς ὁ θεός, κατὰ δεὶ ἡμα̂ς ὁ υἱο̂ς αὐτου̂) It is an ἔργον of God (Sacr. AC., 65). It is a god, but of the second rank (Leg. All., II, 86: τὸ δὲ γενικώτατὸν ἐστιν ὁ θεός, καὶ δεύτερος ὁ θεου̂ λόγος, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα λόγῳ μόνον ὑπάρχει). As such it is called the → εἰκών (Spec. Leg., I, 81: λόγος δʼ ἐστὶν εἰκὼν θεους, διʼ οὑ̂ σύμπα̂ ὁ κόσμος ἐδημιουργει̂το) of the supreme God, and in Philo’s doctrine of creation it takes on basic significance not only as ἀρχέτυπον παράδειγμα87 but also as ὄργανον θεους (Migr. Abr., 6; Cher., 127). With Σοφία88 God has begotten the κόσμος νοητός as His first-born son89 (Agric., 51: τὸν ὀρθὸν αὑτου̂ λόγον καὶ πρωτόγονον → υἱόν). This is equated with the λόγος (Op. Mund., 24: οὐδὲν ἂν ἕτερον εἴποι [τις] τὸν νοητὸν κὸσμον εἰ̂ναι ἢθεου̂ λόγον ἤδη κοσμοποιου̂ντος). Thus the λόγος is a mediating figure which comes forth from God and establishes a link between the remotely transcendent God and the world or man, and yet which also represents man to God as a high-priest (Gig., 52) and advocate (Vit. Mos., II, 133). i.e., as a personal Mediator, and not just in terms of the genuinely Gk. ἀνα—λογία (Plat.Tim., 31c; Plot.Enn., III, 3, 6).

As the κόσμος νοητός it is the sum and locus (Op. Mund., 20) of the creative powers of God, His → δυνάμεις (Fug., 101), the ideas, the individual logoi90 whereby this visible world is fashioned in detail and also maintained in its ordered life (Rer. Div. Her., 188). As δίοπο̂ Καὶ κυβερνήτης του̂ παντός (Cher., 36) it guides the world in exactly the same way as the Stoic νόμος or λόγος θύσεως.

Now W. Theiler91 has shown that the λόγος as the sphere of divine ideas, the νόησις θεου̂, and also as the ὄργανον θεου̂, belongs to the pre-neo-platonic tradition. Yet two things are non-Gk. in this whole concept. The first is the linguistic form with a gen. or adj.: θεους or θει̂ος. This gives the term its distinctive reality, and, as Schwartz has rightly pointed out, marks it off from Gk. usage, even if one cannot always render it “Word of God.” The second is the fact that a universal concept is conceived of personally92 (cf. → Σοφία → Πνευ̂μα, → Νου̂ς93 Closely linked with this is the idea of relationship or sonship, which is expressed in metaphors taken from the sphere of procreation (Agric., 51; Det. Pot. Ins., 54), and which applies both to the manner of the origin of the λόγος and to the mode of its operation, i.e., its wedding of the soul (Spec. Leg., II, 29 ff.) and the fact that it is the father of the daughters ἐπιστη̂μαι and ἀρεταί (Gig., 17).

The anthropomorphic view of the world expressed in the image of putting on the cosmos like a garment (Fug., 110) is certainly non-Gk., though it is also non-Jewish too, and seems to point rather in the direction of oriental and Egyptian theology.94

5.     Hellenistic Logos Speculation and the NT.

There is a great difference between Hellenistic Logos speculation and the NT λόγος.

This is shown first by the pronouncedly rational and intellectual character of the λόγλος, and by the fact that it occurs in very different connections and more precise senses in profane Gk. To the Christian, “word,” “speech,” “reason,” and “law” in the absolute, being in some way expressions of man’s self-understanding, are not important in themselves. The only important thing is what God has to say to man, the λόγος θεους, the fact which cannot be combined with the Greek view of God, namely, that God addresses man in his life here and now.95 In the Gk. λόγος concept one may see an attempt to adjust to life and in some way to master the world in terms of the spirit, which is more than calculable causality. Thus the logos concept of Stoicism is too much controlled by human ratio, which is, of course, rediscovered in nature, world, and God (M. Ant., IV, 4; XII, 26), to offer any parallels to the NT concept, which in the first instance came in the opposite direction from God to man καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμίν (Jn. 1:14). Of course, man has to decide consciously for this λόγος and the life which corresponds to it. But in life κατὰ λόγον (Diog. L., VII, 52 [86]) he does not accept the claim of a will deriving from another world. He comes to himself, to his true being, and attains his → ἐλευθερία,96 by following the most inward law, and consequently God.97 Thus the Gk. λόγλος is revelation only in the sense that one perceives the inner law of the matter, or of self, and orientates oneself thereby.

A further demonstration is to be found in the fact that secular Gk. (e.g., in Stoicism and Neo-platonism) can split up the λόγος into many creative individual or partial logoi in all the phenomena which invest the world with being and reality. To be sure, the λόγος is an expression of harmony.98 It is itself thespiritual bond which holds the world together at its heart (Pos. in PhiloFug., 112: ὅ τε γὰρ του̂ ὄντος λόγος δεσμὸς ὢν τω̂ν ἁπάντων … καὶ συνέχει τὰ μέρη πάντα καὶ σφίγγει κωλύων αὐτὰ διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαρτα̂σθαι … ἁρμονίαν καὶ ἕνωσιν ἀδιάλυτον ἄλει τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα). But it is not a mediating figure which stands independently between God and the world. Only in so far as the constructive principle is also that which reveals the knowability of things can one speak of the Gk. λόγος having a mediatorial role.

Thirdly, the distinction appears in the fact that the Gk. λόγος in its manifestation is not historically unique. It cannot be dated in time. On the contrary, it is an unbroken working and creating. In the eternal cycle of things (according to the Gk. view of the world) it releases creative and constructive forces, and then takes them back into itself in an eternal process which does not begin with the resolve of a personal God but takes place metaphysically, continually, and eternally in a gradual unfolding of being.

A fourth point is that the Gk. λόγος became, or, in Stoicism and Neo-platonism, is the world. As such it is called a υἱὸς99 του̂ θεου̂, but is no → μονογενής. In the NT, however, the λόγος became this one historically unique man, σάρξ.

From the very first the NT λόγος concept is alien to Gk. thought. But it later became the point of contact between Christian doctrine and Gk. philosophy.100

Kleinknecht

C.     The Word of God in the Old Testament.

1.     The Hebrew Equivalents of the Greek Terms for Word.

The roots אמר and דבר are the main Hebrew equivalents of the Gk. λόγος, also λόγιον, ῥη̂μα, ῥη̂σις. Rarer is מִלָּה, which in Hebrew, where it is not an Aramaic loan word (cf. 2 S. 23:2), is mostly restricted to Job, though it is frequent in the Aram. sections of Daniel. Other Heb. words are inaccurately rendered λόγος and ῥη̂μα (e.g., טַעַם, מִצְוָה, מַשָּׂא, סֵפֶר , פֶּה, פִּתְגָּם, קוֹל , שָׂפָה, שֵׁבֶט , תְּבוּנָה, תּוֹרָה ) and hardly call for consideration in relation to the philology of the word.

Our main concern is with the roots אמר and דבר. Here אֹמֶר, “saying” (Ps. 19:2 f.; 68:11; 77:8; Job 22:28)—perhaps101 the basic form of אֲמָרִים with the relevant suffix constructions—is used only poetically, as is also אִמְרָה. The nouns אֹמֶר and אִמְרָה are found before the exile (Gn. 4:23; Dt. 33:9; Is. 5:24; 28:23; 29:4), but are mostly postexilic. They are usually rendered λόγος (some 20 times), ῥη̂μα (some 29 times), λόγιον, or ῥη̂σις. This poetic meaning is plainly distinguished from the verbal concept אָמַר, “to speak,” “to say,” which is one of the most common words in the language.

The basic classical word for λόγος in history and law, prophecy and poetry, is, however, דָּבָר, “word.” Etymology must start with the noun, not the verb דִּבֶּר, which seems to be denominated from דָּבָר, as shown by the absence of the qal. דִּבָר would appear to be inseparable from דְּבִיר, the “holiest of all,” the “back of the temple.” which gives us the basic sense of “back.” To this corresponds the Arab. dubr “back,” which brings us to the heart of the matter.102 The Arab. ďb̌ra means “to have at one’s back,” the Ethiop. tadabbara “to put on one’s back,” the Aram. d’bar “to be behind” (cf. the German treiben103 and also führen).

In דָּבָר one is thus to seek the “back” or “background” of a matter. Whereas אֹמֶר and אִמְרָה denote a saying or expression in the indefinite sense, דָּבָר is to be regarded as the definite content or meaning of a word in which it has its conceptual background. No thing is דָּבָר in itself, but all things have a דָּבָר, a “background” or “meaning.” It is easy to see that in speech the meaning or concept stands for the thing, so that a thing, as an event, has in its דָּבָר its historical element, and history is thus enclosed in the דְּבָרִים as the background of things.

Analysis of the term דָּבָר shows two main elements which are both of the highest theological significance. We must distinguish between the dianoetic and the dynamic element. Dianoetically, דָּבָר always contains a νου̂ς, a thought. In it is displayed the meaning of a thing, so that דָּבָר always belongs to the field of knowledge. By its דָּבָר a thing is known and becomes subject to thought. To grasp the דָּבָר of a thing is to grasp the thing itself. It becomes clear and transparent; its nature is brought to light. In this connection the word is also distinguished theologically from the spirit, since the OT concept of spirit (רוּחַ) does not originally have this dianoetic element. But along with the dianoetic element is the dynamic, even if this is not always so evident. Every דָּבָר is filled with power which can be manifested in the most diverse energies. This power is felt by the one who receives the word and takes it to himself. But it is present independently of this reception in the objective effects which the word has in history. The two elements, the dianoetic and the dynamic, may be seen most forcefully in the Word of God, and the prophets had a profound grasp of this from both sides, so that in this respect they are the teachers of all theology.

2.     The General Use of דָּבָר as a Rendering of λόγος and ῥη̂μα.

The main Gk. terms for דָּבָר are λόγος and ῥη̂μα.

The LXX uses them as full synonyms, so that we may treat the two together. In the usage of the Pentateuch the proportion between λόγος and ῥη̂μα is 56 to 147, so that ῥη̂μα easily predominates. In Jos., Ju. and Ruth the figures are 26 to 30, almost equal. In the other historical books (S., K., Ch., Ezr.-Neh., Est.) the proportion is 365 to 200, and in the poetical books (Job, Ps., Prv., Qoh., Cant.) 159 to 72, though ῥη̂μα is predominant in Job (50 times as compared with λόγος 19). In the prophets (including Da.) we find λόγος 320 times and ῥη̂μα only 40, so that λόγος occurs eight times more than ῥη̂μα. In the apocr. too Wis., Jdt., Sir., Tob., Bar., 1–4 Macc.), λόγος is much more common (221 times to 40). Except in the Octateuch λόγος is thus the predominant rendering.

It has to be kept in view that in the LXX the meaning of λόγος and ῥη̂μα is much influenced by the basic Heb. דָּבָר. The great significance of λόγος in Stoic philosophy, like that of πνευ̂μα, possibly derives from a Semitic root, since Zeno was certainly a Semite.104 By nature the Gk. word has a mainly dianoetic value; it receives the dynamic element only from the Heb. דָּבָר.

In Gk. attributes like ἀγαθός (ψ 44:1), καλός (Prv. 23:8), ὀρθός (Prv. 16:13), ἄδικος (Prv. 13:5), πονηρός (2 Εσδρ. 23:17; ψ 63:5), σκληρός (Tob. 13:14 א), ψευδής (Jer. 7:4, 8; Ez. 13:8; Sir. 36:19[24]), ἀληθινός (2 Ch. 9:5), σοφός (1 Εσδρ. 3:9) are immediately understandable; and φιλόσοφος (4 Macc. 5:35) and φιλοσοφώτατος (4 Macc. 1:1) are to be explained in terms of Gk., not Heb. But other combinations can be understood only against a Heb. background, e.g., 2 Βας. 19:44: ἐσκληρύνθη ὁ λόγος; 24:4: ὑπερίσχυσεν ὁ λόγος; ψ 118:74: εἰς τοὺς λόγους σου ἐπήλπισα (cf. v. 81); v. 89: ὁ λόγος σου διαμένει; v. 154: διὰ τὸν λόγον σου ζη̂σόν με; ψ 147:4: ἕως τάχους δραμει̂ται ὁ λόγος αὐτου̂; Dt. 30:14: ἔστιν σου ἐγγὺς τὸ ῥη̂μα σφόδρα; Jos. 21:45: οὐ διέπεσεν ἀπὸ πάντων τω̂ν ῥημάτων; 2 Βας. 14:20: ἕνεκεν του̂ περιελθει̂ν τὸ πρόσωπον του̂ ῥήματος τούτου; 3 Βας. 13:21, 26: παρεπίκρανας τὸ ῥη̂μα; Tob. 14:4 א: οὐ μὴ διαπέσῃ ῥη̂μα ἐκ τω̂ν λόγων.

Only in the Heb. דָּבָר is the material concept with its energy felt so vitally in the verbal concept that the word appears as a material force which is always present and at work, which runs and has the power to make alive. In connection with ῥη̂μα we might mention here דְּבָרִים == ῥήματα, “history,” as used in 3 Βας. 11:41: ἐν βιβλίῳ ῥημάτων Σαλωμών, or Gn. 15:1; 22:1: μετὰ τὰ ῥήματα ταυ̂τα, etc., whereas the rendering by λόγοι (3 Βας. 14:29 etc.) in such cases is in keeping with the linguistic sense of the Greeks. History is the event established and narrated in the word, so that the thing and its meaning may both be seen, as expressed by the Heb. דְּבָרִים in the plural. From these examples it may be seen that the LXX concept cannot be wholly explained in terms of the Gk. λόγος or ῥη̂μα, but can be fully understood only against the background of the Hebrew דָּבָר.

To the degree that the meaning of a thing is implied in דָּבָר, the whole point is that the word and the thing are co-extensive. Hence the most important attribute of דָּבָר, and of λόγος and ῥη̂μα as translations, is truth.

In keeping is the common reference of the word אֱמֶת (“truth”) to the word. As Yahweh’s words are אֱמֶת (2 S. 7:28), so human words must be (Gn. 42:16, 20: 1 K. 10:6; 17:24; Ps. 45:4; 119:43; 2 Ch. 9:5). If a word is to be valid, the one concerned ratifies it with an Amen (Dt. 27:15 ff. אָמֵן) or Amen, Amen (Nu. 5:22). Similarly, the verb אמן in the ni is used as the sign of attestation of דָּבָר (Gn. 42:20; 3 Βας. 8:26: 1 Ch. 17:23: 2 Ch. 1:9; 6:17) in so far as words are found to be true; and to this there corresponds the fact that one believes a word (Dt. 1:32; 1 K. 10:7; Ps. 106:12, 24; 2 Ch. 9:6). “The sum of the divine word is truth” (Ps. 119:160: רֹאשׁ דְּבָרְךָ אֱמֶת).

In every spoken word there should be a relation of truth between word and thing, and a relation of fidelity between the one who speaks and the one who hears. Hence the word belongs to the moral sphere, in which it must be a witness to something for the two persons concerned.

3.     The דָּבָר of Prophetic Revelation.

a. Revelation in Sign. The history of the theological development of the concept has its roots in prophecy. In what seems to be the oldest Messianic prophecy which we have (2 S. == 2 Βας.] 23:1ff.), where David confesses that he is a prophet (v. 1: נְאֻם דָּוִד), it is said: πνευ̂μα κυρίου ἐλάλησεν ἐν ἐμοί, καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτου̂ (מִלָּתוֹ) ἐπὶ γλώσσης μου. The rare נְאֻם דְּוִד, in contrast to the later נְאֻם יהוה—so that the prophet is the speaker as compared with the later view of Yahweh as the speaker—is very ancient, almost the only other instance being in the Balaam oracles in J (Nu. 24:4, 16, cf. Prv. 30:1). The prophet is seized by God, by His Spirit (רוּחַ) and Word (מִלָּה == λόγος). The power of God finds recognisable expression in the λόγος. The image of the Messianic king, which appears in the λόγος, is evoked by the Spirit. In pneumatic rapture, the prophet receives an ear and eye for this suprasensual picture, and the mystery is thus revealed and imparted.

