Cities of refuge

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City of refuge

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Study in Deuteronomy 19 -20

Cities of refuge

Preamble
Chapter 19 deals with several of the 10 commandments
Where were they located. Dueteronomy 4:41-43
Three on the East side of the Jordan and Three on the west side. 6 more were envisioned when the whole land was conquered but when this did not happen they did not get allocated. Named inBezer, for the Reuebites, Ramoth in Gilead, and Golan in Bashan these were the three cities east of the Jordan. On the west side of the Jordan were:
Hebron in Judah, Shechem in Ephraim and Kedesh in Naphtali.`
Administration. Numbers 35:9-34,
These cities were given to the Levites with additional cities. The cities of refuge were to be governed by the Levites as were those who showed up in the city.
Process for Justice. Exodus 21:12-36
Law of An eye for an eye was introduced as a civil legal system. Avenger of Blood
Modification of the System.
Such a stern system, however, could not, of course, survive unmodified after the community had begun to advance from the purely savage state. Abuses of the privilege of blood-revenge must have soon become evident to the tribal chiefs, as one finds in Ex. xxi. 12 (compare Gen. ix. 6) that the commonly accepted formula that a life must be given for a life is modified by a careful legal distinction between wilful murder and accidental manslaughter. In order to establish a case of wilful murder, it must be shown that weapons or implements commonly devoted to slaughter were used, and that a personal hatred existed between the slayer and his victim (Ex. xxi. 12; compare Num. xxxv. 16; and Deut. xix. 4). The law enumerates three exceptions to this general principle: (a) The slaying of a thief caught at night in flagrante delicto is not punishable at all; but if he is captured by day there is blood-guilt which, however, is not liable to the blood-revenge (Ex. xxii. et seq.). (b) If a bull gored a human being to death, the punishment was visited upon the animal, which was killed by stoning. Its flesh in such a case might not be eaten. If gross contributory negligence could be proved on the part of the animal's owner, he was liable only for blood-money(Ex. xxi. 28). (c) Where the master kills his slave, the offense is punishable only when the latter dies at once, and then probably not by the death-penalty, as some of the rabbinical writers thought (Ex. xxi. 23).
Six Cities of Refuge.
The later codes develop at some length the very just distinction between wilful murder and accidental homicide ). Six Cities of Refuge were appointed for the purpose of affording an asylum to the homicide, where he might be secure from the hand of the avenger (Deut. xix. 12) until the elders of the community of which the accused was a member should decide whether the murder was intentional or accidental (Num. xxxv. 9-34; Deut. xix. 1-13; Josh. xx.). According to the later procedure, at least two witnesses were necessary to establish a case of wilful murder (Num. xxxv. 30; Deut. xix. 15). In case, however, it was not possible to apprehend the murderer or manslayer, the adjudication might take place and a verdict be rendered in his absence.
It appears from Josh. xx. 4 that the elders of the city of refuge chosen by the slayer had the right to decide as to whether he should be permitted to have a temporary asylum or not. If the case were simply one of unintentional manslaughter the slayer was immediately accorded the right of asylum in the city of refuge, where he had to remain until the death of the reigning high priest (Num. xxxv. 25), whose death, in ancient Hebrew law, marked the end of a legal period of limitation (Num. xxxv.; Deut. xix.; Josh. xx.). If the "go'el ha-dam" were to find the slayer of his kinsman outside the limits of the city of refuge, he had the right to kill him at sight.
The Family Executioner.
In a case in which the verdict against the slayer was one of willful murder, the murderer incurred the blood-revenge without any restrictions. If he were already in a city of refuge, the elders of his own city were obliged to fetch him thence by force if necessary, and to deliver him formally to the Avenger of Blood, who thus became little more than a family executioner (Deut. xix. 11 et seq.).
Two very important restrictions should here be noticed: (a) Although the entire family or gens to which the murdered man belonged were theoretically entitled to demand the blood-revenge (II Sam. xiv. 7), still, in the practice of later times, only one member—for example, the next of kin, who was also legal heir—might assume the duty of carrying it out. According to the later Jewish tradition, when there was no heir, the court had the right to assume the position of the "go'el." (b) The law expressly states that the blood-revenge was applicable only to the person of the guilty man and not to the members of his family as well (Deut. xxiv. 16; compare II Kings xiv. 6). This is a most significant advance on the primitive savage custom that involved two generations in a ceaseless feud. Anent this advance, it is interesting to note that, in the time of the kings, the king himself, as the highest judicial authority, was entitled to control the course of the blood-revenge (II Sam. xiv. 8 et seq.).