Equally old is the depiction of the ecstatic Balaam (Nu. 24:4, 16), in whose mouth God sets His Word (Nu. 22:38; 23:5, 16). He speaks as שֹׁמֵעַ אִמְרֵי־אֵל == ἀκούων λόγια θεου̂, as יֹדֵעַ דַּעַת עֶלְיוֹן == ἐπιστάμενος ἐπιστήμην παρὰ ῾Yψίστου (24:16), as one who מַחֲזֵה שַׁדַּי יֶחֱזֶה == ὅρασιν θεου̂ ἰδών in the state of a נֹפֵל וּגְלוּי עֵינַיִם == ἐν ὕπνῳ, ἀποκεκαλυμμένοι οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ αὐτου̂. With opened eye he sees the face of God, with opened ear105 he hears God’s sayings (λόγια). In vision and audition revelation is contained as the knowledge of God (דַּעַת עֶלְיוֹן) which comes forth from God and has God’s plan as its content. Here again one may see the connection between image and word in earliest prophecy. The Messianic picture contains the word of prophecy. Pictorial language is to be translated into words.

The writing prophets of the classical age are also familiar with pictorial revelation which contains the revelation of word. The visions at the call of Isaiah (6) and Ezekiel (1) present images from which the word can be taken.

One might also refer to the visions which God causes Amos to see (7:1ff.; 8:1 f.; 9:1ff.) and with which God’s voice is linked. The image as such already contains a complete revelation. In Ez. the transcendent glory of God is pictorially expressed in the vision at his call (2:1ff.). This finds an echo in the awe of the prophet, which causes him to fall down (2:1ff.). Amos as גְּלוּי עֵינַיִם at once perceives in the five visions the sign of judgment. The sequence of the visions indicates a heightening of the tension from anxiety at approaching judgment to certainty that it is present, so that the last vision depicts utter destruction (9:1ff.). But here a divine word of interpretation is always sought in the picture. In Zechariah we again find instantaneous images whose meaning is at once apparent to the watchful prophet without a word (4:1–6, 10 ff.; 5:1–4, 5ff.). Nevertheless, along with these we also find moving images whose sense cannot be apprehended in a moment but is disclosed only in a temporal process (1:7ff.: 6:1–8), so that even the prophet himself (1:9; 2:4; 4:4; 6:4) needs an interpretative word, let alone his hearers. This is why the angel of interpretation comes to translate the image into a word.

b. Revelation in Sign and Word. In the great writing prophets, however, the significance of the pictorial revelation is much less than that of the verbal revelation. The original voice which they perceive in themselves is no longer revealed as their own voice (2 S. 23:1: נְאֻם דָּוִד) but as the voice of Yahweh (נְּאֻם יְהוָֹה). In the infinitive נאם, the whispering which is not originally to be regarded as articulated speech, the דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה develops constantly increasing clarity and energy.

The interconnection of image and word, in which דָּבָר is the background and meaning of the sign, may again be seen in the puns of, e.g., Amos 8:2, where קַיִץ (“summer fruit”) is linked with קֵץ (“end”), or Jeremiah 1:11 f., where שָׁקֵד (“almond tree”) reminds us of the watchful Yahweh (שֹׁקֵד), so that the sign passes into the sound.

The word does not have to be combined with an image. It can be received as a voice. In the prophets the original sound develops into harmonies and rhythms whose divine sense finds expression in the human word. The word of revelation in saying and sermon may be very short or it may be a most powerful oration.106 In every saying or sermon the original word received from God is the vital nerve so that the finished prophetic address may be described as the Word of God. Reception of God’s Word by the prophets can be called a spiritual process, though the close connection between Word and Spirit which we find in the NT is comparatively rarely seen in the OT.

The Spirit is expressly mentioned, however, in the last words of David (2 S. 23:2) and the oracles of Balaam (Nu. 24:2), and Hosea does not avoid the description אִישׁ הָרוּחַ (9:7). Moreover, that which we call spiritual is implicitly contained in every verbal revelation, though according to OT usage spiritual operations are discerned chiefly in the בָבִיא, the ecstatic, who is not identical with the seer (רֹאֶה, חֹזֶה), and who is distinguished, not so much by the sign and word of revelation, but rather by ecstatic gestures and violent actions.107 It is only as the concept of the seer is gradually merged with that of the ecstatic (cf. 1 S. 9:9) that דָּבָר becomes a mark of the נָבִיא as תּוֹרָה is of the priest (Jer. 18:18).

c. Dissolution of the Sign. In the history of prophecy the דָּבָר increasingly freed itself from the sign and became a pure expression of revelation. The prophet realised that God Himself was addressing him therein. The E formula: Abraham, Abraham (Gn. 22:1 vl.); Jacob, Jacob (46:2); Moses, Moses (Ex. 3:4), suggests the urgency with which the divine voice smites the heart of the hearer and enables him to receive the revelation. The process is very beautifully described in the case of Samuel (1 S. 3:1 ff.). Yahweh reveals Himself (3:21: נִגְלָה יהוה) to him in Shiloh108 by a summons which implies a call, for previously the Word and revelation of Yahweh were not known to him (3:7: טֶרֶם יִגָּלֶה אֵלָיו דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה). He believes that he is hearing the voice of Eli, i.e., a human voice (3:4f.), until Eli sets him on the right track and he declares to God his readiness to hear: דַּבֵּי יְהוָֹה כִּי שֹׁמֵעַ עַבְדֶּךָ (3:9, 10). He then receives the prophecy in clear terms, for Yahweh Himself comes and stands before him (v. 10, cf. Gn. 28:13). This reminds us of the traditional revelation of the דָּבָר to Eliphaz in Job 4:12–16, except that here a figure appeared. Later, it is by the דְּבַר אֱלהִים that Samuel promises Saul the royal dignity (1 S. 9:27), which is thus a divine charisma; and later still he challenges Saul on the performance of the divine word (1 S. 15:13: הָקִים) concerning the Amalekite king, and announces judgment because of Saul’s scorning (v. 23, 26: מָאַסְתָּ אֶת דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה) of the Word of God. The explosive and destructive power of the דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה is here impressively depicted. The דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה which the prophet receives by revelation (1 S. 3:7) embraces both promise and demand. It is despised at the cost of life itself.

From the days of Samuel the דְּבַר־יהוה is the decisive force in the history of Israel. It is given to David through Nathan (2 S. 7:4) and to Elijah (1 K. 17:2, 8). It plays a constructive historical part in the march of events. In K., Jer. and Ez. the formula וַיְהִי דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה is common in connection with the prophet addressed (1 K. 6:11; 13:20; Jer. 1:4, 11; 2:1; 13:8; 16:1; 24:4; 28:12; 29:30; Ez. 3:16; 6:1; 7:1; 12:1). Though it may often be ascribed to the redactor, it shows that the prophetic view of history, with which is linked the Deuteronomic, regards the prophet as an agent of revelation who perceives the secret plan and will of God at work in history. The Word of God is fulfilled (1 K. 2:27: לְמַלֵּא אֶת־דְּבַר יְהוָֹה == πληρωθη̂ναι τὸ ῥη̂μα κυρίου); it comes to pass (Ju. 13:12, 17; 2 K. 22:16: בא), it stands for ever (Is. 40:8: יָקוּם לְעוֹלָם) without any co-operation on man’s part. The mystery of God (Ju. 3:19: דְּבַר־ סֵתֶר, v. 20: דְּבַר־אֱלֹהִים) is to be seen herein, and its content is irresistible (2 K. 1:17; 9:36; Is. 9:7; 55:10 f.). Everywhere that the true prophet speaks בִּדְבַר יְהוָֹה == ἐν λόγῳ κυρίου (1 K. 13:1, 2, 5, 9, 17, 32— ἐν ῥήματι κυρίου only in 3 Βας. 13:18), things take place כִּדְבַר יְהוָֹה == κατὰ τὸ ῥη̂μα κυρίου (1 K. 12:24; 15:29; 16:12, 34).

d. The Writing Prophets. The books of the writing prophets are often opened by the formula דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה אֲשֶׁר הָיָה אֶל־]הוֹשֵׁעַ[ (Hos. 1:1; Mi. 1:1; Zeph. 1:1; cf. Mal. 1:1). Perhaps this is added by the collector of a pre-exilic series, since the date as well as the name is regularly given. It is probably later than the titles חֲזוֹן יְשַׁעְיָהוּ (Is. 1:1), דִּבְרֵי עָמוֹס (Am. 1:1; cf. Jer. 1:1), סֵפֶר חֲזוֹן נַחום (Na. 1:1), which mention the prophet as author. It is also found in the LXX in Jer. 1:1, where the Mas. is דִּבְרֵי יִרְמְיָהוּ. It certainly implies that the whole book is regarded as דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה. In the written form no distinction is made between the divine voice in the prophet and its expression in poetry, saying, and address. We have here a transition to the final view that not merely the prophetic book, but in the last resort the whole of the OT, is the Word of God. The element of revelation is plainly present in the concept of word. For it is as revelation that the books are collected. But this element is present from the very first in the prophetic concept of the word, cf. the partial title (Is. 2:1) to Isaiah’s oldest writing (Is. 2–6), which runs הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר חָזָה יְשַׁעְיָהוּ. The bold image of the word which is seen, found also in Jer. 2:31 but not translated by the LXX, suggests in prophetic speech the close connection between sign and word. The book probably opened with the call (Is. 6). Both in time and substance this comes first, whereas the prophecy of international peace (2:2–5) is not so appropriate an opening. The seen word is the divine word of revelation which is embodied in vision and audition. Is. also refers to דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה as the word of revelation within his addresses, e.g., when he introduces a new train of thought (1:10; 9:7; 28:14; 37:22; cf. 38:7), and even within the structure of an address (2:3; 16:13; 28:13; 30:12). It is characteristic that he equates the Word of God with God’s teaching (תּוֹרָה), 1:10; 2:3; 30:9, 12, for תּוֹרָה is originally the doctrine of God mediated by the priest (cf. Jer. 18:18).109 As compared with תּוֹרָה, , however, דָּבָר has a dynamic, creative and destructive element; Is. 9:7 is a classical example. Yahweh does not retract the words which He has spoken by the prophet, Is. 31:2. In itself revelation in word is a great blessing, 2:3. This is true even when judgment falls because it is despised, 28:13. The relation here is the same as in Amos, for whom the Word of God is a revelation (3:7) which, when received, forces the prophet willy-nilly to prophesy (3:8; cf. 3:1; 4:1; 5:1). Revelation is a blessing whose absence is felt as a judgment, for they will thirst for the Word of Yahweh and they will not find it (8:11f.).110 The Word of Yahweh is a vital force whose withdrawal means that grace ceases.

The most profound theological understanding of the word is to be found in Jer. In accordance with the common usage, Jer. sees the Torah committed to the priest, while the prophet is the specific agent of the דָּבָר (18:18), though, like Is., he closely relates תּוֹרָה and דָּבָר as forms of revelation. His main concern, however, is not with the תּוֹרָה, which, like Hosea (8:12), he knows as a written book (8:8). It is with the דָּבָר whose innermost being he has discovered. Dedicated a prophet from his mother’s womb (1:5), he receives at his call the certainty that Yahweh has put His words on his lips (1:9) as He once did with Balaam (Nu. 22:38; 23:5, 16). From the very first revelation, then, he embodies the Word of Yahweh in his addresses (1:11, 12), and the roll of the book which he has Baruch write for him contains nothing but the words of God (36:2). When he speaks of God’s Word, he does not have primarily in view the dianoetic sense, though he lays great stress on knowledge. He thinks first of the dynamic content, which he has felt strongly in his constant wrestling with God. In the midst of his sufferings he confesses that God’s Word is the joy and delight of his heart (15:16), that he has swallowed it (if we may trust the doubtful Heb. text of 15:16). This he has in fact done. The supreme grace which can come to him through submission of his own will to God in prayer is his renewed appointment as the mouth of God whose witness has the power of conversion for others too (15:19). But the Word also puts him under a divine constraint which his nature resists (20:7ff.). It is thus sharply differentiated from his human thoughts. The prophet’s preaching brings him only mockery and shame, so that he would rather not declare the Word of God. But it is a burning fire in his soul shut up in his bones, so that he cannot contain it.111 The meaning seems to be that he is inwardly aflame with the Word of Yahweh and will perish if he does not speak. This Word does not well up from his own soul. It is tossed into it like a burning brand. It demands to be passed on in his preaching. The torch which has been kindled must shine out; otherwise it will consume the one who bears it. Never has the constraint of preaching the Word found more poignant utterance. Never has the martyrdom of the prophet been more keenly felt. He has to preach the Word for his own soul’s salvation. The specific distinction of this Word from the word of man is thus made plain. The divine constraint as the very opposite of even the most pure and tender human nature is fully perceived. But these conflicts in the soul of Jer. also bring to light the moral nature of the knowledge and power in which his character is purified in wrestling with the Word. It is his supreme burden and joy to be a prophet of the Word, an example of the operation of the Word in the great men of Church history. The dynamic side of the דָּבָר == λόγος is also forcefully portrayed in Jeremiah’s self-differentiation from ordinary prophecy (23:28f.). The prophet who has dreams tells his dreams; the one in whom is God’s Word tells God’s Word. The relation of the Word of God to the dream of the prophet is like that of the wheat to the straw. It may be clothed in a vision, but it is independent of it. It is an irresistible force, like the fire in which the chaff is consumed or like a hammer which breaks the rock, 23:29. Thus the דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה can be depicted only by one who has been seized and broken by it. Here, too, Jer. displays an astonishing ability to analyse the prophetic consciousness into which the Word of Yahweh has come. Since God’s Word is power, it is infallibly accomplished. Its authenticity may be known by the fact that it comes to pass, 28:9: בְּבאֹ, cf. Ju. 13:12, 17; 2 K. 22:16; Ps. 105:19; 107:20. It may be contained in an event which is apparently indifferent in itself, as when Jer. is asked by his uncle to buy a field for him, and he perceives in this the Word of Yahweh, 32:1ff. But it can be found only in prayer, 42:1ff. Only prayer, whether as self-subjection to God (15:10ff.) or as intercession (42:7ff.), can give clarity concerning the Word of revelation.

Whereas in Jer. wrestling with the Word of God is a matter of personal destiny, in Dt. Is. the דְּבַר־יְהוְֹה is a historical force. This theoretician among the prophets seems to see the דָּבָר embodied in the history of prophecy. As living divine revelation it is worked out in terms of the development of things. Nature passes away, but the Word of Yahweh lasts for ever, Is. 40:8. God’s prophecy carries its fulfillment within itself. Dt. Is. finds proof of God in this fulfilled Word. Since the prophetic word proclaims a new creation which is being prepared in the old, this new creation will come. The דִּבַר־יְהוָֹה is presented as absolute by nature in the well-known comparison with rain and snow in Is. 55:10 f. As rain and snow cannot be unfruitful but soak into the earth and cause seeds to sprout, so the Word of Yahweh cannot return to heaven without accomplishing its mission. It executes God’s will and does what it is sent to do. The Word is bound to prophecy, yet this does not produce it in its own strength, but receives it from heaven. Every prophetic word is an effectual force, and the epitome of all prophecy is the living and eternal Word of God. As in Jer., the dynamic aspect of the דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה is here more prominent than the dianoetic. The Word is seen to be a heavenly force which creatively accomplishes its work on earth.

4.     The דָּבָר as Revelation of the Law.

The דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה always contains revelation, and the revelation of the Word is the main form of all divine revelation. The prophetic word establishes a personal and moral relation between God and the prophet. Here is something total, so that the entire work of the prophet can be called דְּבַר־יהוה, Is. 2:1; Hos. 1:1; Mi. 1:1; Zeph. 1:1. He who is smitten by the Word, so that he receives it into himself and is orientated thereto, has become a new man. But along with this is the revelation of the Law, which can also be expressed by דָּבָר, though usually in the plural rather than the singular. Whereas the prophetic word always has topical significance, though the hic et nunc can determine the whole life of the prophet, as may be seen from the example of Jer., the legal דָּבָר is valid for the whole people in every age quite independently of the prophetic recipient.

The best example is the Decalogue, whose ten sayings can be called עֲשֶׂרֶת הַעדּבָרִיס by J in Ex. 34:28, cf. Dt. 4:13; 10:4, though the ancient Decalogue has here been replaced by a law of a very different kind, Ex. 34:10–26. The ten sayings are the basic law of Israel which underlies the divine covenant (Ex. 34:27 f.), which is inviolably valid in every age, and the transgression of which spells ruin for the people (cf. Hos. 4:2 f.; Jer. 7:9). The same is true of the דְּבָרִיס of the book of the covenant (Ex. 24:4, 8 E), which is read by Moses on the making of the covenant (24:7), and to which the people pledges itself. The contents of this book are not imparted. What we now call the book of the covenant (Ex. 20:23—chapter 23) seems more likely to have arisen, not at Sinai, but at the end of the Book of Joshua (24:25).112

Later, Deuteronomy was identified with the Sinaitic book of the covenant. For it bears the name סֵפֶר הבְּרִית (2 K. 23:2 f., 21; cf. Ex. 24:7), and it purports to proclaim as Moses’ testament the divine words which he received on the mount of God (1:1: אֵלֶּה הַדְּבָרִים). In the choice of דְּבָרִים as the title for Dt. one may see the prophetic character of the work, for the words which Moses has to proclaim are words of revelation. The title in 4:44: זאֹת הַתּוֹרָה, which selects the priestly תּוֹרָה (cf. esp. 4:45), is thus to be regarded as secondary. But in the basic singular of Dt. there may be found also the singular הַדָּבָר as the epitome of promise (9:5) and Law (13:1). This is best brought out at the end in 30:11ff., where הַמִּצְוָה (v.11) and הַדָּבָר (v.14) are identified as the sum of Dt. The divine Word which is presented to Israel as מִצְוָה is not beyond the power of Israel to grasp and to do (לאֹ נִפְלֵאת הִוא מִמְּךָ, v.11), as though no inner relation were possible. It is not hidden in heaven or beyond the sea, so that no one can fetch and proclaim it. But קָרוֹב אֵלֶיךָ הַדָּבָר מְאֹד (v. 14). The Word is present revelation. It carries within it the power of performance. The mouth and heart are organs to proclaim and fulfil it. To take effect, it seeks to be proclaimed on the lips and received into the heart. The revelation of God’s will becomes preaching. As such, it permeates the length and breadth of the people. It mediates itself through historical agents in the historical world. The thought is analogous to that of Is. 55:10 f., except that Dt. lays greater stress on the commandment than the message. Divine revelation, however, is both. For in Dt. Moses is also a prophet (18:15ff.). In the original Dt. the priestly תּוֹרָה plays no part, just as דָּבָר plays no real role in priestly legislation, which in P is only rarely called the Law of God (Lv. 4:13; 8:5, 36; 9:6; 17:2). The דָּבָר == λόγος belongs to the prophet, the תּוֹרָה == νόμος to the priest (Jer. 18:18).

5.     The Divine Word of Creation.

In the post-exilic period, when the Law was assembled in the Pentateuch and the prophets in the נְבִיאִים רִאשֹׁנִים and אַחֲרֹנִים, so that the Word of God took fixed written form, the prophetic concept of the דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה merges with the legal to form a single whole, even though the written form as such is not given the name דְּבַר־יְהוָהֹ. As noted, דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה is chosen as the title for many prophetic books (Hos. 1:1; Mi. 1:1; Zeph. 1:1), and the sing. דָּבָר is also used for Dt. (30:14). Since the Word of Yahweh always contained revelation, whether in the Law or the prophets, it could always be used to denote the revealed will of God. Indeed, there is a third sphere of revelation, namely, in the creation of nature, which is everywhere attributed to the Word of God. This thought, though without the term, is present already in the P creation story (Gn. 1), where the world has its origin in the divine Word. It is usually thought that this story is the refashioning of an older account, the work which God does (Gn. 2:2: הַמְּלָאכָה אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה), being replaced by the word which He speaks (וַיְהִי כֵן). This spiritualising of the work of creation may be traced back to a spiritualising of priestly thinking, though it is not impossible that some influence was exerted by Accadian ideas of the creative power of the word,113 which are well attested. There can certainly be no doubt that the concept of creation by the Word was pre-exilic, for Ez. is independent of P and he is acquainted with the creative power of the דָּבָר (37:4: דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה), and is followed in this regard by Dt. Is. (40:26; 44:24 ff.; 48:13; cf. 55:10f.). The Psalter, whose theology is also an influence on Dt. Is., frequently emphasises this creative power (147:15–18), and in the depiction of the creation of heaven by the דָּבָר in Ps. 33 we find the succinct formulation: כִּי הוּא אָמַר וַיֶּהִי הוּא־צוָּה וַיַּעֲמֹד.

6.     The Word in Poetry.

As the creative power of דָּבָר == λόγος came forth out of nothing (Ps. 33), so in poetry revelation is effected by the Word (Job 4:12). In keeping with its prophetic or legal character, the דָּבָר is here regarded as one of promise or of demand. But everywhere it contains revelation, and everywhere it has both a dianoetic and a dynamic element.

The much misunderstood 119th psalm is a veritable treasury of the various nuances of דָּבָר, and it sheds light on דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה from every side. Here דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה is normally in the sing.; דְּבָרֶיךָ with plur. suffix may often be regarded as an original sing. The poetic אִמְרָה can sometimes be substituted for it (v.38, 41, 103, 123, 154, 162, 170) with no essential alteration of sense. תּוֹרָה in particular is used interchangeably with דָּבָר (v. 1, 18, 34, 44, 51, 61, 72, 97, 126, 136, 163), and from this it is clear that the author is thinking esp. of the Pentateuch as the written Word of God. But תּוֹרָה comprehends both promise and demand, so that the prophetic sense is emphasised as well as the legal. The Word stands in heaven (v.89). Its sum is truth (v. 160). It is a light on the path (v.105). It has the content of life, for according to its measure God quickens the righteous (v. 25, 107, 154) and gives him understanding (v. 169). It has within it power, for the poet trusts in it (v. 42 בטח) and hopes in it (v. 74, 81, 114, 147; cf. Ps. 130:5). It demands obedience and observance (v.57, 101). It thus has moral significance for man. It is both promise and hope, demand and power. As one may say that both the motivation and the rest of faith and of the moral life are to be found in the תּוֹרָה, so one may find these in the Word because it contains God’s revelation. Since its quintessence is truth, one can rely on God’s Word absolutely.

The Jewish community lived on this treasure of the Word on the basis of the confession stated in the Pentateuch and believed in by the righteous. But with the canonisation of the prophets as well as the Law, the written word of the prophetic collection was also accepted as canonical, and finally the Writings were added too. The διάνοια and δύναμις of Scripture are to be found in the Word.

Procksch

D.     Word and Speech in the New Testament.

1. Basic and General Aspects of the Use of λέγω/λόγος.

The emphasis which the whole of the NT places on hearing (→ ἀκούω, I, 219) presupposes a preceding speaking. An essential part of the religious relation implied in the NT is thus expressed both quantitatively and qualitatively by the many words for speech—→ ἀγγἐλλω and derivatives, → κηρύσσω/κήρυγμα, → μαρτυρέω etc. It is thus no accident, nor is it the result of arbitrary extraneous influences, that the fundamental Gk. word for speech, both as verb and esp. as noun (λέγω/λόγος), should be the vehicle of important NT statements. Even in matters where the whole emphasis seems to be on action, e.g., the baptism and transfiguration, the → φωνὴ λέγουσα (Mt. 3:17; 17:5) is not just an accompanying phenomenon. It is that which gives the event its theme and content.

It is to be noted, of course, that in the use of the term this special content does not claim or attain any exclusiveness. In the NT both as a whole and in detail both the verb and the noun run the whole gamut of usage from the most everyday to the most pregnant.

That the usage remained basically free from necessary implication is shown by the ingenuous way in which many statements can be made that enshrine a negative estimate of the “word.” Thus in the NT, as elsewhere in the Gk. world,114 it can be said of something which is present only as λόγος that it is nothing (Col. 2:23). λόγος is also the term for a bad word. The NT speaks of the σαπρὸς λόγος (Eph. 4:29), κενοὶ115 λόγοι (Eph. 5:6),116 λόγοι πονηροί (3 Jn. 10), the λόγος κολακείας (1 Th. 2:5), the λόγος which is comparable with a canker (2 Tm. 2:17), πλαστοὶ λόγοι (2 Pt. 2:3). It describes how the human λόγος works itself out in sin, and exceptions to this rule, though not impossible, are rare:117 πολλὰ γὰρ πταίομεν ἅπαντες· εἴ τις ἐν λόγω οὐ πταίει, οὑ̂τος τέλειος ἀνήρ (Jm. 3:2; → γλω̂σσα, I, 721). Above all, 1 C. 1–4 lashes this word of human wisdom (1:17; 2:1, 4, 13) which pretends to be καθʼ ὑπεροχήν (2:1) and yet which is mere vaunting (4:19f.). This speech is called human, not because it is spoken by men, but because its content is human. The same human lips can be instruments of the Word of God (1 Th. 2:13),

Along with this negative estimation we should mention the many occurrences in which there is no judgment. The account of something, whether spoken by Jesus, the disciples, or another, refers to “these words” (Mt. 7:28; Ac. 2:22; 16:36). or collectively118 “this word” (Mk. 7:29; 10:22),119 or “many words” (Lk. 23:9). Paul distinguishes between a letter and the spoken word (λόγος, 2 Th. 2:2, 15; 2 C. 10:10; cf. Ac. 15:27), though even in the same sentence (2 C. 10:11) he can call a letter the bearer and reproduction of the λόγος (2 Th. 3:14; cf. Hb. 5:11; 13:22). An address (Ac. 2:41; 20:7), an account (Ac. 11:22),a rumour (Lk. 5:15; 7:17), can all be called λόγος, and also the partial record embodied in a book (Ac. 1:1).120 Whether in the νου̂ς or the γλω̂σσα, what is spoken is always a λόγος (1 C. 14:19), In the second case it may be inarticulate. It may not be in the form of connected words and sayings (ῥήματα, →, 75; 79). But, as something which Involves a λέγειν, it is a λόγος.

Ac. 20:24:121 ἀλλʼ οὐδενὸς λόγου ποιου̂μαι τὴν ψυχὴν τιμίαν ἐμαυτῳ̂,122 “but I do not regard my life as worth a word (worth speaking of) for myself.” Cf. Hdt., IV, 28: λόγου ἄξιον, also the similar form λόγον ποιει̂ν or ποιει̂σθαι, “to have regard for something,” Hdt., I, 4; III, 25 etc.; Theocr.Idyll., 2, 61; Jos.Ant., 1, 72; 7, 88; 11, 82; Job 22:4. It seems that the text was soon assimilated to this common expression, and at the same time extended, because it was felt to be difficult and unusual. Thus the form arose: ἀλλʼ οὐδενὸς λόγον ποιου̂μαι οὐδὲ ἔχω τὴν ψυχήν μου τιμίαν ἐμαυτῳ̂,123 “but I have regard for nothing, I count not my life as dear to myself.” The reverse possibility that the first form was garbled is less likely.124

It is obvious that the main emphasis of the term is always on saying something. This is why there is such a range of possibilities and such a notable vacillation in sense. The word can contain γνω̂σις or true σοφία (1 C. 12:8). It can also be opposed to them (2 C. 11:6). Or it can be set alongside them (1 C. 1:5; 2 C. 8:7). In the same way word and act, or word and power, can be mutually exclusive (1 Th. 1:5; 1 C. 4:19 f.), or complementary (Lk. 24:19; R. 15:18; 2 Th. 2:17; Col. 3:17). The emphasis of the sentence will decide whether the word intended is empty sound or whether it carries within it a content which impels towards and necessitates action. This multiplicity of possibilities can express anything said or spoken; it can embrace any content put in words.

It becomes fully evident when one compares with it the specific theological concept, yet to be discussed, of the word which proffers the Gospel and its message. Even this part of the usage, which is so pregnant, can be accompanied in the same sentence by looser and less pregnant forms. 1 Th. 1:5 f.: ὅτι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἡμω̂ν οὐκ ἐγενήθη εἰς ὑμα̂ς ἐν λόγῳ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν δυνάμει … καὶ ὑμει̂ς … δεξάμενοι τὸν λόγον …, 1 C. 2:4: καὶ ὁ λόγος μου καὶ τὸ κήρυγμά μου125 οὐκ ἐν πειθοι̂ς σοφίας λόγοις …, 1 Pt. 3:1: ἵνα καὶ εἴ τινες ἀπειθου̂σιν τῳ̂ λόγῳ … ἄνευ λόγου κερδηθήσονται.126 The material distance between such logos-statements is as great as it could be. Nevertheless, there is no need to change the words even in this close spatial proximity. This shows that the chief and proper emphasis of the word remains the same no matter how strong the impress of a given content. The reference is always to a spoken word. Even in the Prologue to John, the term never becomes a purely formal one. It always contains the living concept of a spoken word, in this case the word spoken by God to the world. When it is the word of revelation, in some way the decisive thing is recollection of the One who in living reality speaks this word. The word is never an independent entity. As a genuine word, it always finds its essence and meaning in the fact that it points to Him who spoke it. The essence of the distinctive NT logos-statement is thus to be found, not in the term or form as such, but in the actual relation to Him.

The same is true of the formula which on the lips of Jesus seems particularly to indicate the verbal character of revelation by using the verb. The highly emphatic λέγω of the ἐγὼ127 λέγω ὑμι̂ν (and similar formulae), because it is so very common, undoubtedly characterises the authoritative sayings of Jesus. It is also possible that the link with ἀμήν,127 found only on the lips of Jesus, represents a conscious peculiarity of the word of Jesus. This is not true of the λέγω as such. Even early Christianity did not regard it as a specific Christ formula.128 In the tradition it was used also of the Baptist (Mt. 3:9: λέγω γὰρ ὑμι̂ν). Paul felt no constraint in using it of himself (Gl. 5:2: ἐγὼ Παυ̂λος λέγω ὑμι̂ν).129 It is even put on the lips of Gamaliel (Ac. 5:38: καὶ τὰ νυ̂ν λέγω ὑμι̂ν). It is not authoritarian speech as such which constitutes a Christ saying, but the content which sets aside traditional authorities (Mt. 5:21 ff.) and the fact that this content is offered through Christ (Mt. 13:17).

2. More Specific and Technical Meanings.

In the NT, too, the term λόγος as an expression for something which is really said can be used in a more specific sense. But this is not because the first emphasis is overborne or reduced to silence by a strong accent or content. No λόγος statement is so affected or enhanced by new factors that the original “word” character is transcended by this new and more significant use. This could happen in Philo because for him the categories of speaking and hearing were secondary (→ I, 217). There is no such development in the NT, since all the theocentric and christocentric contents which the word can have find in the idea of speaking and the spoken word a perfectly adequate revelational form beyond which they need not seek a higher. If the basic character is in any way weakened in the NT, it is rather by a loss of emphasis, by a tonelessness due to the influence of current usage.