It is difficult to decide exactly how long the custom of blood-revenge by the "go'el" remained in vogue among the Hebrews. According to II Chron. xix. 10; Deut. xvii. 8, the law of Jehoshaphat demanded that all intricate legal cases should come before the new court of justice at Jerusalem. It is not probable, however, that this regulation curtailed the rights of the "go'el ha-dam," which must have continued in force as long as there was an independent Israelitish state. Of course, under the Romans, the right of blood revenge had ceased (John xviii. 31).
The Redeemer of His Kinsmen.
(2) As indicated above, the term "go'el" had also a secondary meaning. From the idea of one carrying out the sentence of justice in the case of blood-shed, the word came to denote the kinsman whose duty it was to redeem the property and person of a relative who, having fallen into debt, was compelled to sell either his land or himself as a slave to satisfy his creditors (compare Lev. xxv. 25, 47-49). It would appear from Jer. xxxii. 8-12 that the "go'el" had the right to the refusal of such property before it was put up for public sale, and also the right to redeem it after it had been sold (see Ruth).
From the Book of Ruth (iv. 5) it would appear that the duty of the nearest of kin to marry the widow of his relative in case of the latter's dying without issue was included in the obligations resting upon the "go'el"; but inasmuch as the term is not used in the passage in Deut. (xxv. 8-10) in which this institution is referred to—the obligation resting upon the brother to marry his deceased brother's widow—the testimony of so late a production as Ruth can not be pressed. The usage in the book may not be legally accurate.
From this idea of the human "go'el" as a redeemer of his kinsmen in their troubles, there are to be found many allusions to Yhwh as the Divine Go'el, redeeming His people from their woes (compare Ex. vi. 6, xv. 13; Ps. lxxiv. 2), and of the people themselves becoming the "redeemed" ones of Yhwh (Ps. cvii. 2; Isa. lxii. 12). The reference to God as the "go'el" and as the one who would "redeem" His people was applicable to the relationship between Yhwh and Israel in the exilic period, when the people actually looked to their God to restore their land for them, as the impoverished individual looked to his kinsman to secure a restoration of his patrimony. Hence, of thirty-three passages in which "go'el" (as a noun or verb) is applied to God, nineteen occur in the exilic (and post-exilic) sections of Isaiah—the preacher par excellence of "restoration"—for example, in xlviii. 20, xlix. 26, lii. 9, lxii. 12, etc. See Asylum; Cities of Refuge; Job; Murder.
In Rabbinical Literature:
Several primitive social regulations touching the rights of the blood relation, the "go'el ha-dam" (Avenger of Blood), are acknowledged by the Biblical law (Num. xxxv. 19 et seq.; Deut. xix. 12); although, according to the higher conception of the Bible, a murder is not so much a crime against the individual as against the community. This conception is carried still further by the rabbinical law, under which the avenging relative has no rights left. The hunting down of a murderer is no longer the business of the avenger, but of the state; accordingly, whether there is any relative or not, whether the relative lodges complaint or not, the state must prosecute the murderer . Every murderer, or one who had committed manslaughter, fled to one of the cities of refuge before his case was investigated; and there he was secure from any attack on the part of the avenger, who was forbidden, under penalty of death, to assail such a fugitive in his asylum It was obligatory upon the court of justice to arrest the fugitive there, bring him to court, try him, and, if found guilty, to execute him. If it was proved that the death was a case of carelessness and not of intentional murder, he was sent back to the city of refuge in care of armed officers of the court, so as to protect him from the avenger . Should he leave his place of refuge, the avenger had, according to R. 'Akiba, the right—and, according to R. Jose the Galilean, the duty—to slay him, but only when the fugitive had voluntarily left his retreat . But even here it is evident that the avenger enjoyed no peculiar prerogative; for, should the fugitive be slain by a disinterested party, the latter was not held accountable (ib.; for the correct reading of this passage compare Rabbinowicz, "Variæ Lectiones," on the passage). One teacher, however, goes so far as to maintain that neither the avenger nor, still less, a third party can be permitted to take the man's life, should he have left his asylum All these details, however, are hardly to be considered as ever having been matters of actual enforcement; for, although it is highly probable that rabbinical tradition contained much concerning the cities of refuge which existed during the second Temple ), the regulations concerning the Avenger of Blood are rather of an academic nature and are scarcely drawn from actual life.