This development may be noted in 4 respects in the NT.

a. λόγος, “reckoning,” “account.”130

λόγον αἰτει̂ν, συναίρειν, διδόναι, ἀποδιδόναι, “to demand or give an account,” is a common tt. in business.131 In the first instance it suggests an oral report, but in everyday speech this emphasis drops away, and we have the commercial sense of “account,” with no implication that it has to be rendered orally. When suitable, the NT uses the term thus in a purely secular context, e.g., on the occasion of the Ephesian riot and responsibility for it (Ac. 19:40), cf. also in the same passage the related expression λόγον ἔχειν πρός τινα, “to have a complaint against someone, a matter on which reckoning is demanded” (19:38).

In the NT, however, this expression is predominantly used of the responsibility of the Christian to give an account to men (1 Pt. 3:15), and to God, both for himself (Mt. 12:36) and for the neighbour committed to him (Hb. 13:17). It thus implies the whole of the early Christian concept of eschatological judgment and responsibility (R. 14:12; 1 Pt. 4:5). Already in the parables of Jesus this rendering of an account is an important feature, not only in the parables, but also in the interpretation, cf. the parables of the wicked servant (Mt. 18:23), the talents (Mt. 25:19), and the unjust steward (Lk. 16:2). It is particularly plain in Phil. 4:15, 17 to what degree the term has in this sense the tendency to move out of the commercial sphere as a figure of spiritual things. The λόγος (“account”)132 δόσεως καὶ λήμψεως (v.15) which first applies to earthly things, i.e., support of the apostle, unexpectedly becomes an image of the καρπὸν τὸν πλεονάζοντα εἰς λόγον ὑμω̂ν (v. 17), i.e., fruit in a very different eternal sense, since the earthly goods are reckoned as equivalent to the spiritual gift received.

Hb. 4:13 may be cited in the same connection. πρὸς ὃν ἡμι̂ν ὁ λόγος may well contain only a concluding “with whom we have to do.”133 But even then the basic sense of relation or proportion (i.e., “to whom we stand in relation”) is only a variant of the same meaning “reckoning,” i.e., a “relation to be reckoned, or reckoned.” And if the Peshitta and above all the Gk. fathers134 are right in detecting here the thought of reckoning, their judgment should be accepted, not merely because they are closer to the living speech, but also because it corresponds best to the context. For “having to do with God” is not an innocuous thing for early Christians. It is not a meaningless rhetorical flourish at the end. It contains a reminder of the responsibility and account which we owe to God as Judge. When the context deals with the laying bare of the thoughts before Him from whom no secrets are hid,135 it is not impossible that this sense of rendering an account, which is proper to the term and which was known to the author (cf. 13:17), should fix the emphasis.136

b. Ac. 10:29: τίνι λόγῳ; “on what ground?” Ac. 18:14: κατὰ λόγον “with reason.” In both cases we have a very weak and everyday form of the Gk. sense which uses λόγος with ref. to thought (→ 73 f.) as “reason,” “rational consideration,” “the result of deliberation,” “the reason or rational ground” which results therefrom.137

c. λόγος, “the matter (discussed),” “the subject of speech.” This is a common meaning in classical and Hellenistic Gk.138 It occurs several times in the NT. Ac. 8:21: οὐκ ἔστιν σοι μερὶς οὐδὲ κλη̂ρος ἐν τῳ̂ λόγῳ τούτῳ̂, namely, the Spirit sought by Simon in v.19.139 Ac. 15:6: συνήχθησαν … ἰδει̂ν περὶ του̂ λόγου τούτου (namely, the demand of v. 5).140

d. This form of meaning from the Gk. world links up with another which arose as a Semitism from the Heb. דָּבָר, as in Mt. 5:32 and Lk. 4:36. Lk. 4:36: τίς ὁ λόγος οὑ̂τος …; is incorrectly rendered: “What manner of word (or speech) is this?”141 The continuation: ὅτι ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ἐπιτάσσει τοι̂ς ἀκαθάρτοις πνεύμασιν καὶ ἐξέρχονται, does not refer only to the word but to its result, namely, the ἐξέρχεσθαι of demons. There is an exact equivalent in the narrative style of the OT in 2 Βας. 1:4: καὶ εἰ̂πεν αὐτῳ̂ Δαυίδ· τίς ὁ λόγος οὑ̂τος; (Mas. מֶה־הָיָה הַדָּבָר), Here the context shows us the real meaning: “What is this matter?”

In Mt. 5:32 Jesus rejects divorce παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας. This obviously does not mean “saving only for an unchaste word.” It corresponds to the OT formula in such matters often found in the Rabbis: Dt. 24:1: כִּי־מָצָא בָהּ עֶרְוַת דָּבָר (LXX: ὅτι εὑ̂ρεν ἐν αὐτῃ̂ ἄσχημον πρα̂γμα), “because he has found in her some scandal of a matter, or scandalous matter.”142 The question what this might be was much debated by the schools, and there was a good deal of frivolous exegesis. In conscious opposition to this, and in exposition of the formula, the Sermon on the Mount limits the ground of divorce to the λόγος πορνείας, “some form of licentiousness.”143

3. The Sayings of Jesus.

a. The Quotation of the Sayings. Since the work of Jesus consisted to a large extent in the proclamation of the message, i.e., the spoken word, it is natural that there should be countless references to His λέγειν or λόγοι or ῥήματα. In this respect there seems to be no distinction between λόγος and ῥη̂μα.144

The ref. may be to an individual saying. In Mk. 10:22 the rich young ruler is displeased ἐπὶ τῳ̂ λόγῳ (the command to sell all); 14:72: Peter remembers the ῥη̂μα ὡς εἰ̂πεν … ʼΙησου̂ς about the cock crowing. Similarly the plural, a number of sayings, may refer to a definite section of His preaching: Mt. 26:1: πάντες οἱ λόγοι οὑ̂τοι are ended (i.e., the preceding address); also Lk. 7:1: πάντα τὰ ῥήματα αὐτου̂. But the plural may also indicate the sum of sayings, His total message, Mt. 24:35 and par.: οἱ δὲ λόγοι μου οὐ μὴ παρέλθωσιν, Mk. 8:38: ὃς γὰρ ἐὰν ἐπαισχυνθῃ̂ με καὶ τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους, Jn. 15:7: ἐὰν … τὰ ῥήματά μου ἐν ὑμι̂ν μείνῃ. Finally, a collective sing. can be used for the word which comprehends His whole proclamation: Lk. 10:39: Mary, sitting at His feet, hears τὸν λόγον αὐτου̂.

The following formulae are used in quoting the sayings.

τὸ ῥη̂μα ʼΙησου̂ (Mt. 26:75), τὸ ῥη̂μα ὡς εἰ̂πεν … ὁ ʼΙησου̂ς (Mk. 14:72), τὸ ῥη̂μα του̂ κυρίου (Ac. 11:16), ὁ λόγος ὃν εἰ̂πεν (Jn. 18:9), ὁ λόγος οὑ̂τος ὃν εἰ̂πεν (7:36), ὁ λόγος του̂ ʼΙησου̂ ὃν εἰ̂πεν (18:32), ὁ λόγος του̂ κυρίου ὡς εἰ̂πεν (Lk. 22:61), λόγος κυρίου145 (1 Th. 4:15), οἱ λόγοι του̂ κυρίου ʼΙησου̂ ὅτι αὐτὸς εἰ̂πεν (Ac. 20:35), ἐπιταγὴ κυρίου (1 C. 7:25; 7:10, 12: with παραγγέλλω and λέγω).

The variety shows that there is no fixed formula like the later λέγει ὁ κύριος (2 Cl., 5, 2; 6, 1; 8, 5). But this does not mean that the Lord’s sayings do not already have exclusive authority for Paul (1 C. 7:10). The most comprehensive and strongest historical proof of the authoritative character of Jesus’ sayings in the apostolic age is the fact of the Gospels with their accounts of what Jesus said. These are preceded by the apostolic witness, which is expressly accredited by the fact that the apostles were present as eye-witnesses (Ac. 1:21 f.). Yet it is also worth pondering that early Christianity could quite freely accept different forms of the same sayings as preserved in the tradition. This is linked with the fact that the Church could use the various Synoptic Gospels alongside one another. It is true, of course, that the Evangelist examines and sifts the tradition. He tries to find the sources and the accounts of eye-witnesses (Lk. 1:1–4). This displays an interest in the historical aspect of the sayings of Jesus. Nevertheless, he and the community do not give way to the resignation which might arise from inability to fix the precise wording of the Beatitudes or the account of the Lord’s Supper. Neither a book with literally inspired wording nor the mythically or dogmatically fixed statement of a supernaturally docetic Christ constitutes the authority by which early Christianity lives and dies. This authority is the genuine word which Jesus spoke, which men heard, and which is recounted by men. It is no accident that again and again, both on the lips of Jesus and in narration, the self-evident ὃν (οὓς) ἐλάλησα (Lk. 24:44; Jn. 12:48) or ὃν εἰ̂πεν (→ supra) is expressly used of the λόγος of Jesus. This word which is really spoken, and no other, is for early Christianity the Word of Christ. Here, too, the σὰρξ ἐγένετο is taken seriously, and in spite of it, or in it, they see the δόξα.

b. The Authority of the Sayings of Jesus. The Gospel tradition tells us how the sayings of Jesus of Nazareth were received by the hearers. Some are displeased (Mk. 10:22), take offence (Mt. 15:12), and call Him possessed (Jn. 10:20). This is not just because His Word is paradoxical, a hard saying (σκληρός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος οὑ̂τος, Jn. 6:60). It is because the implied claim is unheard of, and is felt to be blasphemous (Mk. 2:7). Opponents can try to catch Him (ἐν) λόγῳ (Mt. 22:15; Mk. 12:13; Lk. 20:20, cf. v.26: ῥήματος). For His claim, and therewith the threat which He poses, may be seen in His λόγος. Yet on the other side there is astonishment at the same Word.146 This is not so much evoked by an external impression147 nor by the psychological operation of a particular depth of ethical or religious insight. It is the devastating effect of the → ἐξουσία displayed in the Word (Mt. 7:28; Lk. 4:32). Because of this the Word of Jesus is different from that of the γραμματει̂ς. It testifies to the authority, not of the rabbi, but the Son. Like His acts and His whole appearance, His Word demands faith in the One whom God has sent. This is the heart of the Word according to the Synoptic tradition (Mt. 8:9 f.; Lk. 5:5). The destiny of man is decided by the attitude to this Word as the Word of Christ, by the attitude to Him. Because it is His Word, to be ashamed of His words is to be ashamed of Him (Mk. 8:38). Because they are His words, they do not pass away even though heaven and earth pass away (Mk. 13:31).

It is in no sense true that the word and work of Jesus are distinct as two separate functions of His manifestation. This basic insight will call for fuller discussion (→ 108 f.), but already at this point is is evident that His Word is a working and active Word. It is an integral part of His action. This is expressed in the request which has healing action in view but speaks only of εἰπὲ λόγῳ (Mt. 8:8; Lk. 7:7), in the ἐπὶ δὲ τῳ̂ ῥήματί σου χαλάσω τὰ δίκτυα (Lk. 5:5), in the account of His driving out spirits λόγῳ (Mt. 8:16), in the many accounts, characteristic of almost all the miracle stories, of the way in which His spoken Word brings into operation His power of healing (Mk. 2:10 ff.), raising the dead (Lk. 7:14 f.), controlling demons (Mk. 1:25 f.), and ruling the elements (Mk. 4:39). The Word of Jesus, and the power of this Word, do not operate only on a spiritual level beyond the physical and natural. They raise a claim to lordship over the undiminished whole of spirit-corporeality as this characterises all creation as described in the Bible.

How strongly the tradition is controlled by recollection that the saying of Jesus in a specific situation has the definite effectual ἐξουσία of operation may be seen from the fact that in the Gk. account many such sayings are preserved in Aramaic: ταλιθὰ κου̂μ (Mk. 5:41); ἐφφαθά (Mk. 7:34) etc. This fixing of the saying might seem to suggest that it is regarded as a magic formula. But in reality there is no such idea, as all our knowledge of primitive Christianity shows beyond doubt. Sayings of the Lord are quoted to give unconditional authority to a demand (1 C. 7:10). Healings are performed in the name of Jesus Christ (Ac. 3:6). It is never suggested, however, that the miracle is magically performed merely by the utterance of the name. Even though this might seem to be implied when the wording was thought to be so important that the original was preserved, primitive Christianity observed with sure and unerring instinct the boundary between the superstition of magic formulae on the one side, and the account of the ἐξουσία of Jesus, and awareness of its present efficacy in His name. on the other.

The facts firmly and definitely described in the Synoptic tradition are taken up by John and expressed in many compendious statements.148 The dual effect of faith or rejection is caused, for Jn., both by the work of Jesus (11:45ff.) and by His Word (6:60ff.; 10:19ff.: σχίσμα ἐγένετο … διὰ τοὺς λόγους τούτους). Men believe in Jesus διὰ τὸν λόγον αὐτου̂ (4:41; cf. 4:50ff.). They accept His words or not (λαμβάνειν, 12:48). They either keep them or not (τηρει̂ν, 8:51; 14:24; 15:20; Rev. 3:8). They abide in His Word (Jn. 8:31; cf. 15:7). His Word enters into them (χωρει̂ ἐν ὑμι̂ν, 8:37). Rejection of His Word means divine judgment (12:47f.). But the man who receives and keeps it is καθαρός … διὰ τὸν λόγον ὃν λελάληκα ὑμι̂ν (15:3). Of him it is said: ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον καὶ εἰς κρίσιν οὐκ ἔρχεται (5:24), οὐ μὴ γεύσηται θανάτου εἰς τὸν αἰω̂να (8:51f.).

In Jn. as in the Synoptic tradition the basis of this evaluation of the Word is the fact that Jesus is the Christ and the Son. ὁ λόγος ὃν ἀκούετε οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμὸς ἀλλὰ του̂ πέμψαντός με πατρός (14:24; cf. 14:10; 17:8). Because these are the words of the Son, they are ῥήματα ζωη̂ς αἰωνίου (6:68), πνευ̂μα καὶ ζωή (6:63). This justifies John’s equating of the Word of Jesus with the γραφή: ἐπίστευσαν τῃ̂ γραφῃ̂ καὶ τῳ̂ λόγῳ ὃν εἰπεν ὁ ʼΙησου̂ς (2:22; 5:47).

This also means, however, that the relation of men to the Word of Jesus is integrated into the relation of active and passive which is integral to the statements of primitive Christianity. To grasp is always to be grasped, and to be grasped is always to grasp. Jn. expresses this in terms of δύνασθαι and esp. in the category of being given: διὰ του̂το εἴρηκα ὑμι̂ν ὅτι οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐλθει̂ν πρός με ἐὰν μὴ ᾐ̂ δεδομένον αὐτῳ̂ ἐκ του̂ πατρός (6:65); οὐ δύνασθε ἀκούειν τὸν λόγον τὸν ἐμόν (8:43). The context of the latter saying makes it clear how remote is the idea that οὐ δύνασθε absolves from responsibility or guilt. The Synoptic statements make exactly the same point. Of Jesus Himself it is said: οὐ πάντες χωρου̂σιν τὸν λόγον του̂τον, ἀλλʼ οἱ̂ς δέδοται (Mt. 19:11). To this corresponds the statement concerning the aim of speaking in parables: ὑμι̂ν τὸ μυστήριον δέδοται τη̂ς βασιλείας του̂ θεου̂ (Mk. 4:11 and par.).149 Cf. also Lk. 18:34: καὶ ἠ̂ν τὸ ῥη̂μα του̂το κεκρυμμένον ἀπʼ αὐτω̂ν, and Lk. 9:45: οἱ δὲ ἠγνόουν τὸ ῥη̂μα του̂το, καὶ ἠ̂ν παρακεκαλυμμένον ἀπʼ αὐτω̂ν ἵνα μὴ αἴσθωνται αὐτό.

c. The Appeal to the Word of Jesus outside the Gospels. It may strike us that the Word of Jesus seems to play a lesser role outside the Gospels than one would expect. To be sure, its application is not restricted to the small number of express quotations. Part of the self-evident freedom of the primitive Church in respect of the spoken Word of the Lord is that, in addition to using many different quotation formulae (→ 105 f.), it can freely quote dominical sayings without express reference. Paul refers to the faith which can move mountains in 1 C. 13:2,150 and James has a wealth of instances,151 as does also the Didache.152 Hence it is incorrect to suppose that the application of the Word of Jesus plays a completely negligible role in the apostolic writings, and that His Word was not held in any high regard, especially by Paul. Quite apart from other factors, the existence of the Gospels, and the interest displayed in them (Lk. 1:1–4), rules out this possibility. It should also be remembered that our knowledge of apostolic proclamation is limited to specific extracts, so that to draw conclusions e.g., from epistles to missionary preaching or catechetical instruction is quite impermissible, or should be done only with great and deliberate caution.

In addition, there is the most important and pregnant fact that for the apostolic age there is no autonomous Word of Jesus separate from christological reality as a whole (→ 107). This shows how improbable is the theory of a distinct source of logia or addresses, or at least how uncertain are all the conclusions drawn from the actual or supposed existence of such a source. The words of Jesus are never more than part of a whole. This means, first, that they are viewed together with His ἔργα, secondly, that, like the whole of the earthly life and work of Jesus, they are seen and estimated in the light of the crucifixion and resurrection, and, thirdly, that once again like the whole of His accomplished work they are related to the contemporaneity of the work of the ascended and heavenly Lord and His πνευ̂μα.

These aspects, esp. the third, are to be borne in mind in respect of most of the not very numerous passages153 in which there is ref. to Christ’s Word, though no express quotation (→ 108), within the primitive Christian literature that has come down to us. Only 1 Tm. 6:3 with its ὑγιαίνοντες λόγοι του̂ κυρίου ἡμω̂ν ʼΙησου̂ Χριστου̂ refers to the recorded words of Jesus as a basis of διδασκαλία. Hb. 1:3: (ὁ υἱὸς) φέρων τὰ πάντα τῳ̂ ῥήματι τη̂ς δυνάμεως αὐτου̂, speaks of the creative Word of Christ. R. 10:17: ἡ πίστις ἐξ ἀκοη̂ς, ἡ δὲ ἀκοὴ διὰ ῥήματος Χριστου̂, certainly has in view the recorded ῥήματα; nevertheless, as the Χριστου̂ shows, it refers also to the Word of the present Lord as this is at work in ἀκοή. This aspect is dominant in Col. 3:16: ὁ λόγος του̂ Χριστου̂ ἐνοικείτω ἐν ὑμι̂ν πλουσίως, though the other need not be ruled out completely.

The most significant and pregnant result of this fact is an extension in content of the λόγος concept to the whole range of the early Christian message. Whether in the form of λόγος του̂ θεου̂, λόγος του̂ κυρίου, or λόγος in the absolute, this becomes a characteristic feature of early Christian terminology.

4. The Old Testament Word in the New Testament.

a. The NT quotes the OT ei

[1]

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* λέγω κτλ. On the whole field: R. H. Grützmacher, Wort u. Grist, eine historische u. dogmatische Untersuchung (1902); M. Kähler, Dogmatische Zeitfragen, I: Zur Bibelfrage2 (1907); K. Barth, Das Wort Gottes u. die Theologie == Gesammelte Vorträge, I2 (1925); W. Vollrath, Das Problem des Wortes (1925); H. W. Schmidt, Zeit u. Ewigkeit (1927); E. Schaeder, Das Wort Gottes (1930); Deutsche Theologie, III (Bericht über den Breslauer Theotogentag [1931]); K. Heim, Jesus der Herr (1935), 167–201. On A: Pass., Liddell-Scott, Cr.-Kö., Pr.-Bauer3, s.v.; J. H. H. Schmidt, Synonymik d. griech. Sprache, I (1876), 1ff.; E. Hofmann, Qua ratione ΕΠΟΣ, ΜΨΘΟΣ, ΑΙΝΟΣ, ΛΟΓΟΣ … in antiquo Graecorum Sermone … adhibita sine (Diss. Göttingen, 1922). On B: M. Heinze, D. Lehre vom Logos in d. griech. Philosophie 1872); G. Teichmüller, Neue Studien zar Geschichte dee Begriffe, I (1876), 167ff. and pass.; A. Aall, Geschichte d. Logosidee: in d. griech. Philosophie (1896), in d. christ. Lit. (1899); H. J. Flipse, De Vocis quae est ΛΟΓΟΣ Significatione atque Usu (Diss. Vrije Univ. Amsterdam, 1902); F. E. Walton, Development of the Logos-doctrine in Greek and Hebrew Thought (1911); E. Hoffmann, “Die Sprache u. d. archaische Logik,” Heidelberger Abh. z. Philosophie u. ihrer Geschichte, III (1925); H. Leisegang, Art. “Logos” in Pauly-W., XIII (1927), 1035–1081; “Der Logos als Symbol,” Blätter f. Deutsche Philosophie, 1 (1927/28), 292 ff.; J. Stenzel, “Zur Theorie des Logos bei Aristoteles,” Quellen u. Studien zur Geschichte d. Mathematik, B. I (1931), 34ff.; G. Bornkamm, “῾Ομολογία, Zur Geschichte eines politischen Begrifles,” Herm., 71 (1936), 377 ff. On C: OT Theol. by E. König3, 4 (1923), 75ff.; E. Sellin2 (1936), 50ff.; W. Eichrodt, II (1935), 32ff.; L. Köhler (1936), 82ff.; cf. also E. König, Der Offenbarungsbegriff des AT (1882); F. Giesebrecht, Die Berufsbegabung d. at.lichen Propheten (1897), 38ff.; F. Buhl, “Über d. Ausdrücke f. Ding, Sache uä. im Semitischen,” Festschr. f. Vilhelm Thomsen (1912); J. Szeruda, Das Wort Jahwes (1921); J. Hänel, Das Erkennen Gottes bei den Schriftpropheten (1923), 19ff.; F. Haeussermann, Wortempfang u. Symbol (1932); K. Beyer, Spruch u. Predigt bei d. vorexilischen Schriftpropheten (Diss. Erlangen, 1933); O. Grether, Name u. Wort Gottes im AT (1934), 59ff.; L. Dürr, “Die Wertung d. göttlichen Wortes im AT u. im antiken Orient, zugleich ein Beltrag zur Vorgeschichte des nt.lichen Logosbegriffes,” Mitt. d. Vorderasiatisch-Ägyptischen Ges. 42, 1 (1938, after the conclusion of this art.). On D: E. Krebs, Der Logos als Heitand … (1910); J. Schniewind, Die Begriffe Wort u. Evangelium bei Pls. (1910); H. Leisegang, Der Heilige Geist, I, 1 (1919), 67ff.; R. Bultmann, “Der Begriff d. Wortes Gottes im NT,” Glauben u. Verstehen (1933), 268–293; R. Asting, Die Verkündigung des Wortes im Urchr. (1938, after the conclusion of this art.). NT Theol. by H. J. Holtzmann, II2 (1911), 437 ff.; J. Kaftan (1927), 201 f.; H. Weinel4 (1928), 437 ff.; P. Feine6 (1934), 338 ff.; F. Büchsel (1935), 153f. On D. 13:–15.: Comm. on Jn. 1:1–14 by Bau., Zn., Schl., F. Büchsel in NT Deutsch, R. Bultmann (1937/8, after the conclusion of this art.); A. N. Jannaris, “St. John’s Gospel and the Logos,” ZNW, 2 (1901), 13–25; E. Schwartz, Aporien im Vierten Ev., IV (NGG, 1908), 497–560; J. Lebreton, Les Origines du Dogme de la Trinité2, Bibliothèque de Théologie Historique, VIII, 1 (1910), 41–73, 110–120, 143–152. 183–205, 495–506. 515–523; G. Vos, “The Range of the Logos-Title in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel,” Princeton Theol. Review, 11 (1913), 365 ff., 557 ff.; W. Bousset, Kyrios Christos2 (1921), 304 ff., 316 ff.; C. F. Burney, The Aram. Origin of the Fourth Gospel (1922), 37ff.; M. J. Lagrange, “Vers le Logos de St. Jean,” Rev. Bibl., 32 (1923), 161ff., 321 ff.; A. B. D. Alexander, “The Johannine Doctrine of the Logos.” Exp. T., 36 (1924/5), 394 ff., 467 ff.; C. F. Nolloth, The Fourth Evangelist (1925), 172ff.; C. H. Dodd, The Bible and the Greeks (1935), Index s.v. λόγος; E. Hirsch, Das Vierte Ev. (1936), 101ff.; Studien z. Vierten Ev. (1936), 44f. On the Historical Problem (On D. 14.–15.): R. Reitzenstein, Zwei religionsgesch. Fragen (1901), 47–132: Schöpfungsmythen u. Logoslehre; J. Kroll, D. Lehren d. Hermes Trismegistos (1914), Index s.v. λόγος; G. P. Wetter, Der Sohn Gottes (1916); R. Reitzenstein, “D. mandäische Buch des Herrn der Grösse u. d. Evangelienüberlieferung,” SAH (1919); Hell. Myst., Index s.v. λόγος; W. F. Albright, “The Supposed Babylonian Derivation of the Logos,” JBL, 39 (1920), 143–151; R. Bultmann, “Die Bedeutung der neuerschlossenen mandäischen u. manichäischen Quellen f. das Verständnis des Joh-Ev.,” ZNW, 24 (1925), 100ff.; H. H. Schaeder, “Der ‘Mensch’ im Prolog d. vierten Ev.,” Studien zum antiken Synkretismus aus Iran u. Griechenland == Studien der Bibliothek Warburg, VII (1926), 306–341; F. Büchsel, Joh. u. der hell. Synkretismus (1928), 21ff., 30 ff., 38ff.; L. Schmid, Joh-Ev. u. Religionsgeschichte (Diss. Tübingen, 1933), esp. 38ff. Wisdom: F. Klasen, Die at.liche Weisheit u. d. Logos d. jüdisch-alexandrinischen Philosophie … (1878); Hillen, Die at.liche Chokma, der platonisch-philonische Logos u. d. chinesische Tao (Programm Coesfeld, 1882); W. Schenke, “Die Chokma (Sophia) in d. jüdischen Hypostasenspekulation” (Skrifter utgit av Vidensskapsselskapet i Kristiania, Historisk-Filosofisk Kl., 1912 No. 6 [1913]); H. Windisch, “Die göttliche Weisheit d. Juden u. d. paulinische Christologie,” Nt.liche Studien f. G. Heinrici (1914), 220–234; J. R. Harris, The Origin of the Prologue to St. John’s Gospel (1917); “Athena, Sophia and the Logos,” Bulletin of the J. Rylands Library, 7 (1922), 56–72; R. Bultmann, “Der religionsgeschichtliche Hintergrund des Prologs zum Joh.-Ev.,” Eucharisterion, H. Gunkel-Festschr., II (1923), 1–26. Memra: Dalman WJ, I (1898), 187 f.; G. F. Moore, “Intermediaries in Jewish Theology: Memra, Shekinah, Metatron,” HThR, 15 (1922), 41–55; F. C. Burkitt, JThSt., 24 (1923), 158f.; Str.-B., II, 302–333; F. Aber, “Memra und Schechinah,” Festschr. z. 75 jähr. Bestehen des Jüd.-Theologischen Seminars Fraenckelscher Stiftung (1929), II, 1–10; V. Hamp, Der Begriff “Wort” in den aram. Bibelübersetzungen, Ein exegetischer Beitrag zum Hypostasen-Problem u. zur Gesch. der Logos-Spekulationen (1938, after the conclusion of this art.). Torah: A. Schlatter, “Die Sprache u. Heimat d. vierten Evangelisten,” BFTh, 6, 4 (1902), 14ff.; Schl. J., 1ff.; Str.-B., II, 353–362; K. Bornhäuser, Das Joh-Ev., eine Missionsschrift f. Israel (1928), 5–13. Philo: H. Soulier, La Doctrine du Logos chez Philon d’Alexandrie (Diss. Leipzig, 1876); J. Reville, La Doctrine du Logos dans le quatrième Évangile et dans les Oeuvres de Philon (1881); P. Wendland, Philo u. d. kynisch-stoische Diatribe == Beiträge zur Gesch. d. griech. Philosophie u. Religion (1895), 1–75; E. Sachsse, “Die Logoslehre bei Philo u. bei Johannes,” Nk. Z., 15 (1904), 747–767; J. d’Alma, Philon d’Alexandrie et le quatrième Évangile (1910); L. Cohn, “Zur Lehre vom Logos bei Philo,” Iudaica, H. Cohen-Festschr. (1912), 303–331; E. Bréhier, Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d’Alexandrie2 (1925), 83–111; B. Kellermann, “Licht u. Logos bei Philo,” Lewi ben Gerson, Die Kämpfe Gottes, II (1916), 307–336; E. Turowski, Die Widerspiegelung des stoischen Systems bei Philo von Alex. (Diss. Königsberg, 1927), 6ff.; cf. also F. Überweg-K. Praechter, Grundriss d. Geschichte d. Philosophie, I: Die Philosophie des Altertums11 (1920), 209 ff.

OT Old Testament.

NT New Testament.

1 E. Hoffmann, 77 ff.

Lat. Latin, latin.

2 Cf.A. Ernout-A. Meillet, Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Latine (1932), 507 ff.

3 Legere == “to read” (something written) comes from “to take from the list by letters” (or names from a list etc.).

4 Walde-Pok., II, 422. The root has not been identified for certain in other Indo-European languages.

5 Hoffmann, 77.

Hom. Homiliae.

Il. Iliad.

Od. Odyssey.

mid. middle.

class. classical.

Hom. Homer, of Chios (?), the classical Greek epic poet, around whose name were grouped the older epics of the Ionians in the 9th and 8th centuries b.c., ed. G. Monro and T. W. Allen, 1908 ff.

obj. object.

Hes. Hesiodus, of Ascra in Boetia (c. 700 b.c.), the oldest Greek poet to emerge as a tangible figure. In his Pastoral Calendar ἔργα καὶ ἡμέραι he proclaims the pastoral ideal of life. His Theogony is a speculative work on the origin and descent of the gods, ed. A. Rzach, 1913.

Theog. Theogonia.

6 Cf. “to tell” in relation to the German zählen, erzählen, sagen, also “tale” Zahl etc.

Fr. Fragmenta (-um).

Diehl E. Diehl, Anthologia Lyrica Graeca, 1925.

Diels5 H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 5th ed. by W. Kranz (1934 ff.).

opp. oppositum.

Anacr. Anacreon, of Teos, early Greek lyric poet, of the middle of the 6th century b.c., ed. E. Diehi, in Anthologia Lyrica, I, 1925.

acc. accusative.

Pind.

Pindar, of Cynoscephalae, near Thebes (518–446 b.c.), the most imporrant author of Greek odes, and preacher of the ideal of nobility still held at the beginning of the 5th century. His most important surviving poems are the Epinicia, in praise of victors in the national games, ed. O. Schroeder, 1930>

Pyth. Pythia.

esp. especially.

Hdt. Herodotus, of Halicarnassus (c. 484–425 b.c.), the first real Greek historian, described as early as Cicero as the father of history. His work deals with the conflicts between the Greeks and the barbarians from earliest times to the Persian Wars, ed. H. Kallenberg, 1926 ff.

Aristoph. Aristophanes, of Athens (c. 446–385 b.c.), the main representative of the older Attic comedy, who reached his height during the Peloponnesian War, ed. V. Coulon and H. van Daele, 1923 ff.

Eccl. Ecclesiazusae.

Aesch. Aeschylus, of Eleusis near Athens (525–456 b.c.), the first of the three great Attic dramatists, ed. U. v. Wilamowitz, 1915; Fragments, ed. A. Nauck in Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, 1889.

Ag. Agamemnon.

Soph. Sophocles, of Athens (496–406 b.c.), the real poet of the Athens of Pericles, ed. A. C. Pearson, 1924.

El. Electra.

Eq. Equites.

Prom. Prometheus Vinctus.

Oed. Oedipus Tyrannus.

Thes. Thesmophoriazusae.