What was it for
God himself set the rules in place for Murder In Genesis 9:4-6 In order to protect the sanctity of life because man was made in his image. But God knowing the sinful heart of man knew that this rule of Justice could be carried to the extreme. It was there to protect the innocent from being killed by an angry relative even though it was an accident.
This primitive system is still in use to today in some less developed cultures especially in cultures where corruption means that people get away with murder by paying a bribe to the people in power something also addressed in this chapter. Albania, India
The first modification of the old usage is made in the Book of Deuteronomy (xix. 1-7, 11-13). As the rural shrines were abolished by the law of that book, it became necessary to make other provisions for the innocent homicide that lived too far from Jerusalem to find shelter there; and accordingly three cities were appointed (their names are not given in the text) to which such a person might flee and within their boundaries be safe. In any one of these a homicide might take refuge and remain secure till his case was decided. The decision was made by the elders of the refugee's city: in general, it may be supposed, by the legal authorities [elders] of the place where the homicide was committed. If he proved to be innocent, he was, of course, under the protection of the authorities of the city of refuge; but it is not said whether or when he was allowed to go home. If he was found guilty, the elders of his own city sent and fetched him, and he was putto death by the avenger of blood. The three cities referred to in Deut. xix. were, no doubt, on the west of the Jordan. The measure was preliminary or tentative, and the trans-Jordanic region, at that time—toward the end of the seventh century—loosely connected with the west (which was really the seat of the nation), was either not thought of, or was left for future legislation. At a later time, probably during or after the Exile, the sense of the ecclesiastical unity of the land grew stronger, and it was thought proper to set apart three cities on the east of the Jordan; or it may be that this step was merely the natural completion of the first measure.
Real Freedom only came after the death of the current High Priest. "the death of the high priest atones" (Mak. 11b), really shows that, according to the opinion current among the Rabbis, the chief factor was the death with its atoning power.
High Priesthood
Phannias ben Samuel (in Hebrew: פנחס בן שמואל Pinhas ben Shmuel) (c. 70 CE) was the last Jewish High Priest, the 83rd since Aaron. He was from the 'tribe' of Eniachin (priestly order Jachin) and did not originate from one of the six families from whom high priests had traditionally been chosen.[1] He was a leader of revolutionary forces and died during the destruction of Herod's Temple in 70 CE.
The High Priest at the time of Christ and led the plot to have Jesus Crucified was Joseph Caiaphas (c. 14 BCE – c. 46 CE), known simply as Caiaphas (Hebrew: יוֹסֵף בַּר קַיָּפָא; Greek: Καϊάφας) in the New Testament, was the Jewish high priest who, according to the gospels, organized a plot to kill Jesus. He famously presided over the Sanhedrin trial of Jesus.[1] The primary sources for Caiaphas' life are the New Testament and the writings of Josephus. Outside of his interactions with Jesus, little else is known about his tenure as high priest.
According to classical rabbinical authorities, the cities of refuge were not places of protection, but places where atonement was made;[12] Philo explained this principle as being based on the theory that an innocent man would never be chosen by God as the instrument of another man's death, and therefore those claiming refuge at these cities must have committed some sin before they had killed, for which their exile acts as an atonement.[36] Thus, these rabbinical authorities argued that if the perpetrator had died before reaching a city of refuge, their body still had to be taken there, and, if they had died before the high priest had, then their body had to be buried at the city of refuge until the high priest expired;[10] even if the perpetrator lived beyond the death of the high priest, the rabbinical authorities forbade them from holding political office.[12] Furthermore, since it was to be a place of atonement, the rabbinical authorities required that the perpetrator should always contemplate the fact that they had killed someone and should refuse any honour that the denizens of the city might grant them from time to time, unless the denizens persisted.[37]