Plat. Plato, of Athens (428/7–348/7 b.c.), ed. J. Burnet, 1905.

Ap. Apologia.

Isoc. Isocrates, of Athens (436–338 b.c.), originally a barrister and writer of political pamphlets, later in connection with the Sophists an outstanding representative of general culture in the 4th century, ed. F. Blass, 1913 ff.

7 Hence the class, suppletive paradigm λέγω ἐρω̂ εἰ̂πον εἴρηκα εἴρημαι ἐρρήθην.

Phaedr. Phaedrus.

Democr. Democritus, of Abdera, in the second half of the 5th century b.c., the leading representative of atomism in ancient philosophy, ed. H. Diels in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, II, 1922.

Sept. c. Septem contra Thebas.

8 Cf. Hoffmann, 77 ff.

9 The simple λόγος seems to have been formed, then, only when the simple λέγω had come to have the predominant sense “to reckon,” “to speak.” Cf. E. Schwyzer, Griech. Grammatik == Handbch. AW, II, 1, 1 (1934), 31.

Nu. Nubes.

Thuc. Thucydides, of Athens (c. 460–396 b.c.), the classic historian of the Greeks, who as a contemporary wrote a history of the Peloponnesian War, ed. C. Hude, 1898 ff.

Pers. Persae.

pap. Papyrus, shortened to P. when specific editions are quoted.

IG Inscriptiones Graecae, ed. Preussische Akademie d. Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1873 ff,

c. circa.

v. vide.

Preisigke F. Preisigke, Wörterbuch der griechischen Papyrusurkunden, 1925 ff.

Polit. Politicus.

Demosth. Demosthenes, of Athens (384–322 b.c.), ed. F. Blass, 1903 ff.

Or. Orati(ones).

Prot. Protagoras.

Heracl. Heraclitus, of Ephesus (535–475 b.c.), pre-Socratic philosopher, ed. H. Diels in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, I, 1922.

10 Cf. the Lat. ratio, “calculation,” “consideration,” then “ground,” “cause.”

Choeph. Choephori.

lit. Literature.

Gorg. Gorgias, of Leontini in Sicily (c. 483–375 b.c.), one of the main representatives of classical sophistic and rhetoric in Athens (cf. Plato’s dialogue Gorgias). From his rhetorical handbook two model speeches have come down to us, the deliverance of Helena and the defence of Palamedes, ed. H. Diels in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, II4, 1922.

Gorg. Gorgias.

plur. plural.

Hom. Hymn. ad Mercurium.

Op. Opera et Dies.

11 These are all the λόγος passages in ancient epic. Hom.Il., 4, 339 (καὶ σὺ κακοι̂σι) λόγοισι (κεκασμένε), is an unconvincing variant for δόλοισι.

12 Identical with the Sanscrit vacas- and the vacah (“speech,” “word”) of the Avesta; on the Indo-European root ueku “to speak,” which is also present in εἰ̂πον, ὄψ, Lat. vox == Sanscrit vac, Lat. vocare, cf. Walde-Pok., I, 245.

13 Hoffmann, 2 ff.

14 Orig. “thought,” cf. Slavic myslĭ, “thought,” “opinion,” Hoffmann, 47 f.

15 Hoffmann, 28.

16 The derivation from “narrative” is to be seen in the fact that grammatically λόγος (unlike ἔπος, λέξις, ῥη̂μα, ὄνομα) is never used for a single word but only for an expression or sentence, Liddell-Scott, s.v. λόγος VI.

Phaed. Phaedo.

Oed. Oedipus Coloneus.

Isthm. Isthmia.

Eur. Euripides, of Salamis nr. Athens (480–406 b.c.), tragic dramatist and philosopher of the stage, ed. G. Murray, 1901 ff.

Heracl. Heraclidae.

Trach. Trachiniae.

v. verse.

Parm. Parmenides.

Menex. Menexenus.

Lyc. Lycurgus, Attic orator and statesman (338–327 b.c.), ed. C. Scheibe and F. Blass, 1899.

Soph. Sophista.

Aristot. Aristotle, of Stageiros (c. 384–322 b.c.), with his teacher Plato the greatest of the Greek philosophers and the founder of the peripatetic school, quoted in each case from the comprehensive edition of the Academia Regia Borussica, 1831 ff.

Nem. Nemea.

Resp. Respublica.

17 Hoffmann, 111 f.; Liddell-Scott, s.v. λόγος VIII.

18 Walde-Pok., I, 283; Hofmann, 121.

Gk. Greek.

fut. future.

pass. passive.

Ion Ion

perf. perfect.

19 Cf. ῥήτωρ, (public) “speaker”; ῥη̂σις, “speech.”

adj. adjective.

20 In poetry from Archilochus, in prose from Hdt.

Archiloch. Archilochus, of Pharos, early Greek lyric poet of the 7th century b.c., ed. E. Diehl in Anthologia Lyrica, I, 1925.

21 Simonides Fr., 13, 16 f. (Diehl, II, 71): καί κεν ἐμω̂ν ῥημάτων λεπτὸν ὑπει̂χες οὐ̂ας, is obscure.

sing. singular.

22 H. Steinthal, Geschichte d. Sprachwissenschaft bei d. Griechen u. Römern, I2 (1890), 137 ff.

Crat. Cratylus.

Aeschin. Aeschines, Athenian orator and politician (c. 390–314 b.c.), who gained fame by opposing Demosthenes. The letters ascribed to him are not authentic, ed. F. Blass, 1896.

Or. Oratio in Timarchum.

Theaet. Theaetetus.

23 But in Tim., 49e τόδε is a ῥη̂μα; cf. Aeschin.Or., 2, 122: κατὰ ῥη̂μα (word for word) ἀκριβέστατα.

Ditt. W. Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum2, 1898 ff.;3, 1915 ff.

24 Preisigke Wört., s.v.

25 Walde-Pok., II, 376; cf. λαλαγέω, “to babble” (Pind.), “twitter,” etc.

CAF Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta, ed. T. Kock, 1880 ff.

26 Doubtful vl.Demosth.Or., 21, 118 λαλω̂ν, “gossiping,” opp. λέγων καὶ καταιτιώμενος ταυ̂τα.

Lys. Lysistrata.

27 Phryn. Anecd. Graec., I, p. 51, 3 (== Phryn. ed. J. de Borries [1911], p. 87, 15) defines λαλει̂ν as φλυαρει̂ν, λέγειν as ἱκανω̂ς λέγειν. Cf. → λαλιά.

Euthyd. Euthydemus.

Plut. Plutus.

Theocr. Theocritus, of Syracuse (born c. 305 b.c.), celebrated Hellenistic poet and master of bucolic poetry (the idyll), later at court in Alexandria under Ptolemaeus II Philadelphus, ed. U. Wilamowitz in Bucolici Graeci, 1905.

Idyll. Idyllia.

28 Herond., VI, 61: “ἐπὴν λαλῃ̂, one will know that it is Kerdo, not Prexinus.”

Ra. Ranae.

Ps.-Plat. Pseudo-Plato.

Ax. Axiochus.

29 Post-class. also the act., Theocr.Idyll., 27, 58: ἀλλήλαις λαλέουσι τεὸν γάμον αἱ κυπάρισσοι, Alciphr.Fr., 5, 2 (p. 156, 9 f., Schepers): πανταχῃ̂· πάντες αὐτὴν λαλου̂σιν.

Probl. Problemata.

Herond. Herondas, Greek poet, probably of Cos (c. 250 b.c.), who gives us realistic scenes from everyday life in his Mimes, of which eight have recently been discovered on papyri, ed. R. Herzog, 1926.

30 Cf. Luc.Vit. Auct., 3: ἐγὼ γὰρ λάλος (“having the gift of speech”), οὐκ ἀνδριὰς εἰ̂ναι βούλομαι.

Athen. Bellone an Pace clariores fuerint Athenienses.

Luc. Lucianus, of Samosata in Syria (120–180 a.d.), best-known, though renegade, representative of the Second Sophistic School, rhetorician and lively satirist of his epoch, ed. C. Jacobitz, 1836; W. Dindorf, 1858.

Vit. Vitarum Auctio.

Cyc. Cyclops.

Hippocr. Hippocrates, of Cos (c. 460 b.c.), the founder of the scientific medicine of the Greeks. The authenticity of many of the works handed down under his name is disputed, ed. E. Littré, 1839 ff.; J. Ilberg and H. Kühlewein, 1899 ff.; J. L. Heiberg in Corpus Medicorum Graecorum, 1927.

31 From λάλος, “garrulous” (from Aristoph. and Eur.) with the infrequent suffix-ιά, like, e.g., στρατιά from στρατός, νεοσσιά (“nest”) from νεοσσός (“young”). In sense the closest is παιδιά (“game”) from παιδ—, P. Chantraine, La Formation des Noms en Grec Ancien (1933), 81 f.

Theophr. Theophrastus, of Eresos on Lesbos (c. 372–287 b.c.), pupil of Aristotle and important scholar, succeeding him as head of the peripatetic school in Athens, ed. F. Wimmer, 1854 ff.; Charact., ed. O. Immisch, 1923; De Igne, ed. A. Gercke, 1896.

Char. Characteres.

Def. Definition, definition.

Debrunner Albert Debrunner, Jena (Vol. 1–2), Bern (Vol. 3–4).

32 Only twice in Hom.Il. 15, 393 and Od., 1, 56: αἰεὶ δὲ μαλακοι̂σι καὶ αἱμυλίοισι (→ 74) λόγοισι θέλγει, and almost as rare in Hes., e.g., Op., 106, always in the sense of connected speech; elsewhere ἔπος and μυ̂θος. Cf. Hoffmann.

33 The transcendent meaning of λόγος is particularly clear when it is a grammatical tt. as compared with ὀνόματα and ῥήματα, Ps.-Plat.Def., 414d: λόγος φωνὴ ἐγγράμματος, φραστικὴ ἑκάστου τω̂ν ὄντων· διάλεκτος συνθετὴ ἐξ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἄνευ μέλους. Cf. Plat.Crat., 424e ff.; Soph., 218c; Aristot. Phys., I, 1, p. 184b, 10 (ὄνομα/λόγος).

34 Examples in Flipse, op. cit., 87 ff. and the lexicons. Cf. J. H. H. Schmidt, I, 1 ff. (λέγειν); 113 ff. (ὄνομα).

35 “For the language of prose is by nature the language of ratio; it is ratio itself in the form of words,” W. Schadewaldt, Antike, 10 (1934), 154 f.; in this art. there are some excellent remarks on the origin of the λόγος concept.

36 On the relation μυ̂θοσ/λόγος, cf. Plat.Leg., I, 645b; Xenophanes Fr., 1, 14 (I, 127, 9, Diels5).

Phoen. Phoenissae.

P. The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, ed. B. Grenfell and A. Hunt, 1898 ff.

BGU Ägyptische Urkunden aus den Kgl. Museen zu Berlin, 1895 ff.

37 There are several examples in Preisigke Wört., s.v.

38 Cf. J. Stenzel, Zahl u. Gestalt bei Plat. u. Aristot.2 (1933), 147 ff.; cf. also sense a.: “word” or “speech” as the representation of one thing in another, acc. to Stenzel’s formulation, 151.

Tim. Timaeus.

Plot. Plotinus, of Lycopolis in Egypt (204–270 a.d.), the last great thinker of antiquity who brought Neo-Platonism to systematic completion, ed. R. Volkmann, 1883 ff.

Enn. Enneads.

synon. synonym.

39 Cf. also Plat.Resp., VIL 525e; Aristot.Phys., II, 3, p. 194b, 27 etc.

40 On λόγος in grammar and rhetoric cf. Leisegang, Pauly-W., 1036 ff.

41 Cf. Plat.Ep., VII, 342b; Resp., I, 343a: ὁ του̂ δικαίου λόγος.

42 Plat.Phaedr., 245e: ψυχη̂ς οὐσία τε καὶ λόγος.

43 Stob.Ecl., I, 79, 8 ff. tells of Chrysipp. (II, 264, 21 ff., v. Arnim): μεταλαμβάνει δʼ ἀντὶ του̂ λόγου τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τὴν αἰτίαν, τὴν φύσιν, τὴν ἀνάγκην, προστιθεὶς καὶ ἑτέρας ὀνομασίας. Cf. Epict.Diss., II, 8, 2: οὐσία θεου̂ … νου̂ς, ἐπιστήμη, λόγος ὀρθός.

Anaxag. Anaxagoras of Klazomenae (500–428 b.c.), mediator of Ionic philosophy to Athens, where he belongs to the circle of Pericles, ed. H. Diels, in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, I4, 1922.

Symp. Symposion.

Eth. Ethica Nicomachea.

v. J. v. Arnim, Stoicorum veterum Fragmenta, 1921 f.

M. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, emperor and philosopher (161–180 a.d.), influenced by Epictetus and one of the younger Stoics. His Meditations (τὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν) in 12 books are the last significant product of Stoicism, ed. H. Schenkl, 1913).

Max. Maximus of Tyre, in Rome at the time of Commodus (180–192 a.d.), Sophist and wandering philosophical orator, an eclectic Platonist with Cynical and Stoic tendencies, author of philosophical essays in the style of diatribes (διαλέξεις), ed. H. Hobein, 1910.

Orig. Origen, of Alexandria (185–254 a.d.), pupil of Clement of Alexandria, and most learned and fruitful representative of ancient Christian scholarship and culture, ed. by different scholars in Die griech, christl. Schriftsteller der ersten 3 Jahrhunderte, 1899 ff.

Cels. Contra Celsum.

Comm. De Communibus Notitiis.

Schol. Scholion (-a).

44 Only in the later cosmogony of Κόρη κόσμου (Stob.Ecl., I, 388, 13 ff.) does God create Φύσις by His word: ἐμειδίασεν ὁ θεὸς καὶ εἰ̂πε Φύσιν εἰ̂ναι … εἰ̂πεν ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἠ̂ν, and in a fragment of Orphic ῞Ορκοι (Orph. Fr. (Kern), 299, Kern) there is distinctive ref. to the αὐδὴ πατρὸς which He φθέγξατο πρω̂τον when He ἑαι̂ς στηρίξατο βουλαι̂ς the whole world (→ I, 634), expounded and rendered by Justin as ὁ του̂ θεου̂ λόγος. Cf. PhiloSacr. AC., 65: ὁ γὰρ θεὸς λέγων ἅμα ἐποίει.

45 Cf. the basic expositions of Bultmann, Glauben u. Verstehen, 274 ff.;; M. Heidegger, Sein u. Zeit, I4 (1935), 32 ff.; J. H. H. Schmidt, I, 1 ff.

46 Cf. Bornkamm, 379.

47 Cf. Pind.Nem., 4, 6: ῥη̂μα δʼ ἐργμάτων χρονιώτερον βιοτεύει, Demosth.Or., 24, 191: τω̂ν ἐκ του̂ νόμου ῥημάτων ἐκλέξας.

48 Cr.-Kö., 450.

Pol. Politica.

49 W. Bröcker, Aristoteles == Phitosophische Abhandlungen, 1 (1935), 28; cf. 176 ff.; cf. also the Stoic theory of meaning in Diog. L., VII, 38 (57): … λόγος ἀεὶ σημαντικός ἐστιν … διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ λέγειν του̂ προφέρεσθαι· προφέρονται μὲν γὰρ αἱ φωναί, λέγεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα).

tt. terminus technicus.

Preis. K. Preisendanz, Papyri Graecae Magicae, 1928 ff.

50 On the other hand cf. Plot.Enn., II, 9, 14: ὅταν γὰρ ἐπαοιδὰς γράφωσιν (the Gnostics) ὡς πρὸς ἐκει̂να λέγοντες, οὐ μόνον τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐπάνω, τί ποιου̂σιν ἢ γοητείας καὶ θέλξεις (enchantments) καὶ πείσεις λέγουσι ὡς λόγῳ ὑπακούειν καὶ ἄγεσθαι.

Leg. Legum Allegoriae.

Eus. Eusebius of Caesarea (260–340 a.d.), ecclesiastical historian, ed. by different scholars in Die Griech. christl. Schriftsteller der ersten 3 Jahrhunderte, 1902 ff.

Praep. Praeparatio Evangelica.

144 E.g., Lk. 9:44 f. (v.44a: τοὺς λόγους τούτους, v.45 [twice]; τὸ ῥη̂μα του̂το both related to the intervening statement of Jesus, v.44b). Cf. also Mt. 26:75; Mk. 14:72 (ῥήματος); par. Lk. 22:61 (λόγου). There is perhaps a certain distinction of emphasis in Lk. 20: v. 20: ἵνα ἐπιλάβωνται αὐτου̂ λόγου, “that they might lay hold of his words” (seen as a whole, in terms of content), and v. 26: οὐκ ἴσχυσαν ἐπιλαβέσθαι αὐτου̂ ῥήματος, “they could not fasten on a single saying.” But it may be that this is to read too much into the statements. For ῥη̂μα in Pl. cf. Haupt Gefbr. (Eph.), 213, 240; on the original relation between λόγος and ῥη̂μα → 79 f.

Philo Philo, of Alexandria (c. 20 b.c.–50 a.d.), ed. L. Cohn and P. Wendland.

Poster. De Posteritate Caini.

Cl. T. Flavius Clemens Alexandrinus, of Athens, but doing his main work in Alexandria (150–215 a.d.), a leading representative of Christian culture, ed. O. Stählin, 1905 ff.

Strom. Stromata.

51 Cf. Pos. in PhiloFug., 112: ὅ τε γὰρ του̂ ὄντος λόγος δεσμὸς ὢν τω̂ν ἁπάντων, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ συνέχει τὰ μέρη πάντα καὶ σφίγγει κωλύων αὐτὰ διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαρτα̂σθαι.

52 Cf. A. Busse, “Der Wortsinn von ΛΟΓΟΣ bei Heracl.,” Rheinisches Museum, 75 (1926), 203 ff.; the definitive interpretation of the λόγος concept in Heracl. is to be found in O. Gigon, Untersuchungen zu Heracl. (Diss. Basel, 1935), 3 ff.; for the range of the concept cf. J. Stenzel, Platon der Erzieher (1928), 43 ff.

53 On the connection and parallelism of λόγος as speech and as cosmic law cf. E. Hofmann, 3 ff.

54 Bultmann (n. 45), 275.

55 Nevertheless, in Heraclitus the λόγος is received more by the eyes than the ears, Fr., 101 (I, 173, 15 f., Diels5); the eyes are more reliable witnesses. In Christianity the λόγος is essentially the spoken word: hence the emphasis on ἀκούειν (→ I, 219).

56 Cf. the Καταβάλλοντες (λόγοι) of Protagoras Fr., 1 (II, 263, 2 f., Diels5), the Δισσοὶ Λόγοι (II, 105 ff.), and the speech-contest of δίκαιος and ἄδικος λόγος in the parody in Aristoph.Nu. 889 ff.

57 On λόγος as an established term in rhetoric cf. Leisegang, Pauly-W., 1043 ff.

58 Like many other terms (cf. → αἰών, → δίκη, → νόμος), λόγος is personified quite early in the poets (Hes.Theog., 229: Eur.Iph. Aul., 1013: Phoen., 471; cf. Rev. 19:13). This is not surprising among the Gks. There are movements in this direction in Plato’s usage, Phaedr., 264c: δει̂ πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῳ̂ον (organism) συνεστάναι σω̂μά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὑτου̂ … etc. E. Hoffmann, 29 f. points esp. to the role of sophistic and dialectically polemic λόγος in Theaet. Thus it can be said of the λόγος (cf. the NT, examples in Bultmann, op. cit., 280, n. 2) that it fights, conquers, succumbs, dies and rises again (cf. Plat.Phaed., 89b: ἐάνπερ γε ἡμι̂ν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. On this cf. H. Diels, SAB (1883), I, 488 f. We are to distinguish this from the equation of λόγος with a god or its hypostatisation to an independent divine essence in later antiquity.

Phileb. Philebus.

59 The verse from the Politeia of Chrysogonus (end of the 5th cent. b.c.), Ps.-Epicharm. Fr., 57 (I, 208, 8 ff., Diels5) seems to me to belong to the context of theories of the rise of culture rather than Hermes theology, as Leisegang suggests in Pauly-W., 1062: ὁ λόγος ἀνθρώπους κυβερνα̂ι κατὰ τρόπον σώιζει τʼ ἀεί· | ἔστιν ἀνθρώπωι λογισμός, ἔστι καὶ θει̂ος λόγος· | ὁ δὲ γε τἀνθρώπου πέφυκεν ἀπό γε του̂ θείου λόγου | <καὶ> φέρει <πόρους ἑκάστωι> περὶ βίου καὶ τα̂ς τροφα̂ς. | ὁ δέ γε ται̂ς τέχναις ἁπάσαις συνέπεται θει̂ος λόγος, | ἐκδιδάσκων αὐτὸς αὐτούς, ὅ τι ποιει̂ν δει̂ συμφέρον. | οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος τέχναν τινʼ εὑ̂ρεν, ὁ δὲ θεὸς τοπάν. On the θει̂ος λόγος cf. Plat.Phaed., 85d. Apart from Plut. we also find θει̂ος λόγος in Orph. Fr. (Kern), 245, 5, Kern: εἰς δὲ λόγον θει̂ον βλέψας τούτωι προσέδρευε | ἰθύνων κραδίης νοερὸν κύτος, and the Hermetic writings, cf. Cl. Al.Strom., V, 14, 94, 5; Sext. Emp.Math., VII, 129 speaks of the θει̂ος λόγος of Heracl.: του̂τον οὑ̂ν τὸν θει̂ον λόγον καθʼ ῾Ηράκλειτον διʼ ἀναπνοη̂ς σπάσαντες νοεροὶ γινόμεθα. For the common use in Philo cf. Leisegang’s Index, s.v. θει̂ος.

60 Cf. Eur.Suppl., 201 ff. In terms of the λόγος J. Stenzel has suggested a whole new understanding of Socrates and Plato in the art. “Sokrates” in Pauly-W., 2, III, 1 (1927), 811 ff.; cf Bornkamm, 377 ff.

Dio Dion, of Prusa in Bithynia (c. 40nd;120 a.d.), later called Chrysostomus, the most important representative of the so-called Second Sophistic school in the Roman Empire, ed. H. v. Arnim, 1893 ff.

61 Plat.Crat., 385b: λόγος, ὃς ἂν τὰ ὄντα λέγῃ ὡς ἔστιν, ἀληθής· ὃς δʼ ἂν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ψευδής.

62 Cf. Pind.Olymp., 1, 28 f.: καὶ πού τι καὶ βροτω̂ν φάτις ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀληθη̂ λόγον (the true, and conceptually possible, content so far as it is expressed in the ode).

63 Cf. Crito, 46b/c (Socrates says): μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῳ̂ λόγῳ ὃς ἄν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὴ λόγους … οὐ δύναμαι νυ̂ν (in face of death) ἐκβαλει̂ν … ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονταί μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμω̂ οὕσπερ καὶ πρότερον … Here, then, the λόγος is set over against the ἀλήθεια, as, e.g., in Demosth.Or., 30, 34. 26: οὐκ ἔχει ταυ̂τʼ ἀλήθειαν, … ἀλλὰ λόγοι ταυ̂τʼ ἐστιν … Plato says of himself in Ep., VII, 328c: μὴ δόξαιμί ποτε ἐμαυτῳ̂ παντάπασι λόγος μόνον ἀτεχνω̂ς εἰ̂ναί τις, ἔργου δὲ οὐδενὸς ἄν ποτε ἑκὼν ἀνθάψασθαι.

64 Bröcker, 27 and 176 ff., who develops the understanding of human existence in terms of the λόγος The λόγος as that which underlies man’s being and gives him the possibility of freedom (M. Ant., VI, 58) is also found later in the Stoics, cf. Zeno in Stob.Ecl., II, 75, 11 ff.; Epict.Diss., III, 1, 25; Plot.Enn., III, 1, 9; M. Ant., VI, 23.

65 The λόγος is here quite closely linked to the ψυχή concept: Eth. Nic., I, 13, p. 1102a, 27 ff., esp. 1102b, 13 ff.: ἔοικεν δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τη̂ς ψυχη̂ς ἄλογος εἰ̂ναι, μετέχουσα μέντοι μῃ λόγου. του̂ γὰρ ἐγκρατου̂ς καὶ ἀκρατου̂ς τὸν λόγον καὶ τη̂ς ψυχη̂ς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινου̂μεν. ὀρθω̂ς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλει̂· φαίνεται δʼ ἐν αὐτοι̂ς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεταὶ τε καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῳ̂ λόγῳ. Here Aristot. speaks on the one side of a πειθαρχει̂ν and ὁμοφωνει̂ν τῳ̂ λόγῳ—this is the ὀρθὸς λόγος, p. 1103b, 32—but on the other the ψυχή can resist it and strive with it.

66 Cf. Plut. De Virt. Morali, 3 (II, 411c): κοινω̂ς δὲ ἅπαντες οὑ̂τοι (Menedemus, Zeno, Ariston, Chrysipp.) τὴν ἀρετὴν του̂ ἡγεμονικου̂ τη̂ς ψυχη̂ς διάθεσίν τινα καὶ δύναμιν γεγενημένην ὑπὸ λόγου, μα̂λλον δὲ λόγον οὐ̂σαν αὐτὴν ὁμολογούμενον καὶ βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑποτίθενται.

67 Cf. the collection of examples in E. Schwartz, NGG (1908), 555, n. 1. 2, and v. Arnim, Index, s.v.

Diog. Diogenes Laertius, author in the 3rd century a.d. of a not very critical history of Greek philosophy in 10 books, ed. H. G. Huebner, 1828.

Stoic. De Stoicorum Repugnantiis.

68 → 79.

Is. et De Iside et Osiride.

Pos. Posidonius, of Apamea in Syria, (c. 135–51 b.c.), natural scientist, geographer, historian and philosopher of Middle Stoicism, ed. J. Bake and D. Wyttenbach, 1810.

Sext. Sextus Empiricus, originally a physician probably practising in Alexandria (c. 200 a.d.), who summed up the whole development of ancient scepticism in his Pyrrhonic Elements and in 11 books against the mathematicians, directed against individual sciences and the dogmatic philosophical schools, ed. I. Bekker, 1842; H. Mutschmann, 1912 ff.

Math. Adversus Mathematicos.

Epict. Epictetus, Phrygian slave of Hierapolis in the days of Nero (50–130 a.d.), freed at the imperial palace, Stoic of the younger school and preacher of ethics tinged with religion. From his lectures his pupil Arrian collected 8 books of diatribes which have been preserved, ed. H. Schenkl2, 1916.

Diss. Dissertation.

Ebr. De Ebrietate.

Pyrrh. Pyrrhoneae Hypotyposes.

69 H. F. Müller, “Die Lehre vom Logos bei Plot.,” Archiv f. Geschichte der Philosophie, 30 (1916), 38 ff.Esp. instructive is the Logos chapter in Plot.Enn., III, 2, 16, where basic mathematical meaning as tonal relation is important for the achievement of cosmic harmony.

Syr. De Syria Dea.

Iambl. Iamblichus, of Chalcis in Syria, at the time of Constantine the Great, founder of the Syrian school of Neo-Platonism, and reputed author of a work on the Egyptian mysteries, ed. H. Pistelli, 1894; De Mysteriis, ed. G. Parthey, 1857.

Vit. Vita Pythagorae.

70 On the much debated Orphic Pythagorean ἱερὸς λόγος (passages in Orph. Fr. (Kern) [Kern], p. 140 ff.) cf. A. Krüger, Quaestiones Orphicae, Diss. Halle (1934), 13 ff.

Suid. Suidas, author in the 10th century a.d. of the most comprehensive Greek lexicon, ed. G. Bernhardy, 1853; A. Adler, 1928 ff.

s.v. sub voce.

No. number.

Corp. Corpus Hermeticum, collection of Hermetic writings (Poimandres and others), late anonymous products of Hellenistic-Egyptian mysticism, the teachings of which may be found already in the 1st century a.d., ed. W. Scott, 1924.

Reitzenstein R. Reitzenstein, Poimandres, 1904.

71 Common in the magic pap., Preis. Zaub., I, 62; IV, 2245.

Sallust. Sallustius, contemporary and friend of the emperor Julian (361–363 a.d.), who in his book Περὶ Θεω̂ν καὶ κόσμου has left a catechism of the theology of the Neo-Platonists, ed. A. Nock.

Dem. Demonstratio Evangelica.

Epic. Epicurus, of Samos (341–270 b.c.), established a philosophical school in Athens in 306, ed. H. Usener, 1887.

Philostr. Flavius Philostratus, of Lemnos, representative of the Second Sophistic School, author as commissioned by the empress Julia Domna (d. 217), wife of Septimius Severus, of a life, containing many marvellous happenings, of the Neo-Platonic philosopher and thaumaturge, Apollonius of Tyana. His Heroicus is written in the same strain, ed. C. L. Kayser, 1870.

Vit. Vita Apollonii.

72 Cf. O. Casel, De philosophorum Graecorum silentio mystico, RVV, 16, 2 (1919), 66 ff.

73 Cf. Hermes as god of ratio, ordo, numerus and scientia, Sen.Ben., IV, 8.

74 For a full list of the gods identified with the λόγος or its many aspects cf. Leisegang, Pauly-W., 1061 ff. The λόγος is an independent personification and του̂ Διὸς ἀδελφός in Menand. Epidict., ed. L. Spengel, Rhetores Graeci, III (1856), p. 341, 16.

Cornut. L. Annaeus Cornutus, ot Leptis in Africa, at the time of Nero, who in his Hellenistic Theology gives us a picture of later Stoic theology and allegory, ed. A. Nock, 1926.

Theol. Theologia Graeca.

75 This has often been compared with Jn. 3:17.

76 On this idea, of which there are hints already in Plat.Crat., 407e ff. and Stoicism, cf. Ac. 14:12: ἐκάλουν δὲ τὸν Βαρναβα̂ν Δία, τὸν δὲ Παυ̂λον ῾Ερμη̂ν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ἠ̂ν ὁ ἡγούμενος του̂ λόγου. Leisegang, Pauly-W., 1063 refers to Iambl.Myst., 1: θεὸς ὁ τω̂ν λόγων ἡγεμών, and Etym. M., s.v. ῾Ερμη̂ς : παρὰ τὸ ἐρω̂, τὸ λέγω, ῾Ερμη̂ς, ὁ του̂ λόγου ἔφορος, cf. also Orph. (Abel), 28, 4 (to Hermes).

77 Cf. the λόγος as αἰδοι̂ον in Reitzenstein, Zwei religionsgeschichtliche Fragen, 96, or the λόγος with strong sexual connections in PhiloSom., I, 200. Plot. (Enn., III, 6, 19), giving a philosophical interpretation of historically developed popular religion, thought the Gks. rightly represented the god Hermes ithyphallically, i.e., as an image of the procreative intelligible λόγος. Porphyr. in Eus.Praep. Ev., III, 11, 42: ὁ δὲ ἐντεταμένος ῾Ερμη̂ς δηλοι̂ τὴν εὐτονίαν, δείκνυσι δὲ καὶ τὸν σπερματικὸν λόγον τὸν διήκοντα διὰ πάντων. For the creation of the world through the divine Λόγος, cf. Sib., 8, 446.

78 Cf. Plut.Is. et Os., 53 (II, 373b): του̂ ῾Ερμου̂, τουτέστι του̂ λόγου, μαρτυρου̂ντος καὶ δεικνύοντος ὅτι πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν ἡ φύσις μετασχηματιζομένη τὸν κόσμον ἀποδίδωσιν. 373 d: τὸ πα̂ν ὁ λόγος διαρμοσάμενος συμφωνον ἐξ ἀσυμφώνων μερω̂ν ἐποίησε.

79 Cf. J. Kroll, Die Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos (1914), 57 ff.

Ael. Aelius Aristides, of Adrianutherai in Mysia (129–189 a.d.), celebrated rhetorician and credulous votary of Aesculapius, one of the best known representatives of later Hellenistic piety in literature (cf. his prose hymns to different deities), ed. W. Dindorf, 1829; ed. B. Keil, 1898.

80 For the most important lit. cf. Leisegang, Pauly-W., 1077 f.; O. Willmann, Geschichte d. Idealismus, I (1894), 617 ff. Cf. also → Bibl.

81 Acc. to Leisegang, op. cit., 1072; cf. also the Philo Index, s.v.

82 Cf. L. Grossmann, Quaestionum Philonearum altera de Λόγῳ Philonis (1829); Leisegang, op. cit., 1072 ff.

83 NGG (→ n. 67), 537 ff.

84 Esp. because of the connection of the λόγος with the → ῥη̂μα θεου̂ (Leg. All., III, 173; Poster. C., 102 of the Law).

85 Op. cit., 303 ff.

86 It is not surprising in his day that Philo should use the term in all the various senses of Platonism and esp. Stoicism, as λόγος σπερματικός (Leg. All., III, 150), προφορικός and ἐνδιάθετος (Vit. Mos., II, 129), ἐρμηνευτικός (Leg. All., I, 74), esp. as ὀρθὸς λόγος (ibid., III, 1 etc.)—along with the sense of Holy Scripture (Poster. C., 142), even as the Stoic moral and cosmic law (Op. Mund., 143; Deus Imm., 71) and destiny (Deus Imm., 176), and including the material qualities of the ἔνθερμος καὶ πυρώδης λόγος (Cher., 30). Cf. the many examples in Grossmann and Leisegang. For distinctions from Stoicism cf. Aall, I, 195 ff.; on Philo’s general method in the development of concepts, cf. Schürer, III4, 698 ff.

Sacr. De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini.

Spec. De Specialibus Legibus.

87 Op. Mund., 25: δη̂λον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρχέτυπος σφραγίς, ὅν φαμεν νοητὸν εἰ̂ναι κόσμον, αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη [τὸ παράδειγμα, ἀρχέτυπος ἰδέα τω̂ν ἰδεω̂ν] ὁ θεου̂ λόγος.

Migr. De Migratione Abrahami.

Cher. De Cherubim.

88 Sometimes the λόγος is also equated with this (Leg. All., I, 65 ἡ δὲ [σοφία] ἐστὶν ὁ θεου̂ λόγος).

89 The younger son is the κόσμος αἰσθητός, also called the λόγος (Deus Imm., 31).

Agric. De Agricultura.

Op. De Opificio Mundi.

Gig. De Gigantibus.

Vit. De Vita Mosis.

Fug. De Fuga et Inventione.

90 Also called ἄγγελοι (Som. I, 148) or ψυχαὶ ἀθάνατοι (ibid., I, 127).

Rer. Div. Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres sit.

91 “Die Vorbereitung des Neoplatonismus,” Problemata, 1 (1930), 30 ff.

92 Acc. to E. Hoffmann, “Platonismus u. Mystik im Altertum” (SAH, 1934/5, 2), 58, who even speaks of an oriental style of thought. This personifying type of thought perhaps explains also the very non-Gk., figurative and allegorical identification of the λόγος with OT characters like Melchizedek, the high-priest, and finally a βασιλεύς, διδάσκαλος, σύμβουλος etc. (for the passages cf. Leisegang, Pauly-W., 1077).

93 Cf. Kroll, 55 ff.

Det. Pot. Quod Deterius Potiori insidiari soleat.

94 Cf. the interpretation of the Osiris myth in Plut.Is. et Os., 53 (II, 373b), where it is said of Horus, the elder of the two sons, ὃν ἡ ῏ Ισις εἰκόνα του̂ νοητου̂ κόσμου αἰσθητὸν ὄντα γεννᾳ̂. From the Herm. writings cf. passages like Herm., I, 8; VIII, 2; XI, 9; cf. Orig.Cels., VI, 60. On this cf. Reitzenstein Hell. Myst., 49 and 329; Poim., 41 ff.; also Kroll, 55 ff.; Turowski, 9, n. 22.

95 On the different usage cf. Schwartz, 555; Bultmann (→ n. 45), 275.

96 Cf. Max. Tyr., 33, 5: ἐγὼ δὲ ἐλευθερίαν ποθω̂ν νόμου δέομαι, λόγου δέομαι. M. Ant., VI, 58.

97 Cf. Plut.Aud., 1 (II, 37d): ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ἕπεσθαι θεῳ̂ καὶ τὸ πείθεσθαι λόγῳ. Thus in Plut. Ad Principem Ineruditum, 3 (II, 780 f.) the true ruler is called a μίμημα καὶ φέγγος θεου̂ when he has θεου̂ λόγον as διάνοια, cf. loc. cit.: ὁ νόμος … ἔμψυχος ὢν ἐν αὐτῳ̂ λόγος, Stoic. Rep., 1 (II, 1033b): ὁ … λόγος του̂ φιλοσόφου νόμος αὐθαίρετος.

98 On the λόγος as harmony, cf. Plut.Is. et Os., 55 (11, 373d); cf. E. Hoffmann, 42: → n. 69.

99 On the equation of λόγς and υἱός cf. Plut.Is. et Os., loc. cit.; M. Ant., IV, 29, 3.

100 For the radical conflict between the ancient and the Christian concept of the Logos cf. already Orig.Cels., II, 31: μετὰ ταυ̂τα Χριστιανοι̂ς ἐγκαλει̂ (sc. Κέλσος) ὡς σοφιζομένοις ἐν τῳ̂ λέγειν τὸν υἱὸν του̂ θεου̂ εἰ̂ναι αὐτολόγον, καὶ οἴεταί γε κρατύνειν τὸ ἔγκλημα, ἐπεὶ λόγον ἐπαγγελλόμενοι υἱὸν εἰ̂ναι του̂ θεου̂ ἀποδείκνυμεν οὐ λόγον καθαρὸν καὶ ἅγιον ἀλλὰ ἄνθρωπον ἀτιμότατα ἀπαχθέντα καὶ ἀποτυμπανισθέντα … οὐδενὸς ἀκήκοα ἐπαινου̂ντος τὸ λόγον ἐ̂ναι τὸν υἱὸν του̂ θεου̂, ὡς ὁ Κέλσος εἴρηκε, … ὡς εἴ γε ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ὑμι̂ν υἱὸς του̂ θεου̂ καὶ ἡμει̂ς (we Greeks) ἐπαινου̂μεν.

Kleinknecht Hermann Kleinknecht, Tübingen (Vol. 1–2), Halle (Vol. 3), (Vol. 4), Münster (Vol. 5–6).

Aram. Aramaic.

Heb. Hebrew.

101 So C. Brockelmann, Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der semitischen Sprachen, I (1908), 255.

Arab. Arabic.

102 Cf. Grether, op. cit., 59 ff.

103 Thus the Aram. dabr̄ (“field”) and the Heb. dober (“pasture”) are related. In the case of מִדְבָּר one might ask whether it does not mean “pasture,” or, better, “hinterland.”

104 M. Pohlenz, “Stoa und Semitismus,” Ilbergs Neue Jahrbücher f. Wiss. u. Jugendbildung, 2 (1926), 258.

105 On the state of the גְּלוּי אֹזֶן cf. Is. 22:14.

106 Cf. K. Beyer, Spruch u. Predigt bei den vorexilischen Schriftpropheten (Diss. Erlangen, 1933).

107 A. Jepsen, Nabi (1934), 43 ff. seems to me to efface the distinctions.

vl. varia lectio.

108 בדבר יהוה is rightly left out in the LXX.

Mas. Masora.

109 Cf. J. Begrich, “Die priesterliche Thora,” in P. Volz-F. Stummer-J. Hempel, Werden u. Wesen des AT == ZAW Beih., 66 (1936), 63–88.

110 8:11, reading דְּבַר יְהוָֹה with LXX Syr. Vg.

111 The subj. of Jer. 20:9b α (וְהָיָה) is hardly God, but the דֶּבָר, since לאֹ אֶזְכְּרֶנּוּ in v. 9a does not refer to God but to the דָּבָר received.

Dt. Deutero-Isaiah.

112 Cf. H. Holzinger, Einleitung in den Hexateuch (1893), 179 and 250.

113 Cf. Grether, op. cit., 139 ff.

Procksch Otto Procksch †, Erlangen (Vol. 1–5).

114 For examples cf. Pass., s.v.; comm. on Col. 2:23.

115 Cf. κενοφωνία in 2 Tm. 2:16.

116 The examples show that with the negative estimation too the plur. and sing. are interchanged at will, even in the same epistle.

117 Schl. Jk., 213: “Regulation of the word is the most difficult thing of all and the last to be attained.”

118 How meaningless the distinction often is between the plur. and the collective sing. may be seen from Ac. 2:40 f.: ἑτέροις δὲ λόγοις πλείοσιν διεμαρτύρατο … οἱ μὲν οὑ̂ν ἀποδεξάμενοι τὸν λόγον αὐτου̂ …

119 On Mk. 9:10 → n. 140.

120 On the πρω̂τος λόγος (== Lk.) cf. PhiloOmn. Prob. Lib., 1; Gal. De Usu Partium Corporis Humani, II, 1 (III, p. 88, Kühn); Hdt., V, 36. Cf. Zn. Ag., ad loc.

121 Cf. H. A. W. Meyer4 (1870), Zn. Ag., ad loc.; Schl. Lk., 624.

122 So א * b.c. etc.

Jos. Flavius Josephus, Jewish author (c. 37–97 a.d.) in Palestine and later Rome, author in Greek of the Jewish War and Jewish Archaeology, which treat of the period from creation to Nero, ed. B. Niese, 1887 ff.

Ant. Antiquitates.

123 So text. rec. acc. to EHLP etc.

124 So Zn. Ag., 716, n. 67.

125 Note the parallelism of λόγος and κήρυγμα, which gives a highly individual content to λόγος.

126 Cf. Ac. 6:4 f.; 11:19, 22.

127 On ἐγώ → II, 343 ff., esp. 345 ff.; on ἀμήν → I, 337 f.

128 This is not altered by the approximation of the formula to the OT ἐγὼ κύριος λελάληκα, Ez. 5:15, 17 etc.

129 Cf. also Gl. 3:17; 4:1; 5:16; 1 C. 7:8, 12 etc.

130 Division into several subsidiary meanings in NT usage is misleading, since this is a single group to the Gk. ear.

131 For examples cf. Pass., Pape, Pr.-Bauer, s.v.; Deissmann LO, 94; Schl. Lk., 372; Kl. Mt. on 18:23; → 73; 78.

132 Mich. Ph., ad loc.

133 So most modern exegetes, G. Lünemann (H. A. W. Meyer4 [1878]), Rgg, ad loc.; F. W. Grosheide, De Brief aan de Hebreen == Kommentaar op het Nieuwe Testament, XII (1927), 139; though cf. Lucifer of Calaris (d. 370): ad quem nobis ratio est (Rgg. Hb.2, 3, 117, n. 8). also Calvin Comm., ad loc.: cum quo nobis est ratio (Vg: ad quem nobis sermo). For examples cf. Wettstein, II, 399; F. Bleek, Der Brief an d. Hb., II, 1 (1936), 591; Rgg. Hb.2, 3, 117, n. 8; Exp. 6th Ser., Vol. VIII (1903), 437; 8th Ser., I (1911), 286 f. Colourless in Wnd. Hb.,1 ad loc.: “of whom we speak,” Hb.2: “… have to speak.”

134 Chrys.Hom. in Hb., VII, 1, ad loc. (MPG, 63, p. 62): αὐτῳ̂ μέλλομεν δου̂ναι εὐθύνας τω̂ν πεπραγμένων. Cf. also E. Preuschen, “Altkirchliche antimarcionitische Schrift unter dem Namen Ephräms,” ZNW, 12 (1911), 260: λόγον αὐτῳ̂ ἀποδιδόναι.

135 Cf. also Ign.Mg., 3, 2: τὸ δὲ τοιου̂τον οὐ πρὸς σάρκα ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεόν, τὸν τὰ κρύφια εἰδότα.

136 So also ad loc., J. C. K. v. Hofmann, Die Hl. Schrift NT’s, V (1873); Schl. Erl.; G. Hollmann, Schr. NT.

137 Examples in Pape, Pass., Liddell-Scott, s.v.; e.g., Aesch.Choeph., 515: ἐκ τίνος λόγου; → 74.

138 E.g., Hdt., I, 95: τὸν ἐόντα λέγειν λόγον, “to represent the matter as it is”; Demosth.Or., 18, 44: ἕτερος λόγος οὑ̂τος, “this is another matter”; Plut.Them., 11 (I, 117e): ἀνη̂γεν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον, “he won him for the matter (referred to).” → 78.

139 τούτῳ shows that there is no ref. back to v. 4 (τὸν λόγον) and v. 14 (τὸν λόγον του̂ θεου̂).

140 Pr.-Bauer includes Mk. 9:10 in this connection, but incorrectly. τὸν λόγον ἐκράτησαν does not refer to the “matter” of the transfiguration of Jesus, but, acc. to v.10b, to the saying about the resurrection in v.9. Cf. Kl. Mk., ad loc.Pr.-Bauer also mentions the form λόγον ἔχειν πρός τινα in Ac. 19:38 → 103. This is not to be taken in the same way as Ac. 8:21; 15:6, since there is no reference back.

141 Zn., Kl., Hck., ad loc.

142 Cf. Str.-B., I, 313 ff.; Kittel Probleme, 100.

143 Cf. S. Dt., 26 on 3:23 (p. 36, Kittel): “It seems that a matter of adultery was found in her (דבר ניאוף == λόγος μοιχείας); T. Shebu., 3, 6: “A matter of violation” (דבר עבירה == λόγος παραβάσεως), cf. Schl. Mt., ad loc. There is to be seen in the formula exactly the same reversal of the OT status constructus formula as in the NT saying.

par. parallel.

145 There is no reason to refer this to a saying of the exalted Lord.

146 → θαμβέω, III, 5 f.; → θαυμάζω, III, 36 ff.; ἐκπλήσσομαι.

147 So perhaps λόγοι τη̂ς χάριτος in Lk. 4:22 (“gracious address”), cf. Zn., ad loc.; Schl. and Hck., ad loc. take a different view: “sweet words of grace.”

148 Jn. usually has λόγος in the sing., often in a collective sense. As a plur. he normally uses τὰ ῥήματα (λόγοι only in Jn. 10:19; 14:24, cf. also vl. 7:40; 19:13); → 13. a.

149 Mt. 13:11 continues: ἐκείνοις δὲ οὐ δέδοται; these words are not found in Mk. But Mk. 4:11 makes it clear that the opinion of the ἐκει̂νοι presupposed in him is the same as that recorded in Mt. (→ ἵνα).

150 == Mk. 11:23; Mt. 17:20; 21:21. Many other examples from Paul are given in H. J. Holtzmann, Lehrbuch der nt.lichen Theologie, II2 (1911), 232 f.

151 Cf. Hck. Jk., 13, n. 46; Zahn Einl., I, 87. Dib. Jk. underestimates the real connection in favour of formal analogies (27).

152 Esp. 1:1ff.

153 In Hb. 6:1: ἀφέντες τὸν τη̂ς ἀρχη̂ς του̂ Χριστου̂ λόγον, the του̂ Χριστου̂ is perhaps an obj. gen. Cf. Rgg. Hb.2, 3, 146, ad loc. The attempt of A. Seeberg in Der Katechismus der Urchristenheit (1903), 248 f. to find here a “catechism whose individual parts may be traced back to Christ” is pure imagination.

[1]Theological dictionary of the New Testament. 1964-c1976. Vols. 5-9 edited by Gerhard Friedrich. Vol. 10 compiled by Ronald Pitkin. (G. Kittel, G. W. Bromiley & G. Friedrich, Ed.) (electronic ed.) (4:69). Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